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GOVERNING THE ECONOMY 





 The 2008 financial crisis provoked a debate over how we as a democratic society 
ought to govern the modern market economy.  Our prevailing response to this problem of 
economic governance has been to appeal either to free markets as self-regulating, self-
optimizing systems, or to technocratic rule by neutral experts.  Both these systems are 
appealing because of they claim to promote the public good free of the corruption, 
irrationality, conflict, and vagaries of democratic politics.  This project aims to overcome 
this skepticism to sketch an account of a democratic approach to economic governance, 
inspired by the thought and reforms of the Progressive Era.  
 I argue below that ideal of democracy should be understood as a matter of political 
agency: we are free in a democratic society insofar as we experience the challenges and 
rewards of self-governance. Appeals to markets and experts, from this standpoint, are 
doubly flawed.  Not only to they entrench threats to our individual and collective agency 
in the form of concentrated private power of firms, diffuse systemic power of markets, 
and the political authority of unaccountable experts; they also narrow the scope for 
citizens to experience genuine political agency.  This view of democracy as experience 
highlights prospects for thickening democratic practice that are often overlooked in 
conventional democratic theories focused on elections, legislatures, and representation.  
Instead, I suggest that democratic agency can be fostered in three ways: first, through a 
 iv 
reconstruction of regulatory agencies as sites of democracy; second, through an expansion 
of the role of local governments as another arena in which citizens can engage with the 
actual practice of governing; and third, through the broadening of economic policy 
discourses to encompass moral and political, not just technical concerns.     
 The closing chapters apply these themes to the policy and institutional debates 
surrounding financial reform.  Ultimately, this democratic approach to economic 
governance suggests a very different response to the financial crisis, pointing to the ways 
in which current institutions for economic governance can be reworked to foster, rather 
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We have frequently printed the word Democracy.  Yet … 
it is a word the real gist of which still sleeps, quite 
unawakened, notwithstanding the resonance and the 
many angry tempests out of which its syllables have come, 
from pen or tongue.  It is a great word, whose 
history…remains unwritten, because that history has yet 
to be enacted”  
 








1 ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN AN ANTI-POLITICAL AGE  
 
On a bright but bitterly cold January morning, Barack Hussein Obama 
ascended the steps of the Capitol balcony to take the oath of office as President of 
the United States. It was January 2009, and the country was in the depths of the 
worst economic disaster since the Great Depression. In September 2008, the 
collapse of the subprime mortgage market had wiped out Lehman Brothers, one of 
the biggest—and most heavily interconnected—investment banks in the world.  
Within days, credit had effectively frozen, and the United States was staring down 
the abyss of the largest financial and economic collapse since 1929.  And yet in the 
midst of the crisis, the mood in January 2009 was hopeful, even buoyant, with the 
promise of a new beginning.  Obama cast himself as speaking to the extraordinary 
socioeconomic challenges of the day. In his inaugural address, Obama outlined the 
challenges facing the country as a stirring call to action:  
Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and 
worked till their hands were raw so that we may live a better life.  
They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual 
ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or 
faction.  This is the journey that we continue today. … Starting 
today we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves, off, and begin again 
the work of remaking America.1  
 
                                            
1 Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009.   
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If there was a central theme to the Obama candidacy, it was this: that collectively, 
we as citizens of a democratic America could band together and remake our world, 
shape our destiny, and renew our sense of civic engagement and empowerment.2   
It was a powerful argument, and understandably resonant.  The economic 
crisis undermined decades of faith in the self-correcting and growth-promoting 
nature of financial markets.  But while new economic policies seemed called for, 
the loss of our ability as citizens to control and shape our own economic fate—and 
to hold our own government accountable and responsive—limited our ability to 
respond to changing economic conditions.  Obama’s appeal at the height of the 
2008-9 collapse was, correctly, to identify the economic crisis as fundamentally a 
problem of politics. Economic threats like instability, financial risk, 
unemployment, and opportunity are the central stuff of democratic politics, 
integral to realizing any aspiration to a just society and a meaningful life for all 
citizens.  Without a responsive and accountable political system, we lack the means 
to respond to the economic challenges of the day.  By calling upon the hope of 
renewed civic engagement, Obama suggested that we as citizens could both retake 
control of our government and, in so doing, respond to the severity of the 
economic crisis itself.   
                                            
2 See e.g., Barack Obama, remarks upon clinching the Democratic nomination for President, St. 
Paul, MN, June 3, 2008: “The journey will be difficult. The road will be long. I face this challenge 
with profound humility, and knowledge of my own limitations. But I also face it with limitless faith 
in the capacity of the American people. Because if we are willing to work for it, and fight for it, and 
believe in it, then I am absolutely certain that generations from now, we will be able to look back 
and tell our children that this was the moment when we began to provide care for the sick and good 
jobs to the jobless; this was the moment when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet 
began to heal; this was the moment when we ended a war and secured our nation and restored our 
image as the last, best hope on Earth. This was the moment - this was the time - when we came 
together to remake this great nation so that it may always reflect our very best selves, and our 
highest ideals.”  
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This vision of democratic renewal, however, evaporated relatively quickly.  
The debate over post-crisis financial reform policy is emblematic.  While the crisis 
itself provoked widespread popular anger against the malfeasance of Wall Street 
firms, growing inequality exemplified by extravagant CEO pay packages, and the 
failures of regulators themselves, the actual policy outcome of the debate over 
financial regulation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010,3 spurned these populist overtones.  The Act provided regulators at the 
Federal Reserve Bank, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other bodies 
with greater authority, resources, and a mandate to coordinate their regulatory 
activities and prevent future financial crises.  These policy prescriptions of Dodd-
Frank—as with the other major economic reform initiatives of the Obama 
administration—were not only a product of legislative politicking and 
maneuvering; rather they manifested an underlying theory of economy, democracy, 
and government.  Dodd-Frank exemplifies a classic New Deal-inspired faith in 
expert economic governance.  Financial markets are complex creatures upon which 
the rest of the economy depends; their management and optimization therefore 
cannot be left to the whims of the lay public, the direct commands of 
representatives in Congress, nor to the vagaries of market forces.  It is only 
through delegating greater authority to politically-insulated regulators, in this 
view, that the complexity of the modern economy can be appropriately managed 
for the public good.   
This managerial, expert-led approach seems on the surface to offer the best 
of all worlds.  Through fine-tuned expert management, we can ensure that we 
                                            
3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
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harness the benefits of modern financial innovations and the market economy, 
while mitigating its worst excesses.  These experts in turn operate in the name of 
the public good, without falling prey to the pressures and frictions of ordinary 
democratic politics.  Yet on both left and right, there is a continued, if not 
growing, unease about the degree to which such expert regulators can or should 
play such an authoritative role in the governing of the modern economy, however 
complex it may be.  These concerns speak to some very real economic and political 
dangers that come with the turn to expertise.  Consider the following instances.  
To address the threat of “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) financial firms like 
Lehman Brothers from sparking another economic crisis by their collapse, Dodd-
Frank creates an elite Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) comprised of 
the heads of the major financial regulatory agencies tasked with devising a formula 
to identify TBTF firms and regulate them accordingly. In the years since Dodd-
Frank’s passage, however, the FSOC has struggled to develop such a formula.  
How big is “too big”? What kinds of economic harms count—financial harms to 
the stock market, or downstream effects on employment?4 Deciding these questions 
implicates more than just technical considerations; moral and political judgments 
about the distribution of harms and protections are also at stake.  Yet these are 
judgments that regulators at the Fed or elsewhere are ill-suited to make, however 
expert they may be.  
Meanwhile, in the emphasis on expert judgment, our institutions for 
economic regulation have also been built to privilege centralized, expert-led 
institutions, systematically undermining the scope for democratic citizen 
                                            
4 See generally, Adam Levitin, “In Defense of Bailouts,” Georgetown Law Journal 99 (2011), 435-
514.  
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engagement and divesting citizens of meaningful roles in shaping financial policies.  
But despite—or arguably because of—such insulation, these technocratic 
institutions have just as often worked to serve industry over public interests. One 
key provision in Dodd-Frank institutes what is known as the Volcker rule, a ban 
on proprietary trading that attempts to prevent the kind of risky bets fueled the 
boom and collapse of mortgage-backed securities during the crisis.  But as 
regulators have worked to draft and implement the actual rule itself, industry 
groups have successfully lobbied aggressively to include a variety of exceptions that 
have neutered the impact of the rule.  By contrast, consumer and other advocacy 
groups pushing for a more aggressive rule have had a much harder time making 
their voices heard.5  Similarly, federal regulators prior to the crisis overruled the 
efforts by several local governments like the city of Oakland to address the 
growing predatory lending and foreclosure crisis before the collapse of the 
subprime mortgage market.6  The result was to leave lenders with a free hand, in 
the name of ensuring a uniform national scheme of lending regulations. Although 
the eventual crisis vindicated these early reform efforts by cities, Dodd-Frank and 
federal regulators have continued to trump such local initiatives.7 
The market economy is at the heart of many of the most central moral 
concerns we face as a society: concerns about distribution, welfare, opportunity, 
and the good life.  It is therefore also a central concern for us as citizens in a 
                                            
5 See Jesse Eisinger, “The Volcker Rule, Made Bloated and Weak,” New York Times Dealbook, 
February 22, 2012; Floyd Norris, “Bank Rules That Serve Two Masters,” New York Times, 
October 13, 2011.   
6 See e.g., American Financial Services Association v. City of Oakland, 34 Cal.4th 1239 (Cal. 
2005). 
7 Comptroller of the Currency, letter to Senator Thomas Carper, May 12, 2011 [on file with 
author].  
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democratic polity. Yet our contemporary institutions for economic governance are 
distrustful of the role of the citizen, keeping them at arm’s length, preferring 
instead the more efficacious machinations of the market system or expert 
regulation.   
It wasn’t always this way.  A century ago, financial crises were the central 
stuff of mass social movements.  In the midst of an industrializing economy 
afflicted by booming inequality and widespread social and economic dislocation, 
anger over the economic and political power of finance animated some of the 
largest mass social movements in American history.  For both the rural Populist 
movement of the late nineteenth century and the urban social reform Progressive 
movement of the turn of the century, finance served as a central villain against 
which reformers mobilized.  Finance, led by prominent elites like J. P. Morgan, 
represented the worst excesses of the new economy: incentivizing speculation and 
gambling; driving growing inequality as bankers expanded their growing wealth by 
hijacking and co-opting the use of other people’s money; corrupting the political 
process itself as these economic elites leveraged their wealth to influence 
legislatures and protect their own interests.  These mass movements advocated a 
variety of economic, social, and political reforms from redistribution to price 
controls to antitrust measures to the socialization of the financial system itself.  
They also shared a common conviction that it was through the mobilization and 
power of the people themselves that the economic and political domination of 
these elites would be broken.   
Though the specific proposals of these turn of the century reformers may 
not be directly applicable today, this ethic of seeking a specifically democratic 
response to the moral challenges of the market economy is instructive for us today.  
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In this project, I argue that instead of turning to neutral, expert regulators to 
optimally manage the market economy, we ought to look to our own capacities as 
democratic citizens. We the people must govern our own economy. To do so we 
must also expand our normative ideals of what democracy means and how it can 
be institutionalized. As such, this project does argue against the laissez-faire 
tradition of rejecting state regulation and favoring markets as self-correcting.  But 
the most central opponent in this project is the technocratic approach of 
responding to market failures through expert-led governance exemplified by 
Obama and the tradition of New Deal progressivism.  The following chapters 
develop a view of democratic economic governance building on four central 
arguments. 
First, although such economic policy debates are often caricatured as 
debates of “more” versus “less” state intervention in the free market, these debates 
are actually driven by a more nuanced clash between rival conceptions of economic 
governance.  These conceptions of economic governance combine two 
components: a moral view of freedom and the relationship between the state and 
the economy, and an institutional concern about protecting such systems of 
ordering the economy from the threat of corruption, special interest influence, or 
capture. The laissez-faire argument, therefore, is more than just a claim of freedom 
from all types of state interference.  Rather, it also rests on a view that markets are 
also less prone to capture by special interests because of their diffuse and 
decentralized nature.  This concern with corruption explains the resilience of 
laissez-faire thought, for the laissez-faire argument rests partly on an institutional 
sociology that critiques state institutions as prone to capture, while markets as 
decentralized aggregative systems are less prone to such special interest influence.  
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This dual nature of the laissez-faire argument also explains the brittleness of the 
technocratic argument against free markets. While it may be true that flaws and 
failures of market society call for greater state regulation, the case for such 
regulation too often rests on a faith that experts themselves are robust to 
corruption or special interest influence—a faith that has been shaken in recent 
decades among both liberals and conservatives.  This understanding of the debate 
between laissez-faire and technocratic views of economic governance points to the 
need for a third alternative view—a more democratic alternative that responds to 
both the limitations of free markets and of expert regulators.  
Second, markets and experts claim to act as apolitical, neutral, and rational 
modes of optimizing the economic order. The turn to markets and experts speaks 
to a deep-seated unease with the tumult, conflict, and disagreement endemic in 
ordinary democratic politics.  This unease motivates us to transfer more and more 
decisions outside of the realm of democracy to markets or experts.  But this appeal 
of markets and experts is illusory, obscuring realities of power, politics, and moral 
controversy that operate beneath the veneer of market-based or expert-led 
efficiency. Instead of responding to these concerns about democratic politics by 
narrowing its scope, we should instead seek ways to expand its vibrancy, making it 
more accessible and channeling democratic contest in more productive ways.   
Third, developing such a view of democracy requires that we expand our 
normative understanding of the ideal itself. I argue that we must view democracy 
not as the registering of preferences, the selection of representatives, or even simply 
deliberation over the common good.  Rather, all of these elements are components 
of a broader democratic commitment to expanding the capacities of citizens to 
engage in the actual experience of governing.  It is only when we possess the 
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political agency to engage in meaningful decision-making—and to live with and 
learn from the consequences of those decisions—that we can lay claim to the 
mantle of democracy.  
Fourth, we require a diverse array of institutional structures and conditions 
in order to realize this kind of democratic political agency. While elections, 
plebiscites, and legislatures have long had a pride of place in democratic theory, I 
suggest that thickening our democratic capacities and experience requires that we 
turn instead to front-line institutions of governance such as regulatory agencies and 
municipal governments.  These institutions lie at the interface between state and 
society, where the actual practice of devising final governmental policies and 
regulations takes place.  It is here that citizens can be engaged in a more 
meaningful and empowered mode of participation.   
The rest of this introduction elaborates each of these themes.  
 
Markets, experts, and citizens 
In the spring of 1945, Friedrich Hayek journeyed to the United States to 
give a hastily-arranged lecture tour arranged in light of the surprising and 
escalating success of his recently published critique of central planning, the Road 
to Serfdom.  After failing to even find a publisher in Europe, Hayek’s book—
particularly its abridged version in Reader’s Digest—became wildly popular.  
Conservative writers and activists appropriated Hayek’s argument in their own 
critique of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Yet Hayek himself was dismayed by 
this characterization of his work as an anti-government creed; his own view was in 
fact much more nuanced, including support for an extensive role for the state in 
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managing market downturns, investing in infrastructure, and providing forms of 
social insurance.8  Indeed, Hayek’s critique of the state and his defense of the 
market rested on a dual foundation: not just a commitment to a negative 
understanding of liberty as the freedom from interference, but also a preference for 
markets as epistemically superior institutions for organizing collective life.  
Centralized regulators, Hayek feared, could never possess all the necessary 
information to make socially optimal choices for allocating resources; it was only 
the diffuse and decentralized system of the market that possessed the capacity to 
aggregate and harness the multiplicity of local individual preferences and 
understandings in a coherent manner.9  Although at the time Hayek saw himself as 
part of an endangered minority of classical liberals eclipsed by the rise of 
Keynesianism and growing faith in the modern regulatory state, his ideas would go 
on to inspire the resurgence of laissez-faire thought through his influence on the 
next generation of conservative thinkers like Milton Friedman, and the ecology of 
free-market advocacy groups, businesses, and think-tanks.10  Hayek’s account also 
resonated with the kinds of concerns that animated pre-New Deal understandings 
of the markets, and critiques of early efforts to build economic regulatory 
                                            
8 Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012), 87-91.  
9 See e.g., Friedrich von Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt 
Leube, eds., The Essence of Hayek (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 211–24. 
10 See  generally, Burgin, The Great Persuasion, and Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The 
Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan (New York: WW Norton, 
2009). 
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institutions in domains such as labor, railroad and antitrust policy during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.11 
Hayek’s account distils a tradition of laissez-faire thought in American 
politics that bookended the New Deal era.  The laissez-faire view of economic 
governance, that economic order is best achieved through “free markets” 
untroubled by state intervention, has served as the primary intellectual critique of 
reformed or expanded state regulation of the economy.  As Hayek’s own account 
suggests, laissez-faire economic governance is not the kind of blanket rejection of 
the state or valorization of the market as it is often caricatured.  Rather, the idea of 
laissez-faire draws its force from two sources.  The first is a normative view of 
freedom as non-interference.  This commitment to negative liberty valorizes the 
autonomy of individuals to form contracts and make their own decisions free of 
external interference from other individuals or from the state.  The second is a 
particular concern that state political power can be co-opted to serve the purposes 
of particular interests rather than promoting the general welfare.  For laissez-faire, 
the commitment to negative liberty emerges in part as a bulwark against such 
corruption or capture.  
These moral and institutional concerns are what animate laissez-faire’s 
distrust of the state and preference for the market.  As a moral matter, the market 
seems to better track a normative commitment to unrestrained individual 
autonomy, whereas state power—beyond that which is minimally required to 
ensure property and contract rights and protect against external threats—poses a 
threat to such individual autonomy.  As an institutional matter, the ability of 
                                            
11 See e.g., Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era 
Police Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). 
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markets to aggregate information, allocate resources, and respond to changes in 
the costs, availability, and preferences over particular resources makes them more 
dynamic, adaptable, and ultimately robust to corruption or capture when 
compared to centralized political institutions like the state.  The market is thus a 
self-equilibriating, optimizing, and adaptable institution for managing economic 
order more effectively than relying on fallible and corruptible individual political 
leaders or policymakers.  In this way, laissez-faire represents a kind of anti-politics: 
the problem is not the existence of the state itself, but rather the proclivity of 
politics to tend towards corruption, inefficiency, and chaos.  By contrast a 
decentralized aggregative system like the market can absorb the myriad of 
individual desires and actions and produce socially optimal allocations.  
This multidimensional quality of the idea of laissez-faire explains its 
persistent impact as the driving force behind major periods of reform and 
advocacy.  The rejection of Progressive Era attempts to achieve minimum wages or 
workday regulations, for example, appealed not only to a narrower view of 
freedom, but also to the concern that expanded regulation might serve the partial 
and particular interest of a certain social class rather than the general welfare. 
Similarly, the turn to deregulation in the late twentieth century gained traction not 
only because of its appeal to the market, but also because of the growing concerns 
that the regulatory institutions of the New Deal state were prone to corruption, 
capture, inefficiency, and unaccountability.   
It was this very appeal to expert regulators that comprised the heart of New 
Deal and more contemporary efforts to expand economic regulation. In the late 
1930s, despite the ongoing Great Depression, a new generation of policymakers 
began to envision an unprecedented mastery over the vagaries of the market 
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economy.  Speaking at Yale University in 1938, James Landis gave what remains 
one of the most assertive defenses of the modern administrative and regulatory 
state.  A leading figure in Franklin Roosevelt’s brain trust and one of the chief 
architects of the newly-created Securities and Exchange Commission, which he 
would later chair, Landis outlined in his lectures a full-throated defense of this 
technocratic vision of economic governance.  The challenges of the modern 
industrial economy, for Landis, required new institutions to manage the vagaries of 
the market system; the market could not be relied on to produce a socially optimal 
economic order on its own. But Landis was equally critical of the “inadequacy” of 
traditional institutions of governance: neither Congress nor the courts possessed 
the knowledge or deliberative capacities to make such complex economic policies.12 
Such a task demanded the expert hand of regulators positioned in institutions like 
the SEC, insulated from the day-to-day pressures of democratic politics.  The 
professionalism, expertise, and transparency of regulatory policy would, according 
to Landis, be more than sufficient to ensure that the regulators employed their vast 
authority for the public good. 
Just as Hayek captured an idea of laissez-faire that manifested throughout 
the modern era as a critique of the state, Landis’ account captures in its most 
aggressive form the technocratic vision of economic governance, from Progressive 
Era thinkers like Charles Francis Adams to New Dealers like James Landis, to 
contemporary advocates of the regulatory state like Stephen Breyer and Cass 
Sunstein. This technocratic approach to economic governance embodies a 
commitment to a more active role for government in the economy: not just in 
                                            
12 James Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 70. 
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ensuring basic rights of property and contract, but also in correcting market 
failures, mitigating risks, and protecting vulnerable populations through public 
policies, social insurance schemes, and other kinds of regulation. As with laissez-
faire, the technocratic view of economic governance combines a moral and an 
institutional claim.  As a moral matter, technocratic economic governance often 
rests on a broader view of freedom as involving not only the protection from 
political or state interference, but also from other kinds of private or systemic 
coercion that may infringe on an individual’s autonomy.  From this standpoint, 
state intervention may in fact be freedom-enhancing.  As an institutional matter, 
the technocratic view doubts that disaggregated and decentralized institutions like 
the market can on their own yield socially optimal economic allocations and 
arrangements.  Rather, the public good requires the creation of specialized 
institutions where uniquely expert or talented policymakers can, through the 
judicious use of their knowledge and public-spiritedness, craft regulations so as to 
promote the public good.  This institutional vision calls for economic policy to be 
made through bodies that are centralized, expert-led, and politically-insulated, free 
to make policy on the basis of morally neutral scientific knowledge.   
Despite their opposition to the laissez-faire distrust of the state and 
valorization of markets, these technocratic thinkers share with laissez-faire a 
habitual unease with democratic politics.  Indeed, the appeal to expertise is in part 
a way to defend the substantive goals of government regulation of the market, 
while sidestepping the anxieties about democratic corruption, chaos, and 
unresponsiveness.  If governmental activity can be channeled through insulated, 
neutral, expert, and public-spirited regulators, the traditional concerns about 
dangers of political power can be addressed without having to resort to the laissez-
 15 
faire extreme of  ‘free markets’.  This shared unease with democratic politics, 
however, introduces a fundamental tension at the heart of the technocratic 
account.  On the one hand, technocratic economic governance draws its moral 
force from a critique of market society and an appeal to the importance of political 
institutions to promote the public good.  On the other hand, this distrust of 
ordinary democratic politics leads the idea of technocracy to commit to a 
particular institutional form for achieving economic order: the insulated expert 
regulator or elite policymaker.  As a result, technocratic economic governance is 
highly dependent on faith in expertise for its legitimacy.  Yet this faith is exactly 
what laissez-faire denies: the notion that individuals wielding political power can 
be reconciled with individual freedom and can act effectively, responsibly for the 
public good, rather than being captured or subverted by private interests.  For all 
its virtues, the idea of technocracy is therefore surprisingly brittle, for it is uniquely 
vulnerable to the criticisms of laissez-faire.  
It is therefore unsurprising that so much of the debate around economic 
governance in recent years has revolved around this basic clash between laissez-
faire and technocratic views of economic governance.  But these are not the only 
two possible approaches to the problem of managing the modern economy.  Even 
as New Dealers like Landis worked to realize their vision of economic governance 
through rational, neutral expertise, there remained a different reformist tradition, 
one that shared the technocratic critique of the market, but looked not to experts 
but to citizens as the solution. Writing not long before Landis’ own lectures, 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, a veteran and central intellectual figure of 
the Progressive movement, took the same starting point as Landis: that the severe 
economic crisis of the Great Depression called for some form of expansive policy 
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response.  But for Brandeis this challenge pointed not to the role of experts but 
rather to citizens.  Echoing Hayekian critiques of the aspiration to technocratic 
mastery, Brandeis warned that formulating the perfect rational economic policies 
would require “some measure of prophecy,” yet “man is weak and his judgment is 
at best fallible.”  But where for Hayek and laissez-faire critics such fallibility would 
be sufficient to turn back to the market as a preferred institution for economic 
governance, Brandeis turned instead to the ideal of democracy: democratic politics, 
for Brandeis, was crucial to allow for policy innovation, experimentation, and 
social learning over time.13  Not only was this the best institutional arrangement 
for yielding policy responses to the dangers of market society; it also represented a 
moral imperative for “only through participation by the many in their 
responsibilities and determinations of business can Americans secure the moral and 
intellectual development which is essential to the maintenance of liberty,” and thus 
remain “masters of their own destiny.”14  
Thus, where the technocratic vision responds to the problems of the market 
through centralized, expert-led, morally neutral policy processes, this democratic 
vision instead appeals to the idea of multiplying the sites and spaces for democratic 
policymaking, facilitating participation and innovation.  It also sees the problems 
of economic governance not just as matters of rational economic management or 
optimization, but also as deeply moral and political problems of hardship, 
dislocation, inequality, and disparities of power.  Similarly, this democratic 
approach suggests a view of freedom that, while sharing with the technocratic 
                                            
13 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 263 (1934) (J. Brandeis, dissenting), at 310-11. 
14 Liggett v. Lee, 283 U.S. 517 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting), at 580. 
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account the idea that state interference can be freedom-enhancing by mitigating 
harms emerging in the private and economic arena, goes still one step further 
through its commitment that such state action be the product of a fundamentally 
democratic process.  It is not enough that these policies promote a common good 
by responding to the harms of the market; these policies must themselves be 
constituted by the active engagement of citizens themselves.  
There are therefore three distinct approaches to economic governance: 
laissez-faire, technocratic, and democratic.  Laissez-faire economic governance 
emphasizes markets as self-optimizing institutions, to be left free of state 
interference as a way to avoid the dangers of corruption and unaccountable state 
authority.  Technocratic economic governance relies on insulated experts to 
develop market-optimizing policies.  This institutional structure allows technocrats 
to respond to the problems of markets while avoiding the perceived dangers of 
democratic politics. The third alternative of democratic economic governance 
offers a way to address the weaknesses of both laissez-faire and technocracy: it 
shares with laissez-faire a skepticism of expert authority, and with technocracy a 
critique of markets.  But unlike both laissez-faire and technocracy, this democratic 
approach responds to the problems of markets and state authority by seeking ways 
to expand the political capacities of citizens, empowering them to engage in the 
morally- and politically-charged decisions of economic policy.  This democratic 
view, therefore, is distinguished by its embrace of politics, in contrast to both 
markets and experts which seek to avoid the tumult of political disagreement by 
depoliticizing economic governance, moving it out of the domain of democratic 
politics into the domain of supposedly neutral and frictionless market forces or 
expert management.  
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A central theme of this project, therefore, is the recovery and development 
of this democratic vision as an alternative response to critiques of both the market 
and expertise.  Indeed, this cleavage between democratic and technocratic 
responses to the market has been a crucial one throughout economic reform 
movements, from the Progressive Era to the present.  One of the goals of this 
project is to bolster this democratic alternative to technocratic regulation.  
Mapping the debates over economic governance in this way highlights two 
important points.  First, economic governance is not just about normative ideals of 
freedom; it is a more nuanced comparative institutional question about what social 
institutions are more likely to be robust to corruption and to produce socially 
optimal decisions.  The appeal of both markets and experts lies in their proclaimed 
capacity to produce neutral, rational economic orderings free of the vagaries of 
democratic politics.  Yet at the same time, the technocratic account is on shaky 
ground because of its reliance on faith in expertise—a faith that is easily shaken.  
Second, if our task is to develop a more democratic alternative to both markets 
and experts, we need to do more than simply advert to the ideal of “the people”.  
We need instead to offer an institutionally-rich account of how democracy can 
produce effective economic governance, and do so in a way that is responsive to 
the citizenry, and less prone to corruption, capture, or subversion. The project of 
restoring a more democratic vision of economic governance is as much about 
defusing the laissez-faire appeal to markets as it is about challenging the more 
recent tradition of technocratic economic governance, which has for decades 
dominated efforts to respond to the problems of the market economy.  Such an 
effort must overcome the deep distrust and suspicion of democratic politics shared 
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by the laissez-faire and technocratic accounts—a distrust that has become 
increasingly entrenched in our popular discourse and politics.  
 
The false hope of anti-politics 
For mainstream reformers responding to the financial crisis, the failures of 
the market seemed like a final winning argument in defense of the modern 
regulatory state.  The persisting anxieties about regulation and expert 
accountability, for these reformers, is a product of our changing attitudes about 
the state.  Where Franklin Roosevelt inherited a robust debate from turn of the 
century critiques of modern industrial capitalism and reformists’ efforts to expand 
the role of government and social organization in response, Obama entered into a 
very different conversation, one that had come to revolve around the libertarian 
and conservative attack on the very idea of effective and accountable government 
action, alongside ongoing efforts to valorize the efficiency and desirability of free 
markets. “The question on the New Dealers’ minds, however naively they 
sometimes answered it, was how best to articulate social action and individual 
energy to promote the welfare of all,” writes historian Daniel Rogers.  “By 
contrast, Obama inherited four decades of public discussion in which the 
importance of society has steadily diminished in favor of individual choice, 
personal identities, markets in goods, and markets in selves. This time the ideas 
with the loudest megaphones came not from the solidaristic left but the libertarian 
right.”15  
                                            
15 Daniel Rogers, “‘Moocher Class’ Warfare” Democracy Journal (Spring 2012), 84-90, at 85. 
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By itself, this shift in background support for government between 1932 
and 2009 does not, however, fully explain the pervasive skepticism and unease 
with the appeal to economic expertise of the kind exemplified by Dodd-Frank. 
Rodgers—and many other critics of the limited vision of the Obama era response 
to the crisis—are right to cast the problem as a deeper matter of ideas, and they are 
right to point to a shift in the overarching ethos of the era, from a focus on 
innovating government responses to the failures of the market in the early New 
Deal to a focus on restraining government excess in the politics of post-Reagan 
America.  But this standard critique is misleading because it gives too little 
responsibility to the failures within the New Deal-inspired vision of government 
itself. Obama’s approach to the economic crisis, as with the New Dealers in whose 
footsteps he follows, is morally flawed in its own right, for it rests on a willful 
preference for expertise over democracy. The conservative critiques of the 
regulatory state do in fact pick up on a very real and legitimate concern over the 
accountability, responsiveness, and efficacy of such expert-driven regulation. In 
responding to the problems of an alien, threatening, uncontrollable market 
economy, we have turned to an equally alien, threatening, and uncontrollable 
system of expert regulation, too far removed from the control and agency of the 
people themselves to generate the kind of broad-based legitimacy needed to 
survive.  The financial crisis, then, did not only reveal weaknesses in the appeals to 
the self-correcting market.  It also revealed a broader, more disturbing pattern in 
contemporary politics: the degree to which even reformers on the left seem to 
distrust the basic idea of democracy itself.   
In the country that claims democracy as its birthright, it is remarkable how 
widespread and deep-seated a sense of democratic failure has become. In recent 
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years, hopes for social progress have come not from the democratic political 
system—where politicians and legislatures are held in nearly universal contempt—
but from just about every other avenue: appeals to the innovation of 
businesspeople and entrepreneurs; the wonders of the free market, privatization 
and deregulation; the promise of non-governmental civil society organizations, 
social entrepreneurs, or mega-philanthropies; the reliance on neutral, scientific 
expertise. From outsourcing and government contracting, to the valorization of 
social entrepreneurship as modes of collective problem-solving, we live in an era 
where it is private, business, and expert initiative, rather than the collective 
political capacities of us as citizens and groups, that seems to offer the most 
attractive route to managing and solving social problems.  The preference for 
experts and markets is just one manifestation of this broader pattern.  What all 
these diverse alternative modes of social reform share is a common distrust of 
democratic politics, and therefore a similar quest for depoliticized modes of 
addressing social problems. Democracy seems too unsophisticated to develop 
nuanced public policies, too subject to deadlock and hyper partisanship, too 
vulnerable to interest group politics and capture, too prone to incoherence and 
chaos. Elections are too unwieldy, too partisan; popular protests when they do 
take place are viewed with distrust as ill-conceived at best, and pathological at 
worst. 
This distaste for democratic politics is at the heart of the appeal of markets 
and experts as systems of economic governance.  Markets present themselves as 
natural forces to which we as individuals must adapt; they are driven by laws of 
nature beyond the reach of human agency.  This makes them apolitical—or even 
anti-political: immune to alteration, lobbying, or corruption, and therefore more 
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reliable as guarantors of social welfare.  Technocracy presents itself in a similar 
manner: by removing policy decisions from the reach of democratic politics, 
technocracy depoliticizes these issues, immunizes them from democratic contest, 
and in so doing achieves the necessary latitude to make socially-optimal policy 
decisions on the basis of rationality rather than politics.  In these accounts, 
democracy recedes into the background, at worst rejected outright; at best, 
relegated to the status of a distant authorizer or delegator of authority to the more 
effective system of free markets or regulatory agencies.   
But the appeal of markets and experts as more rational, effective organizers 
of the economy is ultimately illusory.  Markets are not neutral, frictionless 
optimizers of economic order; rather, they are domains of power and conflict, 
riven by inequalities in bargaining power, welfare, and position, and prone to all 
sorts of distortions and failures.  Similarly, technocratic policymaking is 
inextricably bound up in political and moral judgments that inevitably shape the 
application of supposedly neutral expertise.  Turning to markets and experts as our 
preferred modes of economic governance does not eliminate these concerns of 
power, politics, and morality; it submerges them from view, out of reach. This in 
turn undermines our ability to act as democratic citizens, and to address the very 
pathologies of markets and expertise in economic policymaking.   
Markets and technocracy sterilize economic governance, removing it from 
the scope of our collective agency.  This makes their failures particularly difficult 
to undo, overcome, or revise.  It is no wonder we tend to view the market as a 
force of nature, prone to tempests and shocks that we must simply weather.  Nor is 
it a surprise that the technocratic state is so easily vilified as an alien imposition.  
Both market forces and technocratic regulation are the product of rules, laws, and 
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systems that we as political actors have sanctioned, but we have done so in ways 
that deliberately removes these systems from our own control, out of a distrust of 
the chaos and corruption that is likely to result from such political involvement in 
the managing of the economy.  By cordoning off more and more policy space away 
from the reach of either democracy or politics, the laissez-faire and technocratic 
approaches arrogate ever more authority to a set of institutions held at arms-length 
from ordinary channels of democratic politics: the market, and the expert 
regulatory agency.  It also over time contributes to an accelerating emaciation of 
the domain of democratic politics, as the central issues of political debate are 
increasingly reallocated from the domain of democratic decision-making to the 
domain of the neutral, optimizing market, or the realm of technocratic expertise.  
Caught between the anti-politics of the ‘free market’ and the anti-politics of 
technocratic regulation, it is little wonder that our received conceptions of 
democratic vibrancy have little traction in contemporary politics and discourse.  As 
Dana Villa laments, “what can ‘the public’ and political institutions be in a world 
so dramatically constrained by the imperatives of the global marketplace and the 
ubiquity of bureaucratic hierarchy and bureaucratic process?”16  Put another way, 
how can we have democracy, in any meaningful sense of the term, in a complex 
modern society driven by the imperatives of the market, or managed through the 
insulated authority of the regulatory bureaucracy?   
The biggest challenge to envisioning a more democratic approach to 
economic governance is overcoming this pervasive sense of impossibility. Critics of 
democratic politics tend to compare a particularly non-ideal account of democratic 
                                            
16 Dana Villa, Public Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 25.   
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politics with a rosy view of democracy’s alternatives—whether it is the free market 
or the virtuous expert regulator. While the current weaknesses of democratic 
functioning—from disparities in political voice and representation to defects in the 
basic electoral system of voting, campaign financing, and the like—cannot be 
ignored, these limitations should compel us not to abandon or restrict democratic 
politics, but to expand and revive it.  The failures of contemporary democracy are 
the results of a particularly emaciated set of democratic institutions and practices; 
absent the kind of institutional support and structure needed to foster effective and 
meaningful democratic engagement, it is no wonder that democratic politics seems 
unproductive and ineffective.  Democracy, for all its failings, ultimately offers 
greater hope for responsiveness, adaptability, and accountability.  
But to realize this hope, democracy must be understood not as the 
transmission of citizen preferences through elections, but rather as a set of 
practices and institutions that expand our capacities as individuals and collectives 
to remake our world through the common project of engaging in politics. Too 
often both critics and proponents of democratic revival rest on mostly 
conventional understandings of democracy as requiring the transmission of 
individual preferences through elections of representatives or policymakers, who 
are then empowered to act in accordance with the public good.  This basic 
electoralist understanding of democracy has its strengths.  It describes a good deal 
of the modern experience of democracy, and it points towards several important 
avenues for democratic reform, such as campaign finance restrictions and 
combating voting rights violations.  But it also overlooks the wider range of 
institutional forms that can help contribute to a vibrant democratic polity. 
Democracy relies not only on elections, but on other sites of democratic action, 
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including the very regulatory agencies that are at the heart of many of the anxieties 
over the modern regulatory state.   
 
Democracy as experience 
The impulse to sterilize democratic politics by appeal to markets and 
expertise picks up on a widespread latent anxiety about democracy: that relying on 
the rule of the people may be incoherent, chaotic, prone to the passions of the 
multitude.  This is a long-standing anxiety about democracy.  Indeed, recent efforts 
to reimagine the scope and effectiveness of democracy have focused on the 
epistemic qualities of democratic governance, finding ways that the collective 
wisdom of the crowd can be harnessed to supplement, complement, and even rival 
the supposed epistemic strengths of the free market or technocratic expertise.17  But 
I argue for a broader and thicker view of democracy, not as the generation of 
information, but rather as the fostering of the experience of governing.  
Where many other contemporary efforts at democracy reform emphasize 
the creation of deliberative, collaborative, and transparent governmental 
processes,18 this focus on democracy as experience sees the key feature of 
democracy is not the aggregation of individual preferences or the expression of a 
unified collective will, but rather its capacity for fostering ongoing political contest, 
debate, and the development of ideas and politics over time. The vibrancy of such 
                                            
17 See e.g., David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); Helene Landemore and Jon Elster, eds., Collective Wisdom: Principles and 
Mechanisms (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
18 See e.g., James Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public 
Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).   
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a democracy is determined by the degree to which citizens can directly engage in 
and experience the challenges, difficulties, and rewards of collectively determining 
their own fate. Rather than displacing the real business of governing to seemingly 
better institutions of markets or expertise, this view of democracy would instead 
focus on expanding the opportunities for citizens to experience self-rule—and in so 
doing, expand their capacities for moral judgment and learning over time.  This 
approach then does not focus on getting democratic politics to produce the “right” 
policy answers; rather it focuses on empowering us as citizens to govern ourselves, 
to debate our visions of what a good society looks like—and equally importantly 
to face and learn from mistakes we might make.   
This focus on the experience of democracy points towards a substantive set 
of concerns for public policy.  In this view, the biggest moral threats in a 
democratic society are those practices and arrangements that undermine the 
capacities and powers of citizens to be active political agents: the concentrated 
private power of firms who can dominate individuals in the economy; the diffused 
system of the market that can narrow one’s life opportunities and prospects; the 
specter of an unresponsive and unaccountable state itself.  All of these types of 
power create challenges to the idea that citizens should be the  primary agents in 
shaping their own economic and political destiny.  
More importantly, the idea of democracy as experience also implies a 
participatory view of democratic politics, underscoring the value of institutional 
structures that can make participation more possible, and productive. Without the 
ability to act—whether by proposing policies, sharing in implementation, or 
initiating challenges to existing practices—citizens cannot meaningfully partake in 
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the practice of self-government.19  This participatory ideal is much maligned.  But 
as Carole Pateman argues, “neither the demands for more participation, nor the 
theory of participatory democracy itself, are based, as is so frequently claimed, on 
dangerous illusions or on an outmoded and unrealistic theoretical foundation.  We 
can still have a modern, viable theory of democracy which retains the notion of 
participation at its heart.”  To fail to achieve this is not indicative of democracy’s 
failings, but is rather a “failure of the political and sociological imagination” of 
democratic theorists.20  Equally importantly, this kind of direct participation in the 
practice of political judgment is necessarily contestatory; it will not necessarily nor 
should it ideally produce a genteel consensus among participants. Without some 
form of public discussion, debate, and judgment, such political action would be 
reduced to simple exercises of power.   Such debate must necessarily involve 
disagreement, passion, and argument, but it provides a route towards gradual 
emergence of considered judgments and common understandings through debate 
and experiment.21  
A vibrant democracy is thus one that facilitates, structures, and channels 
political disagreement in productive ways.  The central problematic for democratic 
theory, then, is not so much the problem of disagreement, but rather the problems 
                                            
19 See e.g. Patchen Markell, “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Arche, and Democracy,” American 
Political Science Review, 100:1 (2006), 1-14. 
20 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), 111. 
21 See e.g. Brian Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 86-196. 
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of demobilization, sclerosis, and imbalances of political power.22 The “most 
fundamental threat to democratic political activity,” therefore, “lies in the loss of 
responsiveness to events: the erosion of the contexts in which action makes 
sense.”23  Responding to these problems of demobilization, depoliticization, and 
disempowerment requires a reworking of democratic institutions so that they work 
particularly to catalyze and foster political action.  Sustaining citizen engagement 
with politics requires that we “care for the public world,” that we “create and 
preserve a set of laws, institutions, and public spaces that make active citizenship 
possible.”24  
What does this vision of a participatory, contestatory democratic political 
agency look like in practice? How can it be realized? Overcoming the anxieties of 
democratic dysfunction requires more than a theory of democracy; it also requires 
a concrete vision of how these normative ideals can be achieved.  The account of 
democratic political agency explored in this project suggests that meaningful 
democracy requires open moral debate, contestation, and judgment.  This in turn 
suggests that we need institutions to house and foster this discussion, to enable 
citizens to engage and to make such contestation productive. The ability of both 
associations and individuals to engage in meaningful democratic participation 
depends on the institutional and discursive context in which policies are decided; 
changes to these contexts can magnify the abilities of citizens and associations to 
                                            
22 William Simon, “Three Limitations of Deliberative Democracy,” in Stephen Macedo, ed., 
Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 49-57, at 52. 
23 Markell, “The Rule of the People,” 12. 
24 Villa, Public Freedom, 347. 
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engage and thereby experience and exercise real political power. It is exactly these 
kinds of spaces for democratic political action that free market and technocratic 
frameworks of economic regulation seek to eliminate by creating a distance 
between the impulses of the lay public and the actual governing of the economy.  
This gap between the role of citizens on the one hand and the actual business of 
economic policymaking on the other must instead be narrowed, allowing citizens 
to participate not only as bearers of preferences and some local knowledge, but 
also as sustained and ongoing agents in the task of policymaking.   
 
Regulation and democratic political agency 
The need to create spaces for citizens to engage in this experience of 
policymaking suggests that we look beyond the traditional focal points of 
democratic theory on elections and legislatures.  In fact, much of the actual 
practice of contemporary governance takes place outside of the electoral-legislative 
arena, in what we might term “front-line” institutions of governance—regulatory 
agencies, local-level bodies, and the like.  These regulatory institutions are more 
traditionally seen as merely technical domains of implementing already-settled 
legislative judgments.  But despite the central focus on legislatures, it is in these 
bodies that the actual practice of devising rules, implementing them, adjudicating 
disputes, and revising these rules in light of changed conditions takes place.  
Contemporary democratic theory either ignores or misunderstands these 
front-line institutions of regulatory governance.  First, many theories of democracy 
simply ignore or sidestep the domain of regulation and policy implementation.  But 
empirically, there is more to the practice of democracy than electoral and 
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legislative politics; as such democratic theories that ignore the regulatory state are 
at best incomplete, and at worst, inconsistent to the degree that the dynamics of 
regulation undermine values of democratic participation, equality, and 
contestation.  Second, other accounts accept the central role of regulatory 
institutions as a threat to democracy, but a tragic one, a necessity in a complex 
modern society where generalist legislatures have no choice but to delegate 
extensive authority to technical regulatory institutions.  On this account, genuine 
democracy is an ideal of an earlier era, unsuited for the modern world of economic 
and technological complexity and mass nation-states—a world that demands 
expert-driven and rationalized policymaking.  This turn to bureaucracy may be a 
progressive modernization of government, or a fatalistic trap of modernity where 
government must necessarily function in a routinized and bureaucratized manner 
divorced from ideals of self-government. Finally, a large group of scholars and 
practitioners see the tension between regulation and democracy as real, but as 
largely resolved: regulatory agencies are reconciled with the ideals of democracy 
because they are subjected to oversight be elected officials, procedures that 
encourage deliberation, opportunities for citizens to provide input, deliberate, or 
collaborate on agency policies.   To the extent that regulatory agencies pose a 
problem for democracy, then, the root of the problem lies in the “core” domains of 
democratic politics: background disparities in political organization, or failings in 
the electoral, representative, or legislative processes.   
By contrast, I argue in this project that securing the moral value of 
democracy as experience requires that we engage more directly with these 
institutions of regulatory governance—and that these institutions offer an as-yet-
unrealized potential as sites for participatory, contestatory democratic politics.  
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These institutions offer a key arena in which the ideal of democratic political 
agency can be realized, where the democratic agency of citizens can be fostered, 
catalyzed, multiplied.  Agencies can provide institutional spaces that are a 
“continuation of the public’s and the legislature’s broader process of reasoning 
about what we should do.”25  As institutions tasked with the development and 
implementation of specific policies, regulatory agencies can serve as a unique 
“nexus of democracy and governance,” creating spaces for citizens to engage 
directly in policy formulation and implementation in a way that is difficult in 
context of traditional democratic institutions of elections and legislatures.26  
Regulatory agencies can potentially serve as an enhancer of democratic self-
governance, offering a more robust experience of participation, deliberation, and 
the empowerment of all affected interests.27  But these regulatory institutions as 
currently constituted to not yet act as spaces for such democratic participation.  To 
do so, they must be reformed to better facilitate the democratic political agency of 
citizens themselves. There are four conditions that enable this kind of democratic 
political agency.   
First, the ability of citizens to mobilize and engage in democratic politics 
depends crucially on having a focal point, or target for such mobilization.  Without 
a sense of where to voice a claim or challenge an action, it is difficult to generate 
citizen engagement. This suggests that the channels of political authority in 
                                            
25 Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press 2002), 13.  
26 See Chris Ansell, Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-4.  
27 Mark Warren, “Governance-Driven Democratization,” Critical Policy Studies 3:1 (April 2009), 
3-13. 
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economic governance must be legible, not hidden away, and consolidated rather 
than fragmented into a complex and hard-to-navigate ecology of institutions.   
Second, these institutions must have sufficiently broad powers to actually 
respond to the claims made by citizens. This capacity to respond is an important 
factor in generating meaningful participation; the engagement of citizens depends 
in part on the likelihood that mobilization will produce a response—and on the 
presence of an institutional focal point or arena against which mobilization can 
crystallize, take place, and make claims. 
Third, these institutions of governance must be restructured to foster, 
enable, and facilitate empowered participation by citizens, whether through 
procedural requirements for participatory policymaking, decentralization, or both.  
Further, such participation must be meaningful, and take place throughout the life-
cycle of policymaking.  Rather than simply providing input into a fundamentally 
elite- or expert-driven policy process, citizens must have the powers to initiate 
claims, contest decisions, monitor and facilitate implementation, and revise policies 
in the future.   
Fourth, this participatory engagement must be structured to embrace 
political disagreement and moral judgment.  Rather than sterilizing or 
depoliticizing the issue at hand, democratic institutions must find ways to engage 
the moral heart of the issues, engage citizens at this level, balance the moral and 
the technical dimensions of policy debates, and structure citizen engagement so as 
to cultivate productive contest and moral judgment.   
These conditions for democratic political agency can be achieved in front-
line institutions of regulation and governance.  In contemporary American 
democracy, these institutions are especially prevalent in two domains: national 
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regulatory agencies exercising delegated power from Congress on the one hand, 
and local level governmental bodies created by state charters on the other. Where 
regulatory agencies offer untapped spaces for democracy that have expansive 
authority but insufficient channels of participation, local governments tap into a 
deep tradition of grassroots democratic aspiration, but lack meaningful 
institutional powers to make this participation effective and meaningful. 
Thus, regulatory agencies, normally seen as the bastion of apolitical 
expertise, can in fact serve as a potentially transformative institutional site for this 
kind of democratic political agency, if appropriately reformed.  These agencies 
already possess expansive powers to devise, implement, and revise rules.  But their 
authority that is often too fragmented and illegible to the general public, lacking in 
sufficient channels for meaningful participation, and exercised through an overly 
apolitical, morally neutral discourse for policy judgments.  These features of the 
regulatory state stem from the traditional view of regulatory bodies as tasked with 
the mere implementation of already-settled normative policy judgments, located 
downstream from the more politicized domains of elected branches of the 
legislature or the executive. Instead, we should reform regulatory agencies sites of 
democratic participation.  Regulatory agencies are exactly the right place for this 
kind of participation for it is in these front-line institutions that much of the 
practice of political judgment in modern policymaking takes place.  It is in 
regulatory agencies that general precepts in legislation are clarified, refined, and 
applied to particular policy contexts—and where these policies are often contested 
and revised on an ongoing basis. The regulatory state should be reconceived as an 
expansion of our collective capacities to respond dynamically to a range of modern 
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harms from the decentralized market to the economic, social and ecological risks of 
complex technology to newly threatening concentrations of private power. 
Similarly, local-level governance institutions like municipal governments 
offer a unique potential space for fostering democratic political agency.  Where 
national regulatory agencies possess expansive but insufficiently participatory 
authority, local governments have the inverse problem: valorized as bastions of 
grassroots participation, but in fact lacking in the capacities to make such 
participation meaningful. Indeed, while localism has often been a touchstone of 
democratic theories, it is surprising how little of this aspiration translates into 
meaningful democratic possibility.  On the one hand, the local is treated as a form 
of market choice: citizens engage with the local as consumers, moving to different 
localities to fulfill their preferences for space, public goods, and the like. On the 
other hand, the local can be overly romanticized, as a bounded and intrinsic 
community, divorced from national and regional concerns.  Moreover, in practice, 
local government institutions are severely hampered in their ability to make public 
policies.  By contrast, the focus on democratic political agency would suggest 
empowering and restructuring local governments to expand their powers, facilitate 
participation within them, and integrate local policymaking with national-scale 
dynamics.   
 
Chapter outline 
The following chapters explore these themes, drawing on the intellectual 
history of debates over economic regulation, contemporary normative theory, and 
debates in public law.  Through these excursions into history and law, the 
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following chapters attempt to give clarity and concreteness to the abstract 
aspirations for democratic economic governance.  These chapters also make 
recurring reference to debates over financial regulation as a running example, 
where these divergent views of laissez-faire, technocratic, and democratic economic 
governance have been articulated, tested, and given voice through public policy. 
Much of the debate from 2009-10 for example pitted laissez-faire understandings 
pushing for deregulation against technocratic vision calling for greater insulated 
expert oversight.  What was often missing in this debate is a version of the more 
democratic understanding of economic governance, which emphasizes a more 
substantive vision of economic reordering achieved through participatory 
mobilization.  Indeed, financial regulation also provides an especially difficult case 
for aspirations to democratic economic governance.  Although finance has 
historically been one of the primary villains for waves of economic reform 
movements, it is also a domain that seems so overwhelmingly complex and critical 
that an appeal to markets or experts may be more prudent than to entrust its 
oversight to lay citizens. If the central challenge for democratic economic 
governance is to imagine a way for democratic participation to respond effectively 
to the problems of the market and the regulatory state—when both markets and 
expertise can lay claim to attractive arguments for their epistemic superiority and 
robustness to corruption, capture, or inefficiency—this challenge seems especially 
difficult in context of financial reform. 
Part I outlines the dynamics and limitations of laissez-faire and technocratic 
governance.  Chapter 2 examines the politics and discourse of the financial 
regulation debate in the Obama era.  This exploration highlights the degree to 
which our current economic policy debates are dominated by a binary clash 
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between laissez-faire and technocratic visions of economic governance, and the 
degree to which the long-term aspirations for a more just and democratic economy 
depend on developing a more robust moral foundation than the kind offered by 
the technocratic vision.  The problem of financial regulation—like other similar 
policy and institutional reform debates—is thus not just a matter of technical 
policy design; it is also fundamentally a challenge at the level of ideas, of how we 
conceive of, understand, and seek to remake our political economic order.  
The relative supremacy of this technocratic view of economic governance, 
however, itself is a product of a long historical trajectory—and represents only one 
possible tradition of economic reform politics.  The origins of our modern 
discourses and institutions of economic governance can be traced to the rich 
normative and institutional debates of the Progressive Era from 1880-1920.  These 
reformers took as their central challenge the task of overcoming laissez-faire 
political thought by building new movements for economic reform and democratic 
renewal.  Chapter 3 examines the dynamics of laissez-faire thought and the 
Progressive attack on laissez-faire.  In this chapter, I argue that the laissez-faire 
thinkers of this period espoused the nuanced normative and institutional view of 
markets as both domains of freedom and as institutions that, unlike state actors, 
possessed a superior robustness to capture and corruption: while legislatures could 
be co-opted by special interests, diffuse markets could not. Progressive Era critics 
exploded this laissez-faire view through a powerful critique of the market as a 
system of power, coercion, and pervasive social harm.  The challenge for these 
reformers was to find a way to respond to the dangers of the new market economy 
through political institutions that were nevertheless robust to the kind of capture 
and corruption that laissez-faire thought warned against.  The result of this 
 37 
ferment was to seed multiple traditions of economic reform: not only through the 
creation of new expert-led regulatory bodies, but also through the democratic 
appeal to the power of the people to hold both markets and states accountable to 
the public good. 
Of these two Progressive traditions, it is the technocratic one that came to 
prominence over the rest of the twentieth century.  Chapter 4 traces the rise, 
critique, and fall of this technocratic approach to economic governance. At its 
height in the New Deal, this technocratic aspiration sought to make good on 
Progressive critiques of the market, resolving market instabilities while avoiding 
the same concerns of political corruption and chaotic democratic politics through 
the deployment of rational, scientific expertise.  But as faith in this expertise waned 
in the later twentieth century, the regulatory state underwent waves of reform 
through shifting currents in modern administrative law, each of which struggled to 
preserve the effectiveness and immunity to corruption of technocratic regulation.  
The image of technocratic governance as rational and effective proved an illusion, 
succumbing to the resurgence of laissez-faire critiques during the late twentieth 
century.   
The rise and fall of the technocratic vision as a way of responding to the 
dangers of the market economy creates the dilemma faced by contemporary 
reformers in economic governance debates.  The dislocations and threats of market 
society remain matters of central public concern, but the preferred mode of 
response—the appeal to insulated expert regulation—no longer commands the 
faith as it did at the height of the New Deal, subject instead to a pervasive anxiety 
about the corruption and capture of regulatory authority.  If the solution to the 
problems of the market is a turn to technocratic governance, but such technocratic 
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institutions are themselves seen as reservoirs of unaccountable or captured 
authority, then this places contemporary critics of the market in a difficult 
position.  Yet as the brief historical account in Part I suggests, this technocratic 
vision is only one possible manifestation of the myriad of ideas generated out of 
the Progressive critique of the market.  Many of these critics turned not just to 
expertise but also to the renewed political power of citizens themselves as a way to 
address the dangers of the market while also avoiding the risks of special interest 
influence and capture.  Part II turns to these alternative threads to develop an 
account of democratic economic governance. 
In Chapter 5, I argue that the central motivating concern in economic 
governance is one of agency. Economic policy issues are not simply matters of 
inefficiency or market failure.  The modern market economy is morally troubling 
not just because of its distributional consequences, but because it creates powerful 
private actors such as firms and diffuse systemic market forces that seem to defy 
our ability as citizens to contest, challenge, and revise.  The problem of the 
economy is fundamentally, then, a problem of political agency. This argument 
suggests that in order to respond to the threats of the market economy in a manner 
consistent with democratic ideals, we need an institutional structure for regulation 
that expresses and facilitates, rather than limits, the political agency of citizens 
themselves to engage in self-government.  The most compelling moral defense of 
the modern regulatory state is that it expresses our collective will as democratic 
citizens in responding to these threats of private and market power.   
But as Chapter 6 suggests, this claimed link between democratic citizens and 
the regulatory state is more of an illusion than a reality.  Contemporary 
administrative law claims to have reconciled the tension between democracy and 
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regulation, casting the regulatory state as precisely such an expression of the 
collective democratic will.  But the most prominent attempts to theorize this link 
between democratic agency and the regulatory state ultimately position citizen 
action at too far a remove from the actual exercise of regulatory authority.  In 
practice, administrative law thus papers over rather than actually resolves this 
fundamental tension between a commitment to democratic self-rule on the one 
hand, and the use of regulatory agencies to address problems of a complex market 
economy on the other.  These debates in contemporary administrative law do, 
however, suggest elements of a more democratic regulatory state, particularly 
pointing to the need to rethink regulation along more participatory and 
contestatory lines.  
Chapter 7 then develops the conceptual foundations for a more democratic 
approach to economic governance.  In contrast to the technocratic appeal to 
expert-derived economic regulations developed through insulated institutions that 
bear the sanction—but not the participation—of citizens, this chapter argues that 
we ought to adopt a different understanding of both the concept of democracy and 
the concept of regulation.  I argue here that democracy should be understood as 
fundamentally a matter of experience in the practice of self-government.  This view 
suggests that to achieve democracy as experience, we need institutions that do 
more than simply consult with or gather the input of citizens.  Rather, we need 
institutions that can place citizens in situations where they are engaged in the 
actual challenges of making judgments, implementing policies, learning from the 
repercussions of their decisions, and then revisiting those judgments iteratively over 
time.  This view of democracy in turn suggests that regulation be understood not 
as the technical implementation of already-determined political judgments, but 
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rather as the domain where this kind of actual governing takes place—where 
general principles are translated into policies in particular circumstances. Drawing 
on the thought of some of the more radical Progressive Era democratic thinkers 
like John Dewey and Louis Brandeis, this chapter then develops principles with 
which we can guide the reform of regulatory institutions to function as such sites 
of democratic experience.  In particular, this chapter suggests that these institutions 
must: first be organized to provide focal points as targets for citizen mobilization; 
second, possess the authority to respond to these claims; third, empower citizens to 
engage in governing decisions alongside experts; and fourth, allow these judgments 
to take place through moral, and not merely technical, discourses and debates.   
With this conceptual framework in hand, the book returns in Part III to the 
kinds of concrete institutional and policy questions that began the inquiry to trace 
what this democratic alternative might look like, using the debates around 
financial reform as an ongoing example. Chapter 8 examines how this democratic 
approach would require a more participatory structure to the modern regulatory 
state, as a space in which citizens could experience the challenges of governance, 
and through which these more moralized debates can be productively channeled.  
Again, the recent politics of financial reform provide an illustrative example of 
how this democratic approach would suggest a different institutional reform 
agenda than the one pursued.  Chapter 9 provides a parallel argument in context 
of local government reforms, suggesting how these institutions can be made more 
effective democratic forums, and using the debates over financial reform and 
predatory lending as an example.  
Chapter 10 develops the theme of moral judgment in economic 
policymaking.  This chapter argues that, despite the efforts of technocratic thinkers 
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to cast economic policy as a matter of neutral expertise, economic judgments are 
inextricably moral judgments, and thus ought to be engaged as political decisions 
through a process that better integrates citizens and experts.  Using the examples of 
attempts to address the problems of TBTF firms and speculative derivatives, this 
chapter shows that viewing these issues in a narrow technical register actually gives 
rise to pathological and overly formalistic policy approaches.  By contrast, a 
repoliticization of these debates as moral and political judgments unlocks a 
broader institutional palette of potential responses.  This impulse towards moral 
avoidance also helps explain the drive away from the kind of democratic 
institutions explored in Chapters 8 and 9. Technocratic governance depoliticizes 
these issues and delegates them to expert-led institutions.  Repoliticizing these 
policy debates must come with a similar shift to more democratic institutions for 















2 EXPERTISE AND DEMOCRACY IN FINANCIAL REFORM  
After the immediate urgency of the 2008-9 financial collapse began to fade, 
the policy conversation shifted to the longer-term question of how to reform the 
financial system to prevent such catastrophic crises from recurring. Much of the 
debate revolved around technical matters such as incentives for financial firm 
executives to prevent excessive risk-taking; improvements to regulatory models of 
financial markets; capital requirements for banks and risk-mitigating regulations 
on complex securities trading.1  The debate also generated widespread interest and 
mobilization, not only by financial sector firms trying to stave off new regulations, 
but also by citizens’ groups advocating in favor of even more aggressive proposals.  
The battle for financial reform pitted proponents of expanded oversight in the 
Obama administration against conservative critics of regulation.  But it also 
highlighted a tension among reformers themselves: between those in the 
administration calling for an expansion of expert regulatory oversight, and a 
number of dissident voices proposing more radical and structural constraints on 
the powers and size of financial firms themselves.  The financial reform debate 
became a key battleground for and window into deeper debates over the future of 
American democracy and economy.  What role should finance play in sustaining a 
productive economy? How could financial firms be regulated effectively: through 
                                            
1 See e.g. Joseph Stiglitz, “The Financial Crisis of 2007-8 and Its Macroeconomic Consequences,” 
in Stephany Griffith-Jones, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E Stiglitz, eds., Time for a Visible 
Hand: Lessons from the 2008 World Financial Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press 2010), 
19-41.  
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market incentives, or through expert regulatory oversight, or through more 
structural constraints on financial firms?   
In the end, it was the technocratic view of financial regulation as problem of 
expert macroeconomic management that carried the day.  As a result, the primary 
change in the post-crisis system of finance has not been in the structure and 
dynamics of industry itself, but rather in the mode of oversight.  Dodd-Frank 
focuses much of its attention on expanding the authority, resources, and 
coordination of technocratic financial regulatory agencies.  The underlying theory 
of reform animating the bill is that the problem of financial regulation is best 
resolved by appeal to neutral, insulated, expert regulators who are given sufficient 
authority, resources, and coordination to effectively manage the modern financial 
system.2  But this legislation has not resolved the debate over how to handle “too-
big-to-fail” (TBTF) financial firms.  Over four years after the crisis, analysts are 
already warning of the threat of a repeated financial collapse and the persisting 
“systemic risk” posed by “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions, while anxieties 
persist about the efficacy of regulatory agencies themselves.   
This chapter explores the discourse of the financial reform debate to show 
how this technocratic response to the problem of TBTF firms emerged out of a 
discursive framing of the problem of financial regulation in distinctly technocratic 
terms.  For most mainstream reformers, the very problem of financial reform was 
intrinsically a matter of expert management to resolve market failures, excessive 
risk, and to protect consumer welfare.  More radical proposals of structural limits 
                                            
2 See generally, K. Sabeel Rahman, “Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, 
and Institutional Experimentation in the 2010 Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statues,” Harvard 
Journal on Legislation 48 (2011), 555-590.    
 45 
on TBTF firms, by contrast, were couched in a different discourse that emphasized 
not the role of expert management of technical matters like systemic risk, but 
rather more democratic concerns of holding the power of private firms to account.  
This contrast—and the relative dominance of the technocratic vision—captures 
neatly the broader problem of how our contemporary views of economic 
governance are overly oriented around the technocratic, to the marginalization of 
the democratic.  
 
Financial reform as risk management and consumer protection 
In hindsight, the 2008 crisis itself was caused by the rise of new financial 
activities that magnified economic risks outside the purview of the regulatory 
architecture inherited from the New Deal era and altered significantly during the 
deregulatory turn in the 1980s and 1990s. During the 2000s, subprime mortgage 
lending—the offering of mortgages to borrowers to would not traditionally qualify 
as safe loans—increased dramatically. So too did the increase in complex new 
financial securities such as credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations. 
These securities packaged and repackaged mortgage loans into new assets that 
were then sold, repackaged, and sold again. Securities dealers argued that this 
effectively distributed the risk of potential declines in the value of subprime 
mortgages, while offering safe assets for a wide range of investors including 
pension funds and money market mutual funds. But when the value of subprime 
mortgages started to decline, the diffusion of mortgage-backed securities helped 
provoke a vicious cycle of liquidation, as investors panicked and sought to sell 
their securities. The result was a classic run, only this time it was a run not on 
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bank deposits as in 1929, but rather on short term financial securities such as the 
repo agreements and money market mutual funds—financial products which were 
tainted by mortgage-backed securities, but had come to function like money for 
many businesses.  As a result, when Lehman Brothers collapsed, credit effectively 
froze, bringing the broader economy to a halt. Companies that have come to rely 
on these short-term credit lines could no longer make payroll or pay for 
investments, leading to spillover effects on the broader economy.3 
The discourse of the financial reform debate is indicative of how reform 
efforts interpreted and responded to these events through a predominantly 
technical and technocratic understanding of the core problems.  The debate over 
financial reform and the problem of TBTF firms played out through a number of 
competing narratives each of which sought to frame the problem of the crisis, and 
suggest a set of policy responses. Such public narratives play a major role in 
diagnosing and constructing policy problems, reworking moral and institutional 
understandings, and ultimately in shaping policy responses.4 The mainstream 
discourse of financial reform revolved primarily around two narratives in 
particular: first, a narrative of risk management; and second, one of consumer 
                                            
3 See generally, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2011); Morgan Ricks, “Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis,” 
Harvard Business Law Review 1 (2011), 75-143.  
4 On how political narratives shape the terrain of political possibilities for reform, see Daniel 
Carpenter and Gisela Sin, “Policy Tragedy and the Emergence of Regulation: The Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act of 1938,” Studies in American Political Development 21 (2007), 149-180 (describing 
one case study of the links between narrative, normative argument, and political mobilization). 
More generally, political theorists have noted that for political engagement to take place, “what is 
needed is some articulation of the general threat or, more precisely, an account of the phenomenon 
and a ground on which it can be seen as politically salient.” Mika LaVaque-Manty, Arguments 
With Fists: Political Agency and Justification in Liberal Theory (New York: Routledge, 2002), 18 
(“Who says what is . . . always tells a story, and in this story the particular facts lose their 
contingency and acquire some humanly comprehensible meaning”). Hannah Arendt, “Truth and 
Politics,” in Jerome Kohn, ed., Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 223-260, at 257. 
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protection.  But while these narratives did help animate, justify, and promote what 
became the Dodd-Frank reform statute, they created a dominant understanding of 
the financial crisis as primarily a problem of market failure, calling for the solution 
of technocratic management.  In so doing, these dominant reform narratives not 
only grounded the technocratic ethos of Dodd-Frank; they also sterilized the 
problem of the financial crisis itself of much of its more charged moral dimension.  
Rather than being a matter of the concentrated economic and political power of 
the financial sector, or of a proliferation of socially undesirable “speculation,” the 
issues were constructed and understood through apolitical technical terms of 
stability and consumer protection.  
These policy narratives had to navigate three core tensions.  First, they each 
sought to promote expanded financial regulation while overcoming deep-seated 
and resilient prior commitments to self-correcting, efficient, and socially optimal 
markets. Since the 1980s, political and intellectual currents underscored the return 
of this view that free markets are the optimal mode of organizing social behavior, 
and that any attempts to regulate or alter the workings of the market are likely to 
fail, causing even worse results or jeopardizing underlying moral values such as 
individual liberty.5   Second, they each had to overcome an ambiguity and anxiety 
about who the real villains in the financial crisis were: big private corporations like 
Wall Street firms, or “big government,” who had come to the aid of Wall Street 
through the unpopular TARP bailout program in 2008-9.  While these bailouts 
were widely credited with averting a more catastrophic economic collapse, they 
                                            
5 See Margaret Somers and Fred Block, “From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and 
Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate,” American Sociological Review 70:2 (2005), 260-
87.  On the revival of free-market ideology in the 1980s and 1990s, see Daniel Rodgers, Age of 
Fracture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 41-76.   
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revived anxieties about state intervention and raised the specter of government 
capture by the financial industry—thus partly counteracting the degree to which 
the crisis itself cast doubt on free-market ideology itself.  Finally, these reform 
discourses had to overcome the complexity of financial stability policy.  Most 
policymakers were in the dark about the dizzying array of financial securities and 
practices that ultimately gave rise to the crisis.  This complexity made the crisis 
difficult to understand, and thus difficult to distill into a narrative of cause, effect, 
and response.  Indeed, the more complex a social challenge, the more likely it is to 
be seen by actors as beyond the scope of political action, more akin to forces of 
nature or accident.6   
The first central narrative employed in the financial reform debate was one 
of risk management to ensure market stability.  In this narrative, the problem of 
the financial crisis was one of excess risk-taking.  The solution, therefore, was to 
improve federal regulatory oversight from agencies like the Federal Reserve or the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent excess risk-taking by financial 
firms, thereby ensuring the long-term stability of the free market. In his signature 
speech defending and outlining the financial reform push, President Obama 
emphasized how these regulatory reforms would make financial markets work 
better by alleviating the risk of systemic collapse:  
The problem is that these [financial] markets operated in the shadows of 
our economy, invisible to regulators, invisible to the public.  So reckless 
practices were rampant.  Risks accrued until they threatened our entire 
financial system. … these reforms are designed to respect legitimate 
activities but prevent reckless risk taking.7 
                                            
6 Deborah Stone, “Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas,” Political Science 
Quarterly, 104:2 (1989), 281-300, at 288-9.  
7 Barack Obama, speech on financial regulation, Cooper Union, New York, April 22, 2010.   
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The language of risk can be a powerful one, “pushing a problem out of the 
realm of accident into the realm of purpose”—in this case making the financial 
crash a phenomenon capable of amelioration through reform.8  Indeed, the idea of 
government as risk-manager animates many of the major elements of the modern 
regulatory and welfare state, from Social Security to unemployment insurance.9  
From a policy standpoint, efforts to mitigate excessive risk-taking for example by 
expanding capital requirements for financial firms may be prudent.  But the 
narrative of risk leaves out as much as it enables. What is notably missing from 
this account is any sense of moral blame for those who caused the crisis in the first 
place, any appreciation for the role that economic and political power plays in 
creating situations of social risk in the first place—and distributing that risk in 
unfair and unequal ways across different social classes.  This narrative also 
tellingly privileges financial regulatory experts as the primary responders. It makes 
the problem of finance a technical one of market failure and misaligned incentives 
to be optimized by expert oversight and management.  There seems to be little role 
for citizens or social movements except as passive victims of risk or beneficiaries of 
elite risk management.  While this language is well-suited for justifying and 
shaping particular policy changes, by itself it provides little by way of deeper 
diagnosis, moral critique, or articulation of a cohesive identity for reformers—
elements that undermine the impact of this kind of narrative for a broader social 
movement.   
                                            
8 Stone, “Causal Stories,” 290.  
9 David Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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The second competing master narrative of the financial crisis focused not on 
macroeconomic risk, but on the needs of consumers themselves by emphasizing the 
goal of consumer protection.  In this narrative, advocates of reform argued that 
consumers needed greater regulatory protections from unfair or misleading 
financial products such as excess credit card fees and predatory adjustable-rate 
mortgages.  Again, this narrative provided an account of the crisis—that it partly 
stemmed from unfair lending practices that put consumers deeper in debt—that 
justified a particular reform, the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB).  And like risk-management, the discourse of consumer protection 
has helped motivate many valuable policy reforms.  The creation of the CFPB, in 
particular, represents a major achievement, establishing for the first time a 
regulatory body dedicated to protecting the interests of consumers across the 
universe of financial products from credit card and home mortgage terms to 
student loans.   
The language of consumer protection is one step better than that of risk 
management insofar as it does channel some moral considerations in its emphasis 
on fairness, its critique of manipulation or excessively harsh lending terms, and in 
its background ideal of equal access to financial products. But consumer protection 
is at best only a half solution, for while it can offer a defense of individual 
consumer interests against the interests of the financial industry, it is difficult to 
fully motivate broader changes to the nature of modern finance itself as a response 
to the problem of consumer protection.  As historian Lizabeth Cohen argues, the 
consumer rights discourse, while at times becoming a way of “mitigating the 
excessive power or other political blocs” by empowering consumers as a “residual 
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category” or interests capable of “speaking for the public,”10 it can also fade into a 
more subdued push to protect the interests of consumers as purchasers of goods in 
a market society.11  Indeed, while individual policies to ensure fair and transparent 
financial products are beneficial, it remains to be seen whether such pro-consumer 
efforts will fundamentally alter the power relationship between finance and 
citizens, or whether it will result in a more modest change in the polish of existing 
financial transactions and activities. 
This tension inherent in the discourse of consumerism is exemplified by the 
trajectory of former Harvard Law Professor and later-Senator Elizabeth Warren, 
who emerged as the creator and primary champion of the CFPB.  On the one hand, 
Warren’s advocacy generated widespread grassroots support among reformers, and 
intense opposition from industry groups and conservatives.  But on the other hand, 
taken at its word the language of consumerism used by Warren herself—and 
adopted by President Obama—continued to rest on a sense that the goal of reform 
was not to fundamentally alter the dynamics of modern finance but rather to 
simply ensure that markets worked more efficiently by curtailing unfair or 
deceptive practices.  As Obama argued, “with a dedicated agency setting ground 
rules and looking out for ordinary people in our financial system, we will empower 
consumers with clear and concise information when they’re making financial 
decisions,” thereby creating an economy that “works for all of us.”12 Warren 
similarly argued in her original piece proposing a CFPB that such a regulatory 
                                            
10 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America 
(New York: Knopf, 2003), 24.  
11 Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic, 345-97. 
12 Obama, speech at Cooper Union, April 22, 2010. 
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body would protect consumers from unfair terms in credit cards, auto loans, and 
mortgages, ensuring “minimum safety standards” for these financial products.13  It 
is telling that Warren’s greatest political impact lay not in this appeal to ‘making 
markets work better’ but rather in her symbolic role as a representative for the 
interests and aspirations of ordinary citizens as against the financial industry.  Put 
another way, despite the language of optimizing market functioning, Warren’s 
moral appeal and political force came not from her claim to market optimizing or 
technical expertise, though she possessed plenty of that as well; rather it stemmed 
from an entirely different source: her position as an advocate and defender of the 
decidedly moral and political interests of ordinary families.  The real value of the 
consumer protection narrative, then, is not in its defense of the wants of the 
consumer, but rather insofar as it channels more fundamental moral concerns into 
the vessel of consumer protection: a concern with financial sector power; a sense of 
outrage at the unfairness imposed upon ordinary citizens; and the sense that 
citizens need an organized and institutionalized source of countervailing power to 
provide a check on and accountability for industry.  
Both narratives of risk management and consumerism were common 
between ‘insider’ leaders like President Obama and Congressional advocates for 
reform, as well as outside experts like Warren.  These narratives were also 
supported and employed by outside lobbying groups that aimed to mobilize public 
support for the reforms proposed by the administration.  Tellingly, the main 
                                            
13 Elizabeth Warren, “Unsafe at Any Rate,” Democracy Journal (2007), 8-19, at 18. 
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umbrella organization for these outside groups, Americans for Financial Reform, 
took their rhetorical and policy cues from Warren and Obama.14   
These conceptual frameworks in turn gave rise to the reform proposals that 
would eventually take shape in Dodd-Frank. The Obama administration’s white 
paper released by the Treasury in spring 2009 is indicative.  A key agenda-setting 
document that formed the starting point for the drafting of Dodd-Frank, the white 
paper cast the problem of financial regulation as being fundamentally one of 
managing risk and promoting consumer protection.  The problem was 
fundamentally a decline of regulatory oversight: “gaps and weaknesses in the 
supervision and regulation of financial firms presented challenges to our 
government’s ability to monitor, prevent, or address risks before the built up in the 
system.”15  The response, then, required a renewal of regulatory capacity such that 
expert regulators could engage in better oversight.  Crucially, the white paper 
emphasized the importance of restoring oversight without undermining the basic 
structure of the financial sector, and the innovation that it contributed to economic 
growth and well-being.16 
Similarly, the Congressional Oversight Panel led by Elizabeth Warren 
charged with investigating the financial crisis in advance of the legislative policy 
debate in Congress offered much compelling rhetoric, but a more tentative reform 
package.  The report, for example, opens with a frank acknowledgement that 
finance was an “inherently volatile” industry, in need of strong governmental 
                                            
14 See Americans for Financial Reform, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/  
15 “Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and 
Regulation,” Department of the Treasury (Spring 2009), 1. 
16 Ibid. 
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regulation to ensure that the financial system serves its core “public function” of 
channeling savings into investment.17  The report directly attacked the failed 
“regulatory philosophy” of free market deregulation, instead emphasizing the 
value of regulation as a way of promoting the democratic public good—which 
should be understood not in terms of economic output but rather in terms of the 
“flourishing” and “quality of life” enjoyed by ordinary citizens.18  Yet here too, the 
actual recommendations of the report revolved around the model of expert-based 
regulations focused on the more narrow task of closing market failures, promoting 
transparency, and establishing consumer protections.19   
 
The limits of expert management  
These discursive understandings laid the foundation for the drafting and 
passage of Dodd-Frank.  While the final bill took a more moralized approach on 
certain issues like mortgage lending, where reforms called for more strict 
requirements aimed at protecting homeowners against the malfeasance of lenders,20 
when it came to the central issue of regulating TBTF firms and addressing issues of 
financial stability, the overall response of the statute was to take a more 
technocratic approach, emphasizing expert oversight as the key to closing market 
failures and making the financial system safer and more efficient.21   
                                            
17 Congressional Oversight Panel, Special Report on Regulatory Reform (January 2009), 2-3. 
18 Congressional Oversight Panel, Special Report, 19-20. 
19 See Congressional Oversight Panel, Special Report, 4.  
20 See Dodd-Frank Act, tit. XIV. 
21 See generally, Rahman, “Envisioning the Regulatory State”. 
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Dodd-Frank itself focuses primarily on efforts to expand the authority, 
coordination, and resources of financial regulatory agencies to prevent regulatory 
gaps over the ‘shadow banking sector’ and to enable oversight of risky financial 
products like derivatives.  Crucially, the specific content of these regulations is left 
largely to the discretion of the regulators themselves. For example, the centerpiece 
of Dodd-Frank’s financial stability policy is the creation of a Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC), comprised of the heads of all the major financial 
regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), housed in the Fed, and charged with the task of 
coordinating among the agencies and developing regulations to identify systemic 
risks to the financial sector and tailor appropriate regulatory responses.  The FSOC 
has wide discretion; many of the more specific reform proposals on financial 
stability—such as the proposed 15-to-1 leverage cap on financial firms, or the 
option to break up systemically risky TBTF entities were codified not as statutory 
directives, but rather as options to be implemented as needed at the discretion of 
the FSOC itself.  In a similar spirit, other provisions in Dodd-Frank provide greater 
authorities to financial regulatory agencies like the SEC and CFTC, for example, 
empowering them to regulate derivatives,22 credit rating agencies,23 and municipal 
securities,24 and hedge fund advisors.25  
                                            
22 Dodd-Frank Act tit. VII.  
23 Dodd-Frank Act tit. IX, subtit. C.  
24 Dodd-Frank Act tit. IX, subtit. H. 
25 Dodd-Frank Act tit. IV; e.g., § 402(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b–2(a)) (extending CFTC 
authority to private funds under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)); § 403 
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3(b)) (eliminating the private fund exception to CFTC authority). 
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In addition to these grants of broad regulatory authority to federal agencies, 
it is striking how Dodd-Frank attempts to rationalize—and legitimate—such 
expanded regulatory authority. First, several provisions of the act explicitly 
attempt to promote the rationality and effectiveness of regulation through greater 
coordination between agencies,26 especially by the FSOC.27  Second, while it grants 
agencies broad discretion in setting specific regulatory policies, the statute also 
requires these decisions be backed by greater expertise and research, whether 
through research studies28 particularly through the newly established Office of 
Financial Research,29 agency-created technical advisory boards,30 or data 
collection.31 Third, where the legislation provides for external checks on agency 
regulations, these checks seem built primarily to ensure the rationality and 
expertise of agency actions through statutory requirements for cost-benefit 
analysis,32 congressional audits of agencies,33 and the use of agency inspectors 
                                            
26 Dodd-Frank Act tit. VII, subtit. A (Empowering the FSOC and judicial review to coordinate and 
arbitrate disputes between the SEC and CFTC which are granted shared authority over derivatives 
markets). 
27 Dodd-Frank Act § 119 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5329).  
28 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act tits. I–II (requiring FSOC studies on systemic risk); tit. V (requiring 
Federal Insurance Office to study and monitor the insurance industry to advise the FSOC); § 1013 
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493) (creating a dedicated research arm for the CFPB to investigate 
consumer financial products and develop regulatory options); § 417 (SEC studies on short-selling); 
§ 914 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11) (possible investor advisor certification requirements); § 917 
(improvements to investor financial literacy); § 918 (improvements to mutual fund advertising); §§ 
1074, 1077 (requiring studies of the desirability of further regulation in areas such as mortgages 
and private education loans). 
29 Dodd-Frank Act tit. I, subtit. B. 
30 Dodd-Frank Act § 111(d) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). 
31 Dodd-Frank Act § 112(d)(3) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322). 
32 Dodd-Frank Act § 1022 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).  
33 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 962-964 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d-7 to 78d-9). 
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general.34  Finally, the statute includes several provisions to improve agency 
expertise, neutrality, and autonomy, for example requiring a study to improve the 
SEC’s the agency’s autonomy and effectiveness at enforcement,35 and to reform 
revolving-door policies to limit lobbyist influence.36  
Many of these provisions of can be traced to difficulties in the negotiations 
over the reform bill in Congress, and to a political environment that in many ways 
was hostile to more far-reaching reform. The sheer multiplicity of regulatory 
agencies at the federal and state level has created a problematic politics of turf 
battles between agencies, creating inefficiencies and regulatory loopholes as 
agencies themselves attempt to undermine the authority and capacity of rivals.37 
Similarly, gridlock in Congress may have produced more inefficiencies in the 
statute itself, particularly as more innovative reform ideas were rejected as they 
came from those who lacked influence in Congress.38 Although the reform debate 
did draw in a broader set of policymaking experts and academics, the financial 
reform debate largely left out unions, activists, and thinkers outside of the finance 
policy domain.39 The disparity in political power between the financial industry, 
and other more grassroots organizations representing workers and other citizens 
                                            
34 Dodd-Frank Act § 211 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5391). 
35 Dodd-Frank Act § 967. 
36 Dodd-Frank Act § 968. 
37 Daniel Carpenter, “Institutional Strangulation: Bureaucratic Politics and Financial Reform in the 
Obama Administration,” Perspectives on Politics 8:3 (2010), 825-46, at 832-7.  
38 Carpenter, “Institutional Strangulation,” 826-31 (noting the difficulties faced by reformers like 
Brooksley Born, Elizabeth Warren, and academics trying to push more aggressive reforms in an 
area usually dominated by male finance-sector personnel).   
39 Daniel Carpenter, “The Contest of Lobbies and Disciplines: Financial Politics and Regulatory 
Reform in the Obama Administration,” Working Paper, Obama’s Agenda and the Dynamics of US 
Politics (Russell Sage Foundation, 2010). 
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help skewed not only the legislative result but also the ongoing implementation of 
reforms through agency rulemakings. 
It is telling that the most broadly acceptable policy response to the problem 
of TBTF firms took the form of this technocratic view of regulation. This 
framework seeks to expand both the authority and the discretion of agencies to 
address complex social problems—here, financial crises. This expanded authority 
is legitimated and constrained, not by statutory directive or other forms of political 
constraint, but rather through a variety of mechanisms aimed at ensuring that 
agency actions are expert-driven and rational. Thus, provisions that require agency 
coordination, research, and cost-benefit analysis temper the specter of relatively 
unaccountable regulatory authority by rationalizing regulatory governance. 
Similarly, efforts to improve agency organization and promote autonomy from 
regulated industry aim towards the same goal of rationalizing agency authority.  
This technocratic approach to economic regulation seems to offer a way to 
pursue the public interest and ensure adaptable and responsive policymaking in a 
complex modern economy, free of the conflicts, gridlock, or ignorance of raw 
political disagreement. But the effectiveness and legitimacy of this vision of 
regulation ultimately rests on the faith that citizens have in the regulators 
themselves. Insulation and expertise are compelling sources of regulatory 
legitimacy and effectiveness, but there are reasons to doubt that this technocratic 
vision is a desirable one.  First, there is the concern that the regulators upon whom 
so much depends may not themselves act for the public good, lacking in sufficient 
institutional modes of democratic accountability and responsiveness.  Second, there 
is a more subtle concern that in constructing the problem of financial regulation as 
a technocratic one, this understanding of the problem changes the menu of 
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substantive policy approaches that may be considered, taking more moralized and 
perhaps more desirable approaches to financial regulation off the table out of a 
preference for more neutral managerial approaches.  
The first concern of regulatory accountability and disparities in interest 
group influence and political power is especially clear in the financial reform 
context.  Arguably, agencies like the SEC and the Fed already possessed sufficient 
tools to prevent many of the risky lending, leverage, and securitization practices 
that proliferated on Wall Street in the buildup to the crisis, but chose not to do so 
on the view that most firms knew what they were doing, were already subject to 
sufficient market and regulatory checks, and were generating good value for the 
broader economy.  Yet many of the substantive policy changes envisioned by 
Dodd-Frank depend on the discretion and further deliberation of these same 
regulators who were criticized for failing to hold the financial sector in check 
during the 1990s and 2000s.40  This regulatory discretion also provides an 
opportunity that industry players can exploit to win more favorable policies—a 
fact underscored by how quickly industry firms mobilized their lobbying efforts to 
target regulators as soon as Dodd-Frank was passed.41 This concern is the familiar 
one of regulatory capture and industry influence, and has been a long-standing 
challenge for any regulatory reform effort.42 
                                            
40 See e.g. Jeff Madrick, “Wall Street Leviathan,” New York Review of Books, April 7, 2011.  
41 See e.g. Binyamin Appelbaum, “On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulators,” New York 
Times, June 26, 2010.   
42 For a good account of the history and policy implications of such regulatory capture debates, see 
e.g. Stephen Croley, Regulation and the Public Interest: The Possibility of Good Regulatory 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Dan Carpenter and David Moss, eds., 
Preventing Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming, 2013).  
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The greater the reliance on expert discretion and insulation, the greater the 
concerns that these experts may use their authority not for the general public good, 
but rather for the particular benefit of the financial sector itself.  Whether as a 
result of direct lobbying or corruption, or through more subtle forms of cultural 
and ideological influence where industry interests are shared by like-minded 
regulators,43 or the sheer dependency of regulators on industry for information and 
data,44 the problem of regulatory capture is especially acute in financial regulation.  
Even in the early stages of implementing Dodd-Frank, agencies have been heavily 
lobbied45 by industry firms and supporting associations like the American Bankers’ 
Association, which have collectively been more aggressive in seeking and winning 
meetings with regulatory agency officials during the implementation and drafting 
of these rules, in comparison to consumer advocates or other proponents of 
tougher regulations.46  These efforts have weakened proposed regulations, whether 
by introducing more exceptions and loopholes in the case of new commodity 
derivatives rules, FSOC rules for systemically-risky institutions,47 or relatively lax 
                                            
43 For a good overview of different kinds of direct and indirect, cultural, or ideological capture, see 
Moss and Carpenter, eds., Preventing Capture.    
44 This risk of “epistemic capture” is a danger noted by a range of advocacy groups active in 
financial reform. Industry lobbyists have already hired scores of staff to develop reports and data 
that can justify regulatory decisions more favorable to industry, leaving countervailing advocacy 
groups, like the AARP, scrambling to keep up. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, “On Finance Bill, 
Lobbying Shifts to Regulations,” New York Times, June 27, 2010.  
45 Ben Protess, “Wall Street Lobbies Treasury on Dodd-Frank,” Dealbook, New York Times, April 
5, 2011 (describing the disparity in lobbying presence between financial firms and largely absent 
consumer advocates or other proponents of financial regulation).  
46 Protess, “Wall Street Lobbies Treasury on Dodd-Frank.”  
47 Marian Wang, “Regulators Weaken Dodd-Frank Draft Regs, Allow More Risk,” ProPublica, 
September 22, 2011; Simon Johnson, “The Financial Stability Oversight Council Defers to Big 
Banks,” Economix Blog, New York Times, January 20, 2011 (recounting how early FSOC policy 
reports are deferring to financial industry interests in defining the costs and benefits of limiting the 
size of big banks as required by § 123 of the legislation, in some cases ignoring data suggesting the 
need for more aggressive caps on bank size). 
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enforcement by the SEC in settling suits against financial firms accused of fraud, 
rather than exercising the full range of its prosecutorial powers,48 and declining to 
enforce the ratings agency rules in Dodd-Frank.49  
This danger that supposedly insulated, expert regulators will water down 
regulation in response to industry pressure is particularly well-illustrated by the 
debate over the Volcker rule.  Named after the former Fed chairman Paul Volcker, 
the Volcker rule contemplates a ban on proprietary trading, where financial firms 
use their own funds to engage in risky trading. The original Volcker Rule consisted 
of two parts: an absolute size limitation on financial firms to less than ten percent 
of market share in loans or deposits, plus a ban on proprietary trading that 
supporters saw as a way to reformulate and modernize the New Deal era Glass-
Steagall provision separating commercial and investment banking.50 Initially 
proposed as a bright-line ban, the Volcker rule was notably absent from Treasury’s 
initial white paper setting the terms of Congressional debate.  Amendments to 
Dodd-Frank which sought explicit versions of the Volcker rule, or strict size and 
activity limits on large financial firms were easily defeated.51 Indeed, as the Federal 
Reserve has developed the draft of the Volcker rule, financial sector firms have 
lobbied successfully to add more exceptions, complexity, and vagueness to the 
draft rule, on the grounds of needing to protect various market-making 
                                            
48 Shashien Nasripour, “SEC Takes Light-Touch Approach Against Lawbreakers, Critics Say,” 
Huffington Post, April 7, 2011.  
49 Gretchen Morgenson, “Hey, SEC, That Escape Hatch is Still Open,” New York Times, March 5, 
2011.  
50 Jonathan Macey, James Holdcroft, Jr., “Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to 
Financial Regulation,” Yale Law Journal 120 (2011), 1368-1418, at 1397.  
51 John Cassidy, “The Volcker Rule,” The New Yorker, July 26, 2010. 
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businesses.52  In the process, the force of the rule is being undermined.53  As two 
critics of the Volcker rule noted later, in practice the rule “poses little meaningful 
limitation on the riskiness of big banks or their interconnectedness or systemic 
importance.”54  
On one level, this dilution of the rule stems from difficulties in the issue 
itself: regulators have struggled to identify at a fine-grain level how to really 
distinguish acceptable from unacceptable forms of trading. Even determining the 
ten percent concentration level is a complex task, requiring significant discretion 
and interpretation on the part of regulators.55  But the substantive challenge of 
determining what kinds of financial activity to bar is magnified by a procedural 
disparity in the influence and participation of industry as compared to other 
countervailing advocacy groups.  On the Volcker Rule, the Fed meeting routinely 
with the top banks like JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs, but 
only meeting thrice with consumer advocacy groups like Americans for Financial 
Reform.56  A satellite group of the Occupy Wall Street protestors called Occupy 
SEC combined the work of lay citizen protestors with professionals and academics 
who had in-depth experience in finance to submit its own 325-page point-by-point 
                                            
52 Jesse Eisinger, “The Volcker Rule, Made Bloated and Weak”, Dealbook, New York Times, 
February 22, 2012. 
53 Floyd Norris, “Bank Rules That Serve Two Masters,” New York Times, October 13, 2011. 
54 Macey and Holdcroft, “Failure Is an Option,” 1402-3. 
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rebuttal of industry comments on the Volcker Rule.57 Although a bright-line rule 
would be easier to implement and less likely to be circumvented, industry lobbyists 
have pushed for more exceptions and modifications on the grounds that a strict 
rule would undermine liquidity and raise the cost of capital—an argument that 
industry has successfully pushed over the efforts of consumer advocacy groups.58 
This disparity in participatory engagement points to the second key danger 
of the technocratic model of regulation: it obscures the reality of the normative 
disputes underlying seemingly technical policy questions. This technocratic view 
represents an understanding of the problem of financial reform as primarily a 
problem of macroeconomic management and market-optimization—a 
conceptualization of the problem of finance that is amenable to, perhaps even 
demands, a policy response that privileges the role of expert oversight.  In the 
technocratic framework, the problem of financial regulation is primarily one of 
market failure: financial markets are complex, and vital for economic functioning; 
limitations on the activities and structure of financial firms must therefore be 
minimalist, judicious, and most of all, devised by appeal to technical expertise. 
Thus, Dodd-Frank’s preference for a technical approach—relying on expert 
regulators to manage, constrain, and respond to systemically risky firms—does not 
by itself solve the problem of TBTF firms,59 where a structural bright-line rule may 
                                            
57 Rachel Signer, “Occupying the SEC for a Stronger Volcker Rule,” The Nation, February 16, 
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be more reliable in limiting firm behavior and preventing industry influence on 
regulators.60  
Research, data, and expertise certainly are valuable tools for improving 
policymaking. But no regulatory policy can be stripped entirely of its normative 
commitments. By obscuring or ignoring the value considerations that implicate 
how raw data is interpreted and evaluated, an overly zealous recourse to expertise 
may have two outcomes. At worst, it risks consolidating a deeper form of 
“ideological capture,” in which regulators share a common worldview with 
regulated interests but have sufficient evidence to justify decisions that are 
nevertheless contestable on normative grounds.61 At best, it creates a dynamic 
where the real sources of legitimate disagreement are obscured. This avoidance of 
normative debate in turn has a chilling effect on broader political contests: the 
underlying sources of political debate and disagreement are obscured, leaving 
many affected social groups either unaware of the key implications of regulatory 
debates or unable to engage in the debate itself, which has retreated behind a 
smokescreen of technocratic discourse.  
Indeed, the problem of financial reform is not merely one of technical policy 
design; it is also a thickly moral problem that involves weighty judgments about 
what a good economy looks like, what kinds of financial transactions are socially 
valuable, and about how we ought to distinguish, balance, and regulate these 
different kinds of activities.  The degree to which an appeal to neutral expertise 
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misconstrues morally-weighted political disagreements as merely matters of 
technical policy design has been noted in other areas of regulatory politics such as 
environmental regulation.62 The appeal to expert judgment becomes a way to avoid 
rather than engage the substantive moral tensions at stake in these policy disputes.  
It may sound comforting to say that regulatory experts will make policy on the 
basis of enhancing efficiency, maximizing welfare, and mitigating risk, but these 
seemingly neutral, universally-acceptable goals mask very real political and moral 
choices that must be made in each policy issue—choices which are difficult for 
citizens to see let alone contest precisely because they have been construed as 
matters of technical policymaking, relegated to the care of financial regulatory 
agencies with relatively minimal roles for citizen engagement or contestation.   
 
Financial reform as a moral and democratic challenge 
The political salience and discursive limitations of risk-management and 
consumer protection narratives stand in stark contrast to the dynamics of the third 
aspiring master narrative for the financial reform debate.  In place of broadly 
agreeable and relatively morally neutral goals such as risk mitigation and consumer 
protection, this third narrative cast the problem of the financial crisis not as a 
market failure but rather as the result of an excessive and blameworthy 
concentration of economic and financial power in the hands of the financial elite 
themselves.  As a result, this narrative sought more structural limits on these firms 
as a way to ensure their accountability to the democratic public.  Instead of a view 
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of regulation as a primarily expert-driven project where administrative discretion 
would be used to facilitate the smooth functioning of the market, these counter 
voices expressed a greater concern with the concentrated political and economic 
power of large financial firms capable of bringing down the macroeconomy—and 
of influencing policymakers to prevent threats to their business models.  This 
alternative narrative thus saw the problem of finance as one of overly complex, 
economically concentrated financial firms like Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, 
or Citibank, whose sheer size and interconnectedness made the survival of the 
entire economy contingent on these firms’ success.  This economic concentration in 
turn created the potential for these firms to abuse their place of privilege, 
extracting economic gains as a result of their centralized position, and in turn 
gaining the political influence necessary to protect their interests in Congress and 
regulatory bodies like the Fed.  The answer to this kind of a problem of power 
could not be had by mere expert oversight; rather, this understanding of the 
problem called for more structural constraints on the organization, size, and 
activities of these firms.  
In the early debates over regulatory reform prior to the passage of Dodd-
Frank, for example, while more mainstream commentators and economists 
outlined proposals in line with the eventual Dodd-Frank statute—for example, 
calling for greater authority to the Fed as the main systemic risk regulator, 
promoting more coordination between regulatory agencies, or improving the 
expertise and professionalism of the regulators themselves63—this rival argument 
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emerged from economists like Paul Volcker, Paul Krugman and others.  Volcker 
famously proposed a straight ban on proprietary trading, while Krugman gradually 
came to call for less reliance on expert discretion, and more strict rules that would 
constrain the size and activities of large financial firms.64  During her earlier work 
as on the Congressional Oversight Panel for the 2008-9 bank bailouts, Elizabeth 
Warren along with Inspector General Neil Barofsky also argued for greater 
structural constraints on the modern financial sector. 
The most thorough articulation of this alternative narrative came from 
Simon Johnson, a former IMF chief economist who wrote a highly controversial 
and well-circulated article in The Atlantic in spring 2009, and continued to 
advocate for a more aggressive policy response to the crisis throughout the reform 
debate from 2009-2010.  While Johnson did not view himself as a movement-
builder, he explicitly framed his narrative as an heir to a populist tradition of 
economic and democratic reform.65 Johnson’s narrative comprised three main 
elements.  First, instead of paying lip service to the ideal of free markets, he 
explicitly argued against laissez-faire economics as a self-serving ideology 
perpetuated by America’s financial elite.  According to Johnson, the financial 
industry “gained political power by amassing a kind of cultural capital.”66  
Financial firms “benefited from the fact that Washington insiders already believed 
that large financial institutions and free-flowing capital markets were crucial to 
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America’s position in the world.”  Far from being the default position against 
which reform had to justify departures, the very concept of unregulated financial 
markets was, for Johnson, an ideological construct favoring the interests of 
financial firms at the expense of the general public—a construct absorbed into the 
worldview of key policymakers who had spent too much time in overlapping social 
circles with the titans of Wall Street. Second, and relatedly, Johnson cast the 
problem of financial reform not as one of restoring market stability, but as a 
substantive and political clash of competing interests—in this case, a clash between 
Wall Street and big finance on the one hand, and the broader public on the other.  
Third, Johnson emphasized not only the substantive problem of how to restore 
equity and meaningful public oversight of the financial markets; he also cast the 
financial reform debate as having broader implications for the very ideal of 
democracy itself.  The recent history of deregulation was evidence of a systemic 
“political balance of power that gives the financial sector a veto over public 
policy”—a disparity in political power that violated the ideal of democracy and 
had to be corrected.   
Johnson’s narrative provided a very different diagnosis of the financial crisis 
that informed a more radical solution.  The policy response to the crisis, for 
Johnson, had to do more than simply restore financial stability; it would also have 
to break the political power of finance.  In this account, the problem was not only 
one of market risk or consumer fraud.  Rather, it involved the problem of 
concentrated economic power of financial firms, who by virtue of their economic 
position could exercise enormous—and ultimately unaccountable—authority over 
the economic fortunes of society. This threat was democratic as much as economic: 
the economic power of financial firms in turn came with a concentration of 
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political influence that posed a threat to ideals of democratic equality, while the 
failures of regulation leading up to the crisis highlighted further democratic 
concerns around the accountability and responsiveness of state officials themselves.   
Thus, Johnson proposed more radical policy responses such as temporary 
nationalization and state-led dismantling of “too big to fail” financial firms, as 
well as caps on executive compensation.  All these measures would be needed to 
“break the oligarchy” of finance.  But more importantly, this alternative narrative 
offered greater scope for a broader shift in how citizens and policymakers alike 
conceive of the modern economy.  By calling into question the ideology of free 
markets and creating a clear moral critique of the current system of high 
inequality, risky yet profitable financial firms, and an ailing “real” economy, the 
Johnson narrative opened space for a deeper debate about what a just economy 
ought to look like.  
Just as the dominant narratives of stability and consumer protection shaped 
the technocratically-oriented Dodd-Frank approach, this alternative, more 
moralized account of the financial crisis pointed towards a more aggressive, 
structural type of reform.  Thus, Johnson’s account helped inform an array of 
more aggressive measures aimed at addressing the problem of TBTF through 
structural caps on bank size, rather than through more deferential expert oversight.  
Sherrod Brown’s Safe Accountable Fair and Efficient (SAFE) Banking Act 
proposed a strict limit to the size of big banks to $1.3 trillion in total liabilities, but 
had been defeated in the Senate during the Dodd-Frank negotiations.67  Like the 
SAFE Act, the Kanjorski amendment to the draft Dodd-Frank statute sought to 
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directly break up large financial institutions.68 Other approaches sought to split 
financial firms, separating ordinary banking from securities activities, and 
requiring stricter oversight of potential conflicts of interest such as when Goldman 
Sachs could bet on the market against securities that they themselves sold to 
clients.  These approaches, such as the Merkley-Levin amendment, were similar to 
the Volcker rule that made its way into Dodd-Frank, but were more aggressive in 
that they were statutory requirements for the breaking up of large financial firms—
rather than leaving the ultimate decision to break up a firm at the discretion of the 
FSOC as the Volcker rule did.69  
These proposals gained steam during the late spring of 2010, winning 
support among liberal Democrats70 and earning an endorsement from the New 
York Times,71 only to be defeated in the Congress.  Ultimately, these proposals 
failed.  The Merkley-Levin amendment did not even get to a vote in Congress, 
without the backing of the Democratic leadership,72 while Brown-Kaufman was 
defeated in the Senate by a vote of 33-61. On the one hand, the unwillingness even 
on the part of the more liberal Democratic party to entertain such restrictions on 
banking was the product of a deep-seated faith in the technocratic expertise of 
regulators.  The final statute did include a provision to break up systemically risky 
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financial firms—but only at the discretion of the FSOC, which itself is comprised 
of the leadership of the top financial regulatory agencies.  Legislators thus hesitated 
to impose such a breakup of financial firms as a statutory rule, deferring to 
regulatory expertise.   
Since 2010, however, these kinds of strict limits on financial firm size and 
activity has growing support.  The Dallas Federal Reserve Bank, for example, in its 
2011 annual report called TBTF financial firms a “perversion” of capitalism, 
increasing risks of major financial crashes without real social gains.73  According to 
the Dallas Fed, by leaving TBTF institutions intact—however subject to expert 
regulation—Dodd-Frank was an insufficient reform effort, and needed to be 
supplemented by stricter limits on financial firms such that no single financial firm 
could be large enough to cause economy-wide repercussions were it to fail.  Federal 
Reserve Board members Dan Tarullo and Sarah Bloom Raskin also expressed 
increasing support for more structural limits on TBTF firms.74    
 
Financial regulation as a symptom 
The financial regulation debate thus represented an attempt to respond to 
the excesses of market deregulation, but a problematic one that appealed primarily 
to a technocratic view of economic governance as expert-led risk mitigation and 
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consumer protection. By contrast, the alternative democratic narrative of critics 
like Johnson and others had relatively little sustained political impact. Yet 
historically, finance and the economy more generally have been the central issues 
of concern for Populist and Progressive social movements, particularly during the 
economic upheaval of industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  These movements employed narratives that were far more aggressive, 
substantive, and mobilizing than those of risk and consumerism.  These historical 
narratives outlined both a causal and moral critique of private power of finance 
and other corporations as threats to freedom, democracy, and social welfare.  They 
articulated a vision of an alternative political economy, one that emphasized the 
value of productive labor that contributed to the common good, and where the 
economy was structured to promote not profits but individual and collective self-
realization.  As such, these movements explicitly linked their narratives to deep 
traditions of American thought, reappropriating and redefining concepts such as 
freedom, democracy, and self-determination. 
This disparity between the currency enjoyed by these arguments in an 
earlier era and their relative marginalization today is instructive.  The technocratic 
orientation of the modern financial reform debate—its reliance on expert 
regulatory judgment as the preferred mode for determining socially desirable from 
undesirable financial activity, and its morally neutral understanding of the problem 
of finance in terms of risk, stability, and consumerism—actually represents the 
culmination of a decades-long trajectory in the discourse and conceptualization of 
the problem of finance. It also highlights how little our contemporary institutions 
work to engage and foster more mobilized democratic action beyond sporadic 
elections or lobbying efforts.   
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The following chapters trace the rise and fall of this technocratic vision, 
from this roots in a broader moral and democratic critique of laissez-faire during 
the Populist and Progressive Eras in the late nineteenth century, to its apotheosis in 
the New Deal, to its erosion and collapse in the face of a resurgent laissez-faire 
critique of the regulatory state in the late twentieth century.  This trajectory 
underscores the appeal of technocracy as a rational and effective response to the 
problems of the market, its failures to overcome anxieties of its own 
accountability—and the degree to which this technocratic response to the market 
represents only one of the possible forms of economic governance oriented to 




3 CONTESTING THE MARKET 
 
If the 2008 crisis undermined the claims of laissez-faire ideologues that free 
markets were self-correcting and socially optimal, the mainstream reform response 
turned to technocratic expert-led regulation to resolve market failures, mitigate 
risk, and protect consumers. Yet this turn to technocratic economic governance did 
not alleviate persisting concerns about the desirability of expert-led economic 
policymaking. Our modern understandings of laissez-faire and technocracy were 
forged through efforts to grapple with the rise of the industrial economy and the 
emergence of the modern regulatory state. The debate in 2008-2010 over the 
financial crisis took place in a conceptual terrain that itself is a product of this 
history.  These next two chapters trace the emergence and eventual erosion of this 
technocratic vision as a way to better grasp its strengths and weaknesses—and to 
uncover the beginnings of an alternative to both markets and experts.   
Specifically, this chapter examines the debates over economic governance 
that took place during the Progressive Era (1880-1920).  Then, as now, economic 
upheaval prompted a rich ferment of ideas and policy innovations as thinkers and 
reformers struggled to respond to the rapidly changing economy.  In exploring 
these debates, this chapter makes three points.  First, the tension between laissez-
faire and rival attempts at economic governance is not just about a moral 
disagreement over narrow understandings of freedom as the freedom to contract 
on the open market; it also concerns a comparative institutional claim about what 
kinds of decision-making systems—whether markets, or government policymakers, 
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or citizens—are best suited to promoting the common good, robust to the threat of 
corruption.  Second, the motivation to develop alternative institutions for 
economic governance grew out of Progressive Era critiques of laissez-faire that cast 
the market not as a system of efficiency, but rather one of power and coercion.  
This critique, however, raised a further dilemma of how to respond to the 
problems of the market system without succumbing to the same threat of capture 
or corruption that laissez-faire thought highlighted.  Third, in response to these 
concerns, Progressive Era reformers developed a variety of institutional 
innovations, from reforms to existing majoritarian democratic procedures to the 
creation of new regulatory agencies. These institutions, for reformers, were part of 
an attempt to make the political system itself more responsive to the general public 
and, in so doing, enable a more effective policy response to economic concerns.  
The result of these theoretical and reform debates was to generate a rich variety of 
institutional forms and approaches, which the later New Deal era would build on 
and consolidate into the modern technocratic vision of government.  
 
Laissez-faire political thought  
Advocates of laissez-faire thought in the late nineteenth century articulated 
a vision of economic governance comprised of three central elements. First, state 
regulation of the economy was acceptable through the development of judge-made 
common law doctrines and the use of state police power, which were regularly 
employed to promote economic development and public welfare.  Second, the 
limitations on state action arose not from a rejection of state action per se, but 
from a concern with political corruption: where the state seemed to promote the 
 76 
partial interests of a particular social group or class, such state actions would be 
illegitimate. The preference for market-based social order thus emerged in part out 
of a search for an institutional form of social order that was robust against the self-
interest of competing social groups. Third, this framework of laissez-faire thought 
rested on—and helped consolidate—an underlying understanding of freedom as 
individual liberty from constraint, in particular the liberty to engage in market 
transactions as an autonomous agent.   Although these thinkers held to a view of 
freedom as freedom from state interference, they did not entirely reject the idea of 
the state in economic regulation.  The laissez-faire vision, then, was not a naked 
appeal to libertarianism or unrestrained markets, but rather a fundamentally 
moral, institutionally sophisticated, and even reformist effort to secure liberty and 
public welfare against corruption.  This more nuanced tradition of laissez-faire 
persisted into the current era as a recurring critique of efforts to expand the scope 
of economic regulation, and formed the primary villain against which Progressive 
reformers had to mobilize.  
 
Laissez-faire, regulation, and the fear of capture  
Private common law during the early nineteenth century developed through 
explicit debates over what kinds of legal doctrines would best promote economic 
development and a good economy.  State judges reworked standards of legal injury 
and damages to better promote economic development.  For example, judges 
defined tort doctrines to allow for some interference with landed property rights if 
it resulted in improved economic production, such as through the construction of a 
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new mill or dam.1  Judges made explicit comparisons of the relative social value of 
different property uses to determine legal injuries.2  Nuisance doctrine also shifted 
to more flexible negligence standards, enabling courts to limit the scope of legal 
damages faced by emerging industries and their impact on the environment and 
nearby citizens.3  At the same time, judges during this period increased legal 
protections for corporations, through the development of classical corporate 
personhood doctrines that recognized corporations’ rights against the state and 
other persons.  These legal developments were explicitly geared towards protecting 
the corporate form of association as a more efficient method of channeling 
business capital, encouraging investor confidence, and promoting development.4 
These trends in private common law took place alongside a robust tradition 
of “police power”—the sovereign authority of states to provide for health, welfare, 
and other socioeconomic regulation. As William Novak argues, state governments 
engaged in a variety of social and economic regulations aimed at promoting 
substantive visions of the good life:  
The nineteenth century was not an era of laissez-faire or statelessness where 
public inertia and political naiveté just happened to provide the perfect 
conditions for a burgeoning private market economy and a self-generating 
civil democracy.  On the contrary, the fundamental social and economic 
relations of the nineteenth century—the market, the city and the 
countryside, the family, the laborer, the proprietor, the good neighbor, the 
                                            
1 See e.g., Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (1805); Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 212 (NY 1815).  
2 Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), 32-8.  
3 See e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 418 (Mass. 1823); Horwitz, Transformations 1780-1860, 67-
71, 85-99. 
4 Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 11-64; Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner 
Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 47-8. 
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good citizen—were formed and transformed in this period as the constant 
objects of governance and regulation.5 
 
This practice of police power governance looks very different from the myth 
of a rigid emphasis on individual liberty, free markets, and limited government.  
Instead, police powers jurisprudence saw individuals as socially-embedded, with 
rights that were ultimately relational rather than absolute.  In this setting, the 
common law was a dynamic, man-made policy tool essential to realizing—rather 
than merely constraining—the common good and public welfare.6  Judges, lawyers, 
and commentators alike during this period “envisioned not a defensive society and 
government, summoned to action sporadically when individual rights were 
endangered, but a public society in motion, ever reaching to secure the general 
welfare, public happiness.”7  State courts routinely supported social and economic 
regulations arising from the exercises of the state legislature’s police power, 
upholding the construction of public spaces, waterways, and roads; the imposition 
of fire regulations trumping claims to absolute property rights by landowners; 
public health and safety regulations for cleanliness; and economic regulations over 
trade, occupational licensing, and  product safety.8   
The economy was thus seen as “fundamentally public in nature, created, 
shaped, and regulated by the polity via public law.”9 Nineteenth century thinkers 
and judges accepted some regulation of businesses that were uniquely “affected 
                                            
5 William Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 236.  
6 Novak, The People’s Welfare, 26-45.  
7 Novak, People’s Welfare, 45.  
8 Novak, People’s Welfare, 51-87. 
9 Novak, People’s Welfare, 84.  
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with the public interest” as legitimate, alongside other protections for morals, 
health, and safety.10   Even later where laissez-faire thinkers advocated for 
individualism in the economic realm, they proved broadly accepting of government 
regulations to facilitate growth, curtail alcohol consumption, and restrict 
individual liberties in the name of morality, such as through blasphemy laws.11  
Even grants of private corporate charters were often narrowly construed by courts 
to ensure that corporate authority remained consistent with what the courts 
understood to be the public interest.12  Of course, this still left a wide degree of 
latitude for courts to construe their understanding of the common good and public 
welfare in particular ways, including granting greater leeway for emerging 
industries against the claims of other citizens.  Nevertheless, this discourse accepted 
a major economic role for the state and for regulation.  The debate was not over 
whether or not law could regulate aspects of social and economic activity, but how 
law should do so.  Much of this framework was conducive to economic reform 
politics, and indeed later reformers like Louis Brandeis explicitly positioned 
themselves in the police powers tradition.   
Given the scope of acceptable regulation, the limitations on the state in 
laissez-faire thought emerged not from an outright rejection of state regulation, but 
rather from a more nuanced understanding of nineteenth century political 
economy that sought to immunize public politics from the danger of partial 
                                            
10 Michael Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meanings and Origins 
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” Law and History Review 3:2 (1985), 293-331, at 304. 
11 See Herbert Hovenkamp, “The Classical American State and the Regulation of Morals,” Draft, 
April 2012, on file with author. 
12 Novak, People’s Welfare, 105-9.   
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legislation favoring particular private interests over the common good. The 
nineteenth century preference for the market as the mode for organizing social 
behavior thus emerged as a result of a comparative institutional assessment: the 
market, in this view, was robust against the partial preferences of self-interested 
groups, generating socially-optimal results through autonomous bargaining and 
fair transactions. By contrast, state action risked promoting the interests of some 
segments of society over others, through the likelihood of political corruption and 
legislative capture.  Where the state could be shown to regulate in the general 
interest through police power or common law, these exercises of political authority 
were acceptable, but otherwise the market seemed a more optimal and corruption-
free mechanism for social progress.   
Thus, in the early 1800s, regulation was viewed skeptically insofar as it was 
seen to benefit particular classes and their property or investments.  The 
Jacksonian hostility towards regulation and the development of the classical view 
of laissez-faire—that emphasized limited governmental powers especially in 
economic regulation, along with the principle of equal access to economic 
opportunities—grew out of this core skepticism of favoritism.13  The greatest threat 
to liberty came from the “temptation to misuse the powers of government for the 
benefit of those who controlled it.”14  Because of the influence of the rich or 
powerful, special privileges were seen as presumptively inequitable.15   As the scope 
of economic regulation increased over the mid-nineteenth century, there were more 
                                            
13 Hovenkamp, “The Classical American State,” 3-4.  
14 Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty,” 306. 
15 Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty,” 319-20 (citing the example of legal scholar Thomas 
Cooley’s writings). 
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legal attacks on state and then federal economic regulations as exceeding legislative 
powers.  The judicial response to these challenges revolved around a back-and-
forth debate over whether the regulation in question favored one particular interest 
over the common good.16   
As Howard Gillman argues, “nineteenth-century courts were on guard 
against not all regulations of the economy but only a particular kind of 
government interference in market relations—what the justices considered ‘class’ 
or ‘partial’ legislation; that is, laws that (from their point of view) promoted only 
the narrow interests of particular groups or classes rather than the general 
welfare.”17  When judges struck down legislation and regulation, it was not out of 
a rote adherence to free market ideology, but rather out of a particular—and often 
nuanced—understanding of political economy and political legitimacy, upholding 
legislation that seemed to them as general and pursuant to the public good, and 
striking down legislation which seemed to advance the particular interests of 
certain groups unfairly.18  This ideal of ‘faction-less politics’ as the standard 
characterizing legitimate exercise of the police power yielded a judicial preference 
for generally-applicable legislation treating all citizens equally. The constraints on 
state action in this framework, then, were not simply the result of an outright 
rejection of the idea of regulation or economic intervention.  Rather, the 
limitations on state action came out of a fundamentally political concern about 
accountability and the public good.  
                                            
16 See e.g., Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876); Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). 
17 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 7. 
18 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 10.  
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Indeed, late nineteenth century advocates of laissez-faire—including 
academics like William Graham Sumner, Lyman Atwater and Arthur Perry, 
businessmen like Edward Atkinson, and journalists like E. L. Godkin—often did 
not see themselves as mainstream, but rather as reformers pushing against the tide 
of corruption and special legislation through steady advocacy, argumentation, and 
persuasion.19  Herbert Spencer, who became one of the most influential advocates 
of laissez-faire, combined these elements of negative liberty and distrust of 
legislators to argue for limited government and freedom of exchange through 
treatises and pamphlets popularized by organizations like the American Free Trade 
League.20   These arguments were eagerly absorbed and further advocated by 
businesses, especially in their efforts to prevent the growing movement towards 
labor legislation.21 
 
Consolidating laissez-faire: legal formalism and market freedom  
The result of all this ferment was the development of an entrenched legal 
theory of limited legislative and economic regulatory authority on the part of the 
state, which gained traction not on ground of outright rejection of the state, but 
because of the fear of “class” legislation favoring particular special interests.22   
Laissez-faire thought thus combined an acceptance of some forms of state 
                                            
19 Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty,” 306.  
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regulation, with a distrust of special interests and corruption.  It was only later that 
these ideals were absorbed by and came to be affiliated with the interests of big 
business and the wealthy.23 But as these understandings of economic governance 
were being increasingly formalized in law and late nineteenth century thought, 
structural changes in the economy and society were increasingly voiding these very 
assumptions of freely competitive markets. These conceptual elements congealed 
into an increasingly rigid legal and conceptual framework of laissez-faire political 
economy, which served as the chief constraint against which later Populist and 
Progressive reformers would clash. 
Over time these political concerns about capture and effectiveness helped 
drive the consolidation of laissez-faire political economy into more rigid doctrines 
of law and negative understandings of freedom. While the police powers 
jurisprudence emerged more out of the day-to-day practice of governing rather 
than high theorizing, eventually deep disagreements over competing visions of the 
good society led to a rejection of this tradition of regulation.24 By the 1850s, 
judicial dissents against the exercise of police power appeared with greater 
frequency, driven by newfound cynicism over the public spiritedness of local 
officials and their propensity to captured by powerful, and partial interest groups.25 
Meanwhile, business interests, having secured effective legal subsidies through 
shifts in common law doctrines, increasingly attempted to “lock in” these gains, 
recasting the more functional and policy oriented doctrines of the early nineteenth 
                                            
23 Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty”, 311-13.  
24 Novak, People’s Welfare, 8-17.   
25 Novak, People’s Welfare, 102.  
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century in terms of legal formalism. The doctrines that had initially emerged as 
conscious policy decisions to promote economic development were increasingly 
recast as the results of neutral legal principles, discerned and implemented by an 
increasingly autonomous, professionalized legal system.26 
This framework of classical legal thought thus came to operate as a 
handmaiden to laissez-faire conceptions of market and state.  The goal was to 
“create a sharp distinction between what was thought to be coercive public law—
mainly criminal and regulatory law—and non-coercive private law of tort, 
contract, property, and commercial law, designed to be resistant to the dangers of 
political interference.”27  This distinction between public and private law “sought 
to establish a separate ‘natural’ realm of non-coercive and non-political 
transactions free from the dangers of state interference and redistribution.”28  This 
distinction between a natural, self-organizing domain of private law and free 
market transaction on the one hand, and coercive state power in criminal and 
regulatory law on the other, operated to provide a check on state authority.  In 
effect, classical legal thought depoliticized and formalized what had been a more 
permissive and instrumental understanding of law and state regulation of the 
economy.   
As it congealed and became more formalized, the laissez-faire paradigm of 
economic governance bundled the emphasis on promoting the public good by 
promoting economic development, with a suspicion of state action particularly 
                                            
26 Horwitz, Transformation 1780-1860, 254-9. 
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with respect to the risk of private interests and institutional capture.  The resultant 
view of the market as “an arena of self-equilibriating, moral freedom” emerged in 
large part out of a reaction against the threat of political corruption.29 The aversion 
to factional politics itself rested on the background assumption that no segment of 
society—not even increasingly marginalized groups such as workers in the mid- to 
late-nineteenth century—needed special protections. In this setting of autonomous 
individuals, liberty was best promoted by the free market; state regulation was 
acceptable, but only for the general welfare.  Specific protections for particular 
segments of society were transgressions against this narrower market-based 
conception of freedom and its commitment to class neutral general legislation. As 
Gillman notes, 
So long as people continued to believe that their well-being could be 
ensured by a harmonious market uncorrupted by the imposition of artificial 
government burdens or benefits, there was little reason to question the 
legitimacy of the ethos of the neutral policy.30 
 
The key actors in maintaining and implementing this vision of laissez-faire 
economic governance were the judiciary and the bar.  As Stephen Skowronek 
notes, courts, alongside political parties, were one of the primary central 
nationally-integrated policymaking systems in American society.  They defined 
state-society relations, especially in the domain of economic policy through the 
regulation of corporate charters, state action, and doctrines of substantive due 
process.31 Lawyers and judges themselves emerged as an expert class of self-
                                            
29 Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard 
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conscious policymakers working through the domain of law to police the 
boundaries of legitimate state action.32  Law was thus one of the key terrains in 
which these ideas of political economy battled.  Laissez-faire became embedded in 
legal doctrine through the debates of the mid- to late-nineteenth century, captured 
in the treatises of influential legal scholars like Thomas Cooley and John Dillon, 
who argued for implied legal limits to the police powers of states when it came to 
economic regulations.33 
Meanwhile, the landmark Supreme Court case of Lochner v. New York 
(1905)34 exemplified the judiciary’s hostility to Progressive reform, as the court 
narrowly struck down a New York state law imposing standards for the length of 
the workday in bakeries.  The Court reasoned that the regulation was the result of 
worker interests capturing the state legislature, rather than expressing a general 
public interest.  Yet, the Court also upheld various state efforts to regulate railroad 
rates through the Granger laws. The Lochner court was motivated by this laissez-
faire view of economic governance, which accepted some role for state-fostered 
economic development, but was highly averse to the appearance of class politics.  
As legal histories of the period suggest, the Court in general attempted to 
distinguish between special burdens imposed on segments of society that were 
necessary for the general welfare, and class legislation that unfairly and 
illegitimately discriminated against some in favor of others.35  If individual citizens 
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were seen as independent, in general not posing a threat to one another, then the 
market could be seen as a system of free and equal exchange, and an equitable 
institutional system for adjudicating the rival interests.36 Under such background 
conditions, any legislation that seemed to focus on a particular segment of society 
was presumptively illegitimate.  Lochner thus represented neither judicial 
corruption nor libertarian ideology, but rather a clash between the laissez-faire 
economic governance and the changed socioeconomic reality that provoked new 
legislative efforts to protect special groups seen as vulnerable.37 The Lochner court 
saw itself as protecting against legislative corruption by partial interests of 
workers, while reformers saw themselves as protecting the public in the face of a 
new industrial economic order. 
 
The challenge for reformers 
Yet precisely at the moment that Lochner expressed this laissez-faire view of 
the economy, it was becoming increasingly clear that various segments of society 
would need state intervention to help counter the pressures of rising corporations 
and market instability.38  Lochner was just one of the most famous flashpoints 
between defenders of laissez-faire and growing efforts to remake the economic 
order in the face of the rise of large corporations and the dislocations of 
industrialization.  
                                            
36 See Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 61-4. 
37 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 11.  
38 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 63-4. 
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Social movements such as the trade union movement, the Knights of Labor, 
the Grangers, and the Populists, emerged to defend the freedom of workers, 
farmers, and other segments of society, but these collective responses to 
industrialism were largely viewed by the judiciary as illegitimate class politics, any 
form of legislative capture privileging the interests of the few over the many.39  
Furthermore, legislation favoring these groups seemed to offer no general benefit 
to broader society. Thus, courts often applied tougher standards against labor than 
against business, for collective action by labor was seen as a source of instability, 
efficiency, and undue political power with no offsetting gains from economies of 
scale, whereas some combinations of business could be defended as contributing to 
the overall economic welfare of society.40 Indeed, most legal treatises of that era 
actually saw existing public policy as overly solicitous of worker and labor 
interests. 41 
These elements—a fear of corruption, a narrow view of negative liberty, 
sustained by legal doctrine—combined into a coherent worldview that suffused 
mid-nineteenth century understandings of politics and markets, given further force 
and effect through their codification in legal jurisprudence.  As such, this laissez-
faire paradigm of political economy constrained reformists’ efforts at both a 
conceptual and legal level.  Progressive Era thinkers thus had to overcome a dual 
challenge.  First, they had to reveal the notion of free markets as an illusion, 
highlighting the realities of coercion, power, and social harm that took place under 
                                            
39 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 86-93. 
40 Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 208-222. 
41 Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 211-3. 
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the guise of ‘free markets’.  Second, they had to develop alternative institutions 
that could govern the modern economy in a way that better promoted the common 
good—but did so while also avoiding the kinds of special interest influence and 
corruption that laissez-faire thought warned would be endemic in the turn to state 
economic regulation.   
 
The Progressive critique of laissez-faire 
The dramatic changes to the American economy in the late nineteenth 
century provided a catalyst for reform movements and new intellectual thought. 
Ordinary citizens increasingly found themselves at the mercy of the modern 
economy, subordinate to and dependent upon powerful private entities such as 
railroad monopolies, financial firms like J.P. Morgan, and trusts like Standard Oil. 
At the same time, the vast impersonal forces of the market itself created 
widespread anxiety and hardship through social dislocation, fluctuating wages, 
and volatile commodity prices. Industrialization, urbanization logical change 
threatened not only the stability of professions but also basic health and safety in 
and outside of the workplace. These anxieties were experienced by large swaths of 
Americans society, from farmers to industrial workers to the urban middle-class. 
Old ideals of individual liberty and independence secured through free contract 
suddenly seemed irrelevant.  But to address these concerns, reformers had to first 
overcome the intellectual edifice of laissez-faire thought. Progressive Era thinkers 
thus focused their arguments on deconstructing this vision of markets as smooth, 
corruption-free systems.   
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Progressive Era reformers approached their critique of laissez-faire in three 
ways.  First, a group of Progressive thinkers and legal scholars loosely known as 
the ‘legal realist’ movement challenged conventional understandings of laissez-faire 
by highlighting the ways in which the seemingly natural dynamics of market 
society were in fact the product of coercion between private actors. As such, the 
supposedly free market generated moral and social harms that had to be 
remedied—particularly harms from the concentrated power of private actors like 
firms, and the harms from the diffuse aggregate dynamics of market forces.  
Second, these thinkers also argued that the market economy was a fundamentally 
political institution, suffused with background regulation by the state through laws 
of property, contract, and tort—and thus was already subject to social control.  
Third, if the market was in fact the product of such coercion and endemic state 
action, as these thinkers argued, then, rather than shying away from the power of 
the state as something to be eliminated, this power should instead be harnessed to 
promote a more frank and openly discussed public good.42  The response to both 
of these threats of private and market power was through revived and reformed 
political institutions that could alter the dynamics of the market itself to better 
promote social welfare. 
The first threat posed by market society was the problem of private power.  
This problem was most glaringly posed by the rise of large corporations and trusts 
during the late nineteenth century, comprising the chief villain for antitrust 
reformers.  As one of the intellectual leaders of the Progressive movement, Louis 
Brandeis best articulated this concern with private power as a threat to individual 
                                            
42 See generally, Joseph Singer, “Legal Realism Now,” California Law Review 76:2 (1988), 465-
544; Horwitz, Transformations, 1870-1960. 
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freedom and social welfare.  Large corporations, to Brandeis, enjoyed profits while 
paying less than subsistence wages, creating a disparity in political power that was 
akin to slavery where workers were “absolutely subject” to the will of the 
corporation.43  The contrast of enormous profits for corporate entities such as the 
Steel Trust with the lack of subsistence wages for workers was for Brandeis 
symptomatic of a vast disparity of power that amounted to a form of industrial 
slavery.44 These large corporations effectively enjoyed a power bordering on 
“industrial absolutism,” which Brandeis argued was irreconcilable with American 
traditions of political liberty.45 Even if corporations acted benevolently towards 
their workers and towards consumers, the unaccountable power possessed by these 
corporations was such that they constituted a coercive state-like entity “so 
powerful that the ordinary social and industrial forces existing are insufficient to 
cope with it.”46  Although these private firms had acquired power to rival the state, 
they lacked the political checks on the exercise of such power that come with state 
authority.  Because of this risk of unaccountable arbitrary power, these private 
firms were dangerous, even if their power was used benevolently.47  Such 
concentrated private power, for Brandeis, comprised the “greatest problem” facing 
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American citizens: “the problem of reconciling our industrial system with … 
political democracy.”48   
Investment bankers like JP Morgan were the particular villains of Brandeis’ 
account, for they controlled not only their own vast wealth, but also the wealth of 
everyone else.49  This “money trust” of “banker-barons” created evils for society 
such as higher tolls and prices for services, weakening of competition and 
innovation, and the “suppression of industrial liberty.”50  The concentrated 
economic power of these financial interests meant that they could affect anyone 
dependent on them for credit or for sustaining a market for the self-produced 
goods of farmers and entrepreneurs.  All of modern society thus lay under the 
domination and arbitrary will of financial giants.   
Similarly, Louis Jaffe argued that private trade groups and corporations 
effectively created law by generating standard practices and customs though these 
were nominally ‘private’ entities.  In effect, “the state has relinquished to the 
individual the ‘sovereign’ function of laying down the rules which govern 
society.”51  For Jaffe, associations and corporations could legitimately make their 
own rules, but when they reached a certain size, they acquired coercive authority 
over others—for example, unions that could bar trade with certain parties, or 
corporations who could set the terms of wage and labor practices:  
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Great complexes of property and contract which constitute our modern 
industrial machine, the monopolistic associations of capital, labor, and the 
professions which operate it, exert under the forms and sanctions of law 
enormous powers of determining the substance of economic and social 
arrangements, in large part irrespective of the will of particular 
individuals.52  
 
Such private power posed a major problem in democratic society, for its 
nominally “private” nature insulates it from the kinds of political checks that 
constrain and direct equally coercive state power:  
Tolerated, covert monopolies—power exercised indirectly—may be much 
more difficult to attack or to ameliorate than the edicts of majorities arrived 
at openly and according to the forms of law.53  
 
These threats to individual freedom and wellbeing were not limited to large 
corporations and monopolies. Indeed, Progressive Era thinkers saw a spectrum of 
private power running from the highly visible monopolies and trusts, to more 
diffuse forms of private power exercised throughout the market economy. Thus, by 
the 1920s, it became clear to many Progressive thinkers that the seemingly free 
domain of private market transactions was actually riven by power imbalances 
between private market actors such as firms and workers.  The aggregation of such 
exercises of power created the seemingly impersonal forces of “the market.”   
This critique of market power was advanced particularly powerfully by the 
legal realist school of thought that emerged during this period. For the legal 
realists, market outcomes were not merely efficient results of fair transactions. 
Rather, they were outcomes in large part determined by the prior distribution of 
bargaining power in society–distribution which was fundamentally created and 
thus alterable by the state through enforcement of background legal doctrines of 
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contract, property, and tort. The free market itself was thus effectively a regulatory 
system created by the state through law.  Therefore, it could be reshaped through 
state control to realize more explicit policy goals and normative aspirations.54 
Robert Hale, for example, argued that because coercion was omnipresent 
even in free market society, state power was already in some sense present in the 
private domain of market transactions.  “The distribution of income,” argued 
Hale, “depends on the relative power of coercion which the different members of 
the community can exert against one another.”55  But the coercive powers of 
private individuals themselves derived from state-sanctioned structures of property 
and contract rights.  Thus, rather than accepting existing distributions of income 
or private power as “natural,” reformers could change these distributions, 
provided they had a coherent theory to guide and structure this already-present 
role of the state in the economy.  This blurring of the distinction between state 
power and private power was vital to enabling more open policy interventions 
aimed at economic ills such as income inequality or low wages. Morris Cohen 
similarly argued that property was itself a form of sovereign power, compelling 
obedience in the commercial economy just as state power compelled obedience in 
politics.56  As a result, “it is necessary to apply to the law of property all those 
considerations of social ethics and enlightened public policy which ought to be 
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brought to the discussion of any just form of government.”57 The legal realists’ 
“attack on the public/private distinction was the result of a widespread perception 
that so-called private institutions were acquiring coercive power that had formerly 
been reserved to governments.”58   
Beyond particular coercive transactions and unfair bargaining positions in, 
for example, wage levels, the aggregate dynamics of the market itself posed a 
broader, systematic threat to individual liberty and social welfare.  Thus, while 
John Dewey shared the legal realist critique of ‘free markets’ as structured by the 
coercive operation of property and contract rights, for Dewey the market posed an 
even bigger threat.  According to Dewey, in the modern economy, the central 
constraint on individual flourishing was not the state, but rather “material 
insecurity” and “the coercions and repressions that prevent multitudes from 
participation in the past cultural resources that are at hand.”59 The market, for 
Dewey, created broader instabilities, externalities, and risks that affected those far 
beyond the binary transactional relationships of private exchange.  What was most 
pernicious about this market system was that the cumulative effect of individual 
market transactions had repercussions affecting a wider range of citizens, for 
example through aggregated fluctuations in wages and prices, or through the 
imposition of what today we would think of as externalities—risks to health, 
safety, and the like.  These risks were especially dangerous because they defied the 
ability of any one individual to contest them.  A worker facing low wages as a 
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result of market competition could not, as an individual, seek redress from any one 
other actor, as the condition of wage risk was a product of thousands of 
aggregated transactions far beyond the knowledge and reach of the worker.  
Nor was this critique of the market generated solely by philosophers and 
lawyers. Much of the intellectual energy of the growing social science and 
economics community was directed towards this Progressive challenge of 
overcoming laissez-faire thought through what these thinkers saw as a more 
accurate and realistic understanding of modern society.  Economists like E. R. A. 
Seligman drew on newly emerging theories of marginal utility and diminishing 
returns to argue for a graduated income tax on the grounds that the wealthy 
simply derived fewer welfare gains from each marginal dollar of income than the 
poor—thus challenging Supreme Court rulings that had cut down reforms aimed at 
increasing taxes on the wealthy.60  Other economists like John Commons argued in 
defense of labor unions as a way to maximize workers’ ability to be paid a fair 
wage, which Commons defined by appeal to economic science as equivalent to the 
workers’ marginal contribution—plus some additional element to achieve social 
welfare-enhancing redistribution.  Here too, Commons clashed with prevailing 
Supreme Court precedents that struck down reformist efforts at achieving a 
minimum wage.61  Finally other economists like Richard Ely and Thornstein 
Veblen lent additional weight to the legal realist critiques of market contracting 
and bargaining as fundamentally unequal.62 These economists all shared a view of 
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the market not as a naturally occurring state, but rather as a social institution, that 
could and should be modified to promote social welfare.63  Where later economics 
would serve as a launching pad for the laissez-faire revival and a modern critique 
of the regulatory state in the late twentieth century, during the Progressive Era 
economists provided one of the key intellectual bulwarks for the critique of laissez-
faire.    
This critique implied the need to develop equivalent checks and norms to 
limit and shape the actions of these private and market actors.  In such a setting of 
private and markets based coercion, the neutral state could no longer justifiably sit 
apart from the task of economic regulation. Rather, state policy would be needed 
to help balance disparities in power and opportunity.  By the 1920s, this argument 
gained traction as “more and more judges and lawyers were trying on the 
progressive notion that the general welfare in the age of industry require the 
government to expertly adjust and manage tumultuous market relations”—thus 
undercutting the “linchpin” of traditional laissez-faire jurisprudence which sought 
to distinguish between valid legislation for the general welfare and invalid 
legislation promoting the interests of particular groups such as workers.64 
 
Building a new democracy 
This broad socioeconomic crisis mobilized an entire generation of reformers 
and thinkers during the Progressive Era. Concerned with the rise of concentrated 
private power, monopoly, and the dislocations and uncertainties of the market, 
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these reformers sought to create an alternative economic order. From rural farmers 
and factory workers to a growing class of intellectuals and social scientific 
reformers, the period represented one of the richest moments of debate over the 
nature and structure of American political economy.  While impossibly diverse in 
demographics, proposals, and organizational forms, at its heart all of this 
mobilization focused around the core question of how to govern the new industrial 
economy. Activists, reformers, and thinkers grappled with competing visions of 
politics, state-society relations, and economic order.  
But the task of reform faced another barrier in the limitations of existing 
political institutions.  Many reform proposals were out of sync with limited federal 
and state governmental capacity to regulate the dynamics of industrial capitalism. 
Courts constrained the very political terrain in which reformers could mobilize, 
act, and innovate.65  Legislatures and political parties seemed increasingly corrupt, 
and beholden to the very private interests that reformers sought to constrain.  The 
multiplication of social interests arising from the newly industrializing economy 
seemed to threaten the ideal of a coherent public good to be realized by state 
action.66 The problem of capitalism, for Progressives, was thus fundamentally a 
problem of politics.  To better control, redirect, and respond to the challenges of 
industrial capitalism, these reformers had to overcome these political blockages in 
an attempt to unleash their own capacities as self-governing citizens.   
The Populist movement of rural reformers, for example, sought to challenge 
growing corporate power, inequality, and the vagaries of the modern market 
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system both by demanding more responsive government institutions and 
expanding the capacity of farmers themselves to engage in self governance and 
political action. Reformist farmers saw themselves as pitted against key villains of 
their contemporary political economy: middlemen whose markups raised costs and 
lowered profits for farmers, and railroads and financial firms whose monopolistic 
control enabled them to charge unfair rates for transport and credit.67  The central 
concern for the Populist movement was the threat that private power posed to 
individual liberty, a deep anxiety that such private dominion would displace 
democracy and leave individuals powerless and enslaved: “populists feared that 
sovereignty would reside in the private realm and that this would lead to a class-
state under the dominance of business.”68  In response, the Populists engaged in a 
broad effort to educate and mobilize rural farmers, building a network of 
decentralized protest.  The electoral aspirations of these movement were 
secondary—and therefore ultimately limited.69 Populists sought to restore some 
form of citizen control over the forces of the modern market system, through a 
combination of political advocacy, institution building, and mobilization of 
farmers themselves.  Through organizations such as the Farmers Alliance, farmers 
advocated for government regulation and public ownership of railroads and credit, 
while engaging in massive civic education campaigns aimed at improving the 
livelihood and political skills of ordinary rural citizens.70 As Charles Postel argues, 
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“participants in this movement believed that they could collectively wield new 
technological and organizational methods … [and] efforts of common citizens to 
shape the national economy and governance.”71    
Though a largely urban, middle-class movement, Progressive reformers 
similarly sought to respond to the problems of concentrated corporate power in 
the form of trusts, decentralized market power that gave rise to problems such as 
poverty, and the ongoing political challenge of corruption within state legislatures, 
the main political parties, and the seemingly business friendly judiciary.72  
Progressives have often been derided as racially-exclusive; a movement of middle-
class elites espousing socially conservative Victorian sensibilities;73 prone to favor 
corporate capitalism74 and bureaucratic, organizational mastery.  Many of these 
criticisms are deserved.  But the Progressive movement was also highly diverse, and 
built a rich reform discourse around a shared core focus on the threat of 
unregulated power in the marketplace.75  
The breadth and diversity of reform politics in this era necessarily meant 
that there were conflicting currents amongst reformers.  Although these reformers 
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did not ultimately agree on what kind of politics would be ideal, they collectively 
experimented with a range of new political institutions. The result was a rich 
innovation in a variety of new political institutions, from direct democratic 
referenda to the creation of new regulatory agencies.  What linked these 
innovations together was that they all sought to enable policies that could better 
respond to economic upheaval, but specifically sought to do so through processes 
that would be more immune to the threat of corruption and capture.  Thus, 
Progressives during this time saw in the idea of empowering “the people” through 
direct democracy and pursuing the common good through expertise and regulation 
as ways to solve this dual problem of economic change and special interest or elite 
political influence. 
 
Majoritarian democracy and mobilization  
The first major front for institutional innovation during this period was the 
attempts to rescue majoritarian electoral democracy from cooptation by economic 
and political elites.   
From 1890 to 1912, Progressive reformers succeeded in institutionalizing 
the first ballot, recall, initiative, and referenda procedures in state constitutions. 
This turn to direct democracy was popularized by observers like J. W. Sullivan, 
through his widely read and influential report, Direct Legislation by the 
Citizenship through the Initiative and Referendum (1892), and other popular 
newspaper essays and columns.76  Sullivan saw direct legislation as rooted in 
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American traditions of town hall democracy, and as a way to bypass the problems 
of special interest influence and legislative corruption.77 Sullivan, along with other 
reformers like Eltweed Pomeroy formed the National Direct Legislation League in 
1893, and the Direct Legislation Record in 1894, to provide an organizational 
hub, publicity, and education for state activists seeking to establish direct 
democratic procedures.78  
These arguments resonated with the growing reform movement among rural 
populists, who appealed to direct democracy as a means to temporarily bypass 
special interest influence in state legislatures to push for substantive reforms 
favoring farmers, debtors, against workers.79  While some reformers saw this as a 
way to achieve true democratic participation and sovereignty, others were 
motivated less by a desire to promote participation, and more by a desire to create 
checks on corruption in the hopes of incentivizing more efficient and rational 
government.80 These state-level efforts in turn shaped the national political 
conversation, as the Populist Party endorsed initiative and referendum procedures 
in its 1896 platform,81 while Progressive activists in legislatures and governorships 
helped facilitate the passage of these reforms.82 
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Meanwhile, Progressive reformers appealed to majoritarian democracy as a 
way to bypass the judiciary which had become a conservative barrier to social 
reform, exemplified not only by cases like Lochner, but also through a number of 
other high-profile rulings that blocked minimum wage laws.83 These decisions 
generated heated criticism in the Progressive press, in venues like The New 
Republic and The Atlantic, as well as through newspaper columns.84  Political 
campaigns against courts as a threat to the democratic majority will became a 
mainstay of Progressive politics. Teddy Roosevelt made curbing judicial authority 
a central theme in his 1912 presidential campaign.85  William Jennings Bryan called 
for the establishment of national elections for federal judges and proposed recall 
elections for judges, stripping them of their life tenure.86  Senator Robert LaFollette 
proposed a Congressional power to override judicial decisions, later making this a 
centerpiece of his 1924 campaign for the presidency and his book entitled, Our 
Judicial Oligarchy.87  Fueled by the legal realist critique of the judiciary as 
advancing the interests of business through legal formalisms, labor and other 
reform advocates castigated the judiciary as creating new legal protections for the 
economic elite.88 
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In a similar vein, nearly all activists and reformers in this period sought to 
mobilize citizens through political association as a way to create a more equitable 
balance of political power. The era was dense with robust, active, and mass 
membership associations which offered both civic cultivation for their members, as 
well as a source of countervailing political power to represent the interests of their 
members in electoral politics. But there was a core ambivalence, though, among 
reformers over the degree to which such civic mobilization should emphasize 
conflict between classes and social groups—such as through labor militancy—or 
instead transcend political conflict to promote conciliatory deliberation among 
citizens.89  For example, the government crackdown following the Pullman strike 
of 1894 split reformers, with some reformers embraced the aggressive conflictual 
vision of labor strikes, while others including John Dewey and Jane Addams 
became disenchanted with destructive class antagonisms, seeking ways to shift 
politics away from such conflict towards more conciliatory and productive 
reform.90  Reformers seeking labor legislation often focused on efforts that could 
draw the support of multiple classes such as social insurance, putting them in 
conflict with organized labor itself.91  In other reform debates, Progressives 
exhibited a similar ambivalence between mobilizing to contest the power of big 
business and seeking reforms with cross-class appeals to ‘good government’ in 
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hopes of transcending class conflict, partisanship, and other forms of social 
conflict.92    
 
Forging the regulatory state 
These same aspirations to overcoming political blockages, and developing 
alternative channels for citizens to engage in politics, check elite influence, and 
address pervasive economic concerns drove efforts to construct the modern 
administrative and regulatory state.  The development of new regulatory agencies 
staffed by policy experts offered reformers the hope of an effective new tool for 
managing the increasingly complex modern economy, and asserting the public 
good against powerful private actors such as trusts or corporations. The regulatory 
state could be achieved at both the local and national levels through the founding 
of new commissions and agencies, in both cases sidestepping the problems of 
political corruption and capture within legislatures.93  Thus, from 1880 to 1920, 
the Progressive push to regulate businesses achieved tremendous “innovation in the 
social control of business, industry, and the market,” through “a panoply of new 
ideas like public utilities, rate regulation, price discrimination, fair rate of return, 
valuation, just price, and economic planning.”94 This explosion of regulatory 
activity at both the federal and state level was marked by common techniques of 
centralization and administrative policymaking and enforcement.95  These tensions 
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and struggles to construct such new regulatory institutions are most clearly seen in 
three parallel policy debates during the period: first in efforts to create public 
utilities and state oversight of prices in key industries; second in the antitrust 
movement; and third in early efforts at financial regulatory reform responding to 
the Panic of 1907 and through the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank itself.  In 
all three of these domains, Progressives experimented with new institutional forms 
aimed at asserting social control over the economy, but each of these efforts raised 
deep disagreements between reformers over how to balance the need to check 
market actors against the need to also ensure the robustness of state institutions to 
corruption or limiting them from exercising unchecked authority. 
 
Social control through public utilities 
Widespread efforts to establish public utilities as a mechanism for regulating 
industries such as urban transportation, telecommunications, warehouses, banking, 
and basic commodities constituted a key domain of experimentation with new 
forms of regulation, but these efforts were constrained by conflicting visions of 
regulatory goals and structure.  The argument for treating formerly private 
industries as public utilities gained traction both as a response to the activities of 
the companies themselves, and as an effort to reduce political corruption in 
legislatures.96 Thus, urban reformers sought to break the private power of 
railroads, water companies, and other key industries, eliminating their ability to 
dominate consumers and curry favor with legislatures by building systems of 
administrative regulation of these industries. Similarly, rural reformers advocated 
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the creation of nationalized public utilities to replace the privately owned railroads, 
and the private provision of banking and credit services. Inspired by the model of 
the Postal Service, farmers hoped that the creation of a centralized, publicly-run 
bureaucracy would bypass local power centers, eliminate the corruption of 
political elites catering to business interests, and provide a check on the activities of 
these businesses themselves.97 Progressives construed the idea of public utilities 
broadly, as a way of establishing public ownership and oversight over a range of 
industries including water, electricity, gas, railroads, telecommunications, 
warehouses, ice, banking, and milk.98  The public utility model thus offered a 
“vibrant and expansive arena for experimenting with unprecedented governmental 
control over business, industry, and market.”99 
But the convergence around the idea of the public utility belied deep 
disagreements about the nature of good government of the public utility approach 
was meant to promote. Some reformers argued that public utilities should be 
established in more precise and technically determinable domains of natural 
monopolies, while others argued on the basis of a broader social vision that drew 
on ideas of illegitimate profit and advocated full public ownership.100 Meanwhile, 
efforts to create public commissions such as urban transit commissions around the 
turn of the century were often backed by a confusing array of supporters including 
advocates of more democratic and participatory control over industries, organized 
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labor and the poor, and the business elite who saw opportunities for profitable 
enterprises licensed by these new commissions and argued for nonpartisan, 
nondemocratic, and limited government through elite and expert administration.101 
Ultimately, concerns about possible corruption in public ownership led to a 
compromise consensus around insulated, expert-driven regulatory commissions—
an institutional form which then proliferated across municipalities, states, and even 
the federal government. This institutional approach was seen as the best of both 
worlds, offering public oversight and private ownership, avoiding the corruption 
that seemed to come with interest-group democratic politics, and establishing 
minimum standards of conduct while ensuring returns for private businessmen.102 
 
Social control through antitrust  
A similar set of tensions and concerns shaped the debates over regulation in 
the antitrust movement.  Here, the central cleavage was between efforts to address 
the problem of monopolies and oligopolies in industries like rail through 
decentralization, breaking up these entities into smaller firms, or through 
centralized oversight by regulatory experts. But disagreement about the purposes 
of antitrust and consistent conservative pushback through the courts worked to 
mitigate the more radical proposals.  
Early battles over antitrust regulation during this period consisted of efforts 
to impose state-level rate regulations on railroads, whose increasing concentration 
and competition often put merchants and farmers at a loss facing higher prices.  
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Such “Granger” legislation, pioneered by the farmers cooperative union of the 
Grange in the upper Mississippi, spread across the Midwest in states like Illinois, 
Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.  In these states, legislation established rate 
commissions that aimed to combat price gouging, which courts had let slide under 
common law.  While initially supported by the Supreme Court as a legitimate 
exercise of police power, these rate commissions failed to achieve structural 
economic change, and as their energy dissipated, the Court itself shifted to hold 
that railroads were entitled to a fair return on their efforts, undercutting the rate 
regulation rationale.103  At the federal level, the early efforts to consolidate support 
around the creation of a new Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) failed, 
leading legislators to propose an institutional model of insulated expert 
policymakers as a way of defusing the political deadlock around railroad 
regulation, and creating a system that would not be beholden to any one interest 
group. But the result was an ICC with a weak mandate, one that was narrowed 
even further as a hostile Supreme Court narrowly construed ICC authority.104  
Similar debates over the substantive content and institutional structure of 
antitrust regulation, driven by anxieties over political capture and economically 
harmful regulation, served to narrow antitrust initiatives such as the Sherman Act 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).105  The antitrust movement argued for 
the more aggressive use of state power to curtail the threat of concentrated private 
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power in the form of large corporations capable of exploiting workers and moving 
markets to their own advantage.  Reformers during this period shared a common 
distrust of large trusts like Standard Oil, and financial giants like JP Morgan. 
These reformers thus shared a common view of the problem of antitrust as 
primarily a problem of power, not consumer welfare: the goal of antitrust reform 
was to prevent the concentration of economic power by trusts and to enhance 
individual freedom by protecting against economic—and potentially political—
domination.106  The Sherman Act of 1890 expressed this political view of antitrust, 
advocating the control of private power through economic decentralization.107 
Brandeis himself was an ardent supporter of the antitrust movement, 
seeking to counteract the power of monopolies and corporations by using the state 
to break them up into smaller, less threatening private actors that no longer posed 
a threat to freedom, fair competition, and democratic politics.  This program of 
antitrust enforcement was part of a broader view of Brandeis to deploy the powers 
of the state to enforce a more socially beneficial market system. Brandeis argued 
for regulation of the economy to ensure a more fair and equitable system of market 
competition, free of excessive domination of powerful private actors such as trusts. 
As Brandeis argued, “regulation is essential to the preservation and development of 
competition, just as it is necessary to the preservation and best development 
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liberty.”108  In this vision of “regulated competition,” Brandeis sought to harness 
the benefits of market competition and innovation, while preventing the rise of 
concentrated private power in the form of trusts or mega-corporations capable of 
dominating workers and citizens alike.  In addition to antitrust enforcement, this 
vision of regulated competition also required state intervention to assure things like 
minimum wages and other ‘floors’ to prevent deleterious forms of competition or 
‘races to the bottom.’  Thus, the state was crucial not only in preventing such 
concentrations of power, but also in ensuring the smooth functioning of beneficial 
forms of market competition.109   
But disputes arose among reformers over whether such concentrated private 
power could be better checked by policies that promoted a more decentralized 
economy and polity—for example, by breaking up large firms, and expanding the 
power of local and state regulatory bodies—or by creating a new, more powerful 
centralized national government capable of checking and monitoring the excesses 
of these large firms. The presidential campaign of 1912 revolved largely around a 
clash over economic regulatory philosophies, as Theodore Roosevelt argued for 
federal oversight of trusts on the Massachusetts Model, building on his own prior 
administration’s formation of the US Bureau of Corporations in 1903, while 
Woodrow Wilson called for a more decentralized approach to breaking up trusts 
into smaller, less threatening elements.  The Wilson administration’s final 
legislation creating the FTC in 1914 took a hybrid approach, but as a result 
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produced an FTC that lacked clear leadership, mandate, or policy on antitrust 
matters.110 Brandeis, a key advisor to Wilson and architect of the FTC, saw it as a 
clearinghouse of information that would benefit small businesses.111  Meanwhile 
the Supreme Court continued to undermine the impact of these new regulatory 
efforts by interpreting the powers of the FTC narrowly.112  
 
Social control in financial regulation 
These cross-currents among advocates of the emerging regulatory state can 
also be seen in efforts to expand the regulation of the financial sector, particularly 
after the Panic of 1907. Although the Federal government had gradually expanded 
its role in banking regulation through the National Currency Act of 1863, the 
National Banking Act of 1864, and the creation of Treasury and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), these recurring financial panics were 
increasingly seen as revealing failures in the basic regulatory architecture of the 
financial system, including the lack of a lender of last resort, and scattered policies 
about bank reserve requirements.113 
Rural farmers in the Populist movement had already made finance a central 
concern for their advocacy, seeking greater credit and access to cash and calling for 
silver-based or greenback fiat currency.  The common threads in these reform 
proposals were first an agreement on the importance of a more scientific and 
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uniform approach to the regulation of money and finance, and second a hostility 
to private financial firms, which were seen as unaccountable and capricious, and 
threatening to the basic welfare of ordinary citizens. This hostility to self-interested 
private financiers, banks, and middlemen led Populists to call for the public 
provision of credit through a national system financial regulation and loans.114  For 
Progressive activists, this “curse of bigness,” as Brandeis famously termed it, could 
only be righted by various regulations aimed at curbing bankers’ excesses and 
rendering them accountable to Congress and to the democratic public.  Thus 
Brandeis proposed the prohibition of interlocking directorates, arguing that 
bankers must only serve one master rather than running multiple businesses.115  He 
also emphasized the role of publicity in making bankers transparent, empowering 
investors to punish bad banks and make informed decisions of their own.116   
Corporate business interests, by contrast, worked to defuse these calls for 
reform by presenting money and banking as apolitical, developing networks of 
banking experts who could help manage the new financial economy under the 
legitimacy of dispassionately promoting the public good.117  These industry voices 
defused the call for greater social and democratic control over the banking sector 
by appealing to the market as a self-regulating system, arguing instead for 
institutionalizing checks on financial activity through market mechanisms like 
expanding the numbers and powers of shareholders.  The New York Stock 
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Exchange, for example, successfully resisted more aggressive calls for 
nationalization or government oversight by appropriating the language of free 
markets and public welfare, and arguing that existing market mechanisms such as 
shareholder rights were sufficient to police the financial system and hold firms 
accountable.118 
After the Panic of 1907, proposals for financial regulation through a central 
bank took on new urgency, pitting defenders of private control over the banking 
system against different attempts to institutionalize public control. Opponents of a 
central bank feared the concentrated economic power of financial interests, and 
their concern about greater government oversight was not out of a rejection of the 
state per se, but rather out of a fear that governmental bodies would be captured 
by industry.  Proponents of a central bank couched their arguments not only in 
terms of economic necessity, but also presented a central bank as a way to ensure 
the public’s capacity to hold the financial sector accountable through a national, 
public regulatory body.  These debates over the creation of the Federal Reserve 
thus exemplified the tensions inherent in the Progressive response to the market.  
In creating new institutions to protect the public good against, reformers struggled 
to simultaneously check the power of private firms while also ensuring that state 
actors did not themselves become so powerful as to exceed the ability of the public 
to hold them in check.   
Thus, the 1907 Aldrich Plan proposed a central bank conceived as a 
cooperative union of banks comprised of representatives from small and large 
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banks.119 Critics feared this institution would be easily captured by Wall Street 
financiers.120 Indeed, the ABA succeeded in eliminating a part of the proposal that 
would have allowed the president to appoint and remove board members.121  The 
Aldrich Bill thus came to stand for a ratification of private industry control of the 
banking sector—which drove the collapse of support for the bill.122  After the 
Democrats regaining control of Congress in 1910 and the presidency in 1912 on a 
platform flatly opposed to the Aldrich bill, subsequent proposals drafted by Carter 
Glass and supported by Woodrow Wilson emphasized a more centralized 
governmental authority over the central bank.123 While many of the congressional 
experts involved in the drafting of the bill sought to give control of the system to 
the member banks themselves, Wilson felt the reform would not be accepted unless 
it was publicly controlled, ultimately securing presidential appointments for all 
members of the Federal Reserve Board.  Over the course of Congressional 
negotiations, legislators struggled to strike a balance between assuring the 
independence of the central bank from both government and bankers, ultimately 
settling on longer tenure terms for Board members, staggered so that no individual 
president could appoint all of them. The final Federal Reserve Act of 1913 gave 
greater insulation as well as more flexibility over monetary policy to the new 
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Federal Reserve.124 This compromise between direct public control and private 
control therefore defused the conflict around the central bank: progressive and 
Populist reformers uneasy with financial interests saw the Act as assuring 
democratic control over the financial system125, while business interests uniformly 
backed the bill, appeased by the insulation of the Federal Reserve Board from 
party politics, the creation of expert advisory committees to help shape Board 
policies, and the placing of regional reserve banks under the control of local 
bankers.126  The very structure of the Fed thus emerged out of an effort to balance 
concerns with private financial power on the one hand, and ensuring accountable 
governmental power on the other. 
 
A conflicted Progressive legacy 
In the face of tremendous social upheaval and dramatic new forms of 
private power, reformers and thinkers during the Progressive and Populist 
movements mobilized to articulate and help realize an alternative vision for 
American political economy. These reformers uniformly rejected traditional 
nineteenth century views of laissez-faire thought, arguing that the dynamics of the 
new industrial economy—in particular the presence of powerful corporations and 
deep market instabilities—demanded new political organizations, state institutions, 
and public policies. In the process, these reformers also realized that to achieve 
their aspirations of socioeconomic reform, they also had to grapple with the 
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existing political constraints of late nineteenth century democracy, leading many 
reformers to direct their energies political mobilization and institutional reform as 
well. 
The Progressive Era therefore suggests several implications for 
contemporary debates in American political economy.  First, debates over 
economic regulation did not follow the caricature of “more” versus “less” state 
regulation; rather, the debate between reformers and laissez-faire opponents were a 
more nuanced contest over what kinds of regulation would be most robust to the 
threat of corruption and the difficulties of making complex and effective policies 
work.  Thus, the laissez-faire critique of the state was both a moral and an 
institutional one.  Reformers had to not only develop a richer conception of power 
and freedom in a market society; they also had to address head-on the anxieties 
over political capture, corruption, and responsiveness.  Socioeconomic change had 
to come with a change in political institutions and practices themselves.  Thus, 
progressives also developed a range of institutional innovations in democratic 
institution-building such as expanding political associations, local-level policy 
experimentation, and democratic engagement with the emerging regulatory state. 
Second, later generations of reformers—including the chief architects of 
economic regulation in the New Deal and the later twentieth century—inherited 
this Progressive Era critique of laissez-faire understandings of the economy, in 
particular the concerns over concentrated private power and market instabilities.  
These concerns drove future reformers to continue their attempts to build the 
powers of the modern state to promote the public good.  But despite a common 
focus on socioeconomic change and unregulated power, different wings of 
reformers focused on different—and often conflicting—political institutional 
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strategies such as anti-monopoly, community mobilization, or regulatory 
expertise.127  The unresolved debate among Progressive Era reformers over what 
form such expanded state powers should take—democratic or technocratic; 
oriented towards mobilized contest between groups or towards expert knowledge 
and consensus; local or national—created an uncertainty as to what particular 
vision of politics and state would emerge in future decades.   
There remained a troubling ambiguity as to whether these agencies were to 
be new sites of democratic politics freed from the problems of unequal political 
power and political capture, or whether they were to be apolitical policymaking 
entities, separated from politics altogether.   Some reformers sought the creation of 
powerful, elite and expert driven regulatory agencies that could govern modern 
society efficiently, separated from the vagaries of both democracy and politics 
itself. Others saw this turn to administration and expertise as a way of narrowing 
rather than expanding the scope of state action, as administrative agencies would 
be more prone to fiscal discipline and more minimal state intervention where it is 
absolutely necessary. Still others saw the regulatory state as a prerequisite and 
catalyst for a more vibrant, participatory democratic politics. Meanwhile, the 
hostility that economic regulatory efforts provoked often led reformers to settle 
upon more conservative regulations and more expert driven institutional forms as 
a palliative response. For a time, these wings of reform discourse fed one another: 
emerging faith in expertise and new regulatory bodies seemed compatible with and 
important bulwarks for the progressive vision of a reformed economic and 
                                            
127 Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” 123-127. 
 119 
democratic order.  It was only later that tensions between the appeal to expertise 
and the appeal to democracy began to surface. 
The debates of the Progressive Era were enormously influential in shaping 
American society. Many of the New Deal policies were in fact developed out of 
inherited Progressive ideas such as antitrust, social insurance, and the regulatory 
state.128 But this inheritance also bequeathed an ambivalence over how exactly the 
state ought to respond to these problems in market society. The ferment of this 
period put into place multiple progressive traditions of economic governance as a 
response to the dangers of laissez-faire. Once specific policies of economic 
regulation and the very idea of expert-driven regulatory agencies came under 
increasing attack from the 1970s as socially harmful and politically corruptible, 
later progressives found themselves ill-equipped to respond.129   
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4 ANXIETIES OF EXPERTISE 
 
Faced with economic upheaval and constrained by the straightjackets of 
laissez-faire thought and political constraint, Progressive Era reformers and 
thinkers struggled to develop alternative ways of understanding and governing the 
new economy.  No single settled framework emerged from this period of ferment.  
There were deep disagreements between those who saw the answer in political and 
economic decentralization and those who sought a more centralized national state 
and economy; between those who appealed to the reconciliation between social 
factions, and those who emphasized political conflict and contest; and between 
those who valorized new social scientific expertise as the key to regulatory 
policymaking, and those who instead vested their hopes in the direct participation 
of citizens themselves.  The common thread throughout these diverse 
understandings of politics and the economy was the struggle to establish some 
form of social control over the economy.  The disagreements arose over what 
institutional framework and core political values would animate this reassertion of 
collective agency over the new industrial economy.  
It was out of this Progressive intellectual inheritance that the policymakers 
and thinkers of the New Deal developed their own response to the calamity of the 
Great Depression. In many respects, the New Deal represented the culmination and 
realization of Progressive Era aspirations, finally establishing a range of powerful 
national regulatory agencies to promote the interests of consumers and labor, and 
to check the excesses of finance and powerful corporations—all in the name of the 
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democratic public that had empowered the Roosevelt administration and its allies 
in Congress. In the process, the New Deal changed the fabric of American political 
economy—and the nature of the debate over economic governance.     
The New Deal consolidated a conceptual framework of technocratic 
economic governance, which emphasized the role of neutral, insulated expert 
regulators managing the economy, as a truer servant of the democratic public than 
traditional branches of government.  By the 1940s, the diversity of democratic 
thought and institutional innovation that marked the Progressive Era response to 
laissez-faire had been replaced by the ascendancy of this technocratic vision.  As a 
result, the Progressive Era discourse of economic governance shifted in three 
important ways.  First, it preferred insulated expert-led regulatory agencies rather 
than the democratic public as the driver of economic regulation.  Second, it took 
the purpose of such regulation to be not a fundamental restructuring of the 
modern economy, but rather the facilitation and optimization of the market itself.  
Finally, this view shifted the understanding of citizens from active participants in 
government to consumers in the economy.  
It was this vision of market-optimizing, technocratic regulation that formed 
the dominant intellectual paradigm that later twentieth century thinkers and 
policymakers would challenge—and that contemporary progressives like Obama 
would later seek to emulate.  As laissez-faire critiques of economic regulation 
revived in the late twentieth century, defenders of this New Deal legacy responded 
by doubling down on and subduing this technocratic approach.  By then the more 
radical democratic tradition of economic governance had been largely forgotten.  
The limits of this thinner, constrained technocratic vision helps explain the 
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difficulties of contemporary efforts to expand regulation in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis.  
 
Progressivism realized—and transformed  
After his election in 1932, Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal agenda 
drew much of their moral force and initial policy ideas from the Progressive 
arguments of previous decades.1  While Roosevelt’s early New Deal is often seen as 
a period of policy innovation—almost to a fault, as contemporaries and later 
commentators would criticize Roosevelt for implementing scattershot policies with 
little overarching vision—many of the ideas themselves were inherited from the 
earlier ferment of the Progressive Era.  As historian Daniel Rogers argues, 
The paradox of crisis politics is that at the moment when the conventional 
wisdom unravels, just when new programmatic ideas are most urgently 
needed, novel ones are hardest to find. The need for well formulated 
solutions goes hand-in-hand with conditions least suited for reflective policy 
formulation: haste, confusion, the opportunism of expediency, the 
impossibility of perspective on the onrushing events. One of the most 
important aspect of crises, in consequence, is that they ratchet up the value 
of policy ideas that are waiting in the wings, already formed though not yet 
politically enactable.2 
 
The crisis of the Great Depression altered the “conditions of the politically 
possible,” and suddenly a host of policy ideas developed during the Progressive Era 
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seemed both attractive and politically feasible in a way that they had not during 
the 1920s.3   
FDR openly embraced much of the rhetoric of Progressive Era reformers 
who castigated the concentrated power of large firms as a threat to the economy 
and to the ideals of political liberty.  In one famous 1932 speech in Columbus, 
Ohio, for example, Roosevelt attacked the Hoover administration for being 
enthralled to the business elite.  Like Hoover, FDR proclaimed his support for 
American individualism but he argued that Hoover’s deeds contributed to the 
demise of such individualism by encouraging the concentration of economic power 
in a few elite institutions.  “I believe that the individual should have full liberty of 
action to make the most of himself,” Roosevelt declared.  “But I do not believe 
that in the name of that sacred word a few powerful interests should be permitted 
to make industrial cannon fodder of the lives of half the population of the United 
States.”4 Roosevelt blamed “the ruthless manipulation of professional gamblers” 
for the stock market crash.5  In opposition to these elite interests, Roosevelt argued 
for the expansion of government authority as a crucial check acting on behalf of a 
democratic public:  
I believe that the Government, without becoming a prying bureaucracy, can 
act as a check or counterbalance to this oligarchy so as to secure the chance 
to work and the safety of savings to men and women, rather than safety of 
exploitation to the exploiter, safety of manipulation to the financial 
manipulators, safety of unlicensed power to those who would speculate to 
the bitter end with the welfare and property of other people.6  
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Throughout the 1930s, Roosevelt continued to assert this central theme 
defending the importance of government to promoting the interests of the 
democratic public. Even the frontiersmen of the eighteenth century turned to 
government as a mechanism through which individuals could cooperate to improve 
their welfare and pursue their goals:  
Government was an indispensible instrument of their daily lives, of the 
security of their women and their children and their homes and their 
opportunities.  They looked on government not as a thing apart—as a 
power over our people.  They regarded it as a power of the people, as a 
democratic expression of organized self-help.7 
 
Americans struggling with the Depression, FDR argued, must view 
government as an “ally,” as evidenced by New Deal programs to insure bank 
deposits, provide mortgage support, protect against foreclosure, and develop social 
insurance.  Such aggressive governmental action was necessary to promote the 
common good—but for Roosevelt, it was also important to view this government 
action as subject to the will of the democratic public.  “Let us never forget,” he 
argued, “that government is ourselves and not an alien power over us.  The 
ultimate rulers of our democracy are not a President and Senators and 
Congressmen and Government officials but the voters of this country.”8 
This familiar Progressive-style rhetoric was backed by major policy 
successes, particularly in financial regulation. Financial reform was one area where 
New Dealers hearkened back to more traditional arguments of the sort associated 
with Louis Brandeis that regulation was needed to constrain the concentration of 
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power in the financial sector.9 Roosevelt was deeply influenced by Progressive Era 
writings on the subject, especially Brandeis’ tract Other People’s Money, and was 
sympathetic with the Progressive and Populist effort to create aggressive federal 
regulations that would supersede lax state level oversight of financial and securities 
firms—who had proven adept in lobbying state legislatures.10  Immediately after 
taking office, FDR signed the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, which in addition 
to providing for an immediate bank holiday to stem the tide of bank runs, for the 
first time provided explicit support for governmental backing of deposits as a key 
way of promoting confidence in the banking system. The Roosevelt administration 
also passed a series of other financial reform statutes including the 1933 Banking 
Act, and the Securities Act, the 1934 Securities Exchange, and the Banking Act of 
1935.  
The regulatory efforts of the early New Deal thus viewed business “not as a 
power to be propitiated or, at the very least, as a partner to be cajoled, but as an 
erratic and irresponsible force requiring strict social discipline.”11   Unlike other 
New Dealers who believed in the power of big institutions in business and in 
government to generate social welfare and who sought to set up a national 
economic planning apparatus, those who were behind financial reform lacked such 
“faith…in the virtues of bigness and of industrial self-government, and propos[ed] 
instead to use the federal power to revitalize and police the competitive economy.” 
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Collectively, these statutes expressed Roosevelt’s vision of establishing regulatory 
oversight of financial firms and monopolies.   
These policies established a stable and well-regulated financial sector that 
persisted for several decades by creating a governmental backstop for depositories 
and establishing tight structural limits on the powers of financial companies, and 
the scope of future financial innovation.  Thus the creation of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and deposit insurance led to a dramatic decline of 
bank failures played the financial system prior to the 1930s. New Deal legislation 
also enabled the Federal Reserve to set ceilings on savings account interest rates 
(Regulation Q) while separating investment and commercial banking provisions 
such as the Glass-Steagall Act, incorporated into the 1933 Banking Act.   As a 
result, “postwar commercial banking became similar to a regulated utility, 
enjoying moderate profits with little risk and low competition.”12  Further, by 
separating different types of financial industries like investment and commercial 
banks, mortgage lenders, and finance companies from one another, the New Deal 
regulatory framework compartmentalized the economic activities of different 
financial firms, and “fragment[ed] the financial sector into diverse industry groups 
that found it difficult to cohere around a unified political agenda.”13   In the 1970s, 
the financial sector composed just over 3 percent of US GDP, with pay comparable 
to the rest of the private sector. This system of “boring banking”—a system that 
lacked the complex array of wildly profitable and risky securities that marked the 
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pre-2008 crisis economy—proved more than adequate to facilitate postwar 
economic growth and relatively high incomes for workers in the financial sector.14 
These statutes also went a long way towards establishing the importance of 
public oversight of the financial sector, articulating a vision of government that 
was more than just an optimizer of market functioning, but rather was an 
aggressive promoter of the public welfare by establishing near public ownership or 
public guarantees of vital social necessities such as the currency, banking deposits, 
credit, and utilities.15  Indeed, the fault lines during these debates were more often 
between proponents of the bills and Progressives who wanted even more radical 
centralization and government control over the financial sector. Older Progressives 
in Congress largely supported the Roosevelt administration’s efforts as realizing 
the aspirations of the Progressive Era, more often criticizing the administration for 
not going far enough rather than expressing outright opposition.16    
But by the end of the New Deal, this Progressive vision had been 
dramatically transformed in three ways: first, shifting from democratic to 
technocratic institutions of governance; second, by subduing the substantive goals 
of regulation to one of optimizing the market; and third, by viewing citizens not as 
agents in governing but as consumers. 
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From democracy to technocracy  
New Dealers gradually pulled away from the more participatory and 
democratic visions that animated earlier generations of Progressive reformers.  
Where several early New Deal efforts at economic planning involved a heavily 
participatory structure including direct citizen involvement in the planning process, 
through local advisory boards, and engaged civic participation,17 over time these 
efforts eroded.18  As historian Alan Brinkley notes, late New Dealers in particular 
sought to achieve familiar economic goals such as regulation of monopolies 
through resort to more centralized technocratic policymaking rather than 
decentralized and participatory democratic alternatives.  These New Dealers were 
thus “coming to a common vision of government—a vision of capable, committed 
administrators who would seize control of state institutions, invigorate them, 
expand their powers when necessary, and make them permanent actors in the 
workings of the marketplace.”19 
This specifically technocratic vision was perhaps most forcefully articulated 
by one of the central architects of the New Deal, James Landis.  Speaking at Yale 
University in 1938, Landis gave what remains one of the most assertive defenses of 
the emerging administrative and regulatory state. A protégé of Felix Frankfurter, a 
former clerk of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, and a leading young law 
professor, Landis was already celebrated as one of drivers of the creation of a new 
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financial regulatory institution, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which he would later chair.   
 As Landis argued, these new regulatory agencies responded to both the 
challenges of the modern industrial economy, and the “inadequacy” of traditional 
institutions of governance.20 The creation of this new governmental power was a 
necessary “response… to the demand that government assume responsibility not 
merely to maintain at the levels in the economic relations of the members of 
society, but to provide for the efficient functioning of the economic processes of 
the state.”21 Such economic mastery could only come through the use of regulatory 
agencies, staffed by specialized experts capable of making policy on the substantive 
merits rather than according to the dictates of interest group politics or the archaic 
limits of legal doctrine. Landis was dismissive of both Congress and the courts as 
institutions incapable of fully responding to modern needs in a complex and 
rapidly changing economy.  Agencies could make more effective public policy by 
drawing on specialized expertise, and could do so more rapidly than legislatures or 
courts.  “The administrative process is, in essence,” wrote Landis, “our 
generation’s answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and legislative process.”22   
Not only were agencies superior; they also required a free hand in order to 
act effectively. “It is easier to plot away through a labyrinth of detail,” proclaimed 
the Landis, “when it is done in the comparative quiet of a conference room than 
when it is attempted amid the turmoil of the legislative chamber or a committee 
                                            
20 James Landis, The Administrative Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 1.  
21 Landis, The Administrative Process, 16.  
22 Landis, The Administrative Process, 46.  
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room.”23  Expertise was thus vital to developing public policies that would actually 
promote the common good and be effective in light of the complex modern 
economy.  But to harness the benefits of such expertise, policies needed to be 
crafted by regulatory agencies that, although created by Congress and overseen by 
the judiciary and the elected executive, enjoyed broad delegations of power and 
relative independence.24  Indeed, rather than restraining agencies through narrow 
grants of power and tight oversight, Landis preferred to give agencies a relatively 
free hand, relying instead on the beneficial effects of publicity of agency policies 
and their justifications,25 as well as the professionalism, expertise, and 
independence of agencies26 to ensure that they served the common good. 
This technocratic vision was institutionalized through the formation and 
consolidation of regulatory agencies.  The early New Deal faced several stiff legal 
challenges to efforts to create new regulatory agencies—most famously, the 
Supreme Court unanimously struck down Roosevelt’s National Industrial 
Recovery Act for delegating unconstitutionally broad powers to executive agencies 
in the name of coordinated economic planning27—and the legal community 
continued to express anxieties about the constitutional status and potential or 
arbitrary or authoritarian power on the part of regulatory agencies.  But by the late 
                                            
23 Landis, The Administrative Process, 70.  
24 Landis, The Administrative Process, 55. 
25 Landis, The Administrative Process, 62. 
26 Landis, The Administrative Process, 99-100. 
27 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  
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1930s the Landis-style theory of insulated regulatory expertise had been effectively 
endorsed by the Supreme Court.28  
 
From contesting power to managing the market  
While the New Deal consolidated a shift from citizens to experts as the 
drivers of economic policy, it also shifted the substantive goals of such economic 
regulation.  In practice, many of the New Deal policies themselves proved to be 
less aggressive, and more market-friendly than earlier Progressive Era thinkers may 
have envisioned. By mid-century, the kind of aggressive oversight and checks on 
economic power that animated earlier generations of reformers like the antitrusters 
would give way to a more managerial and market-friendly view of the purposes of 
economic regulation. 
The example of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is 
instructive.  From the outset, the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, 
which collectively established the SEC, proved in practice to be a more tentative 
and ultimately market-friendly construction of Progressive Era reform ideals.  The 
malfeasance of financial firms and securities dealers was one area where 
Progressive Era critiques of financial firms’ power to manipulate prices and 
outright fraud had taken root as the primary political narrative of the crisis, and 
the main motivation for the reforms themselves, particularly after the Pecora 
                                            
28 See e.g. Mark Tushnet, “Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation 
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hearings in Congress.29  But the SEC itself was formed essentially as a compromise, 
as financial sector lobbying led to the creation of a separate regulatory agency, 
rather than conveying the power to regulate securities to the already-established 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—a move that the financial sector as well as 
opponents of the bill saw as a weakening of the reform proposal.30  The business 
lobby, including the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of 
Commerce, even succeeded in resisting the nationalization of stock exchanges; the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act left the New York Stock Exchange as a private, self-
regulatory organization.31  
Once established, the early leaders of the SEC like James Landis and 
William Douglas sought to combine Progressive ideals of economic regulation with 
their faith in social science and expertise.32 But rather than employing the emphasis 
of Progressive Era democrats like Brandeis on self-rule and participation, the SEC 
focused on the goals of economic efficiency, investor protections, and smoothing 
the functioning of the market.33  In place of the more democratic visions of 
Progressive Era reformers, the SEC instead cast itself as “a site for the production 
and application of economic knowledge.”34 The SEC also committed early in its 
                                            
29 See Seligman, Transformation of Wall Street, 12-36. 
30 Seligman, Transformation of Wall Street, 70, 97. 
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existence to a strategy of regulation via third-party industries, for example by 
creating incentives for accountants, self-regulating exchanges, and financial 
professionals themselves to police each other.35   While this approach may have 
magnified the enforcement capacities of the SEC for a time, they also worked to 
blunt the more radical reformist potential of the SEC.  
Thus the SEC focused its actual enforcement efforts on relatively 
noncontroversial activities such as the maintaining of disclosure requirements and 
accounting standards, narrowly interpreting its regulatory authority in an effort to 
maintain its legitimacy and avoid interfering with the profitability of financial 
firms.36  The operative language of § 10 of the Act, for example,37 empowered the 
SEC to prescribe rules that would make it unlawful for financial firms to employ 
any manipulative or deceptive practices when devising or advertising financial 
instruments.  The SEC—and later the judiciary, following several legal challenges 
to the new agency’s powers—interpreted this section to mean that the SEC was 
empowered primarily to compel financial firms to disclose the terms of their 
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financial instruments.  Yet this focus on disclosure was only a part of the original 
reformist vision animating the 1934 Act, which envisioned a robustly empowered 
SEC that would require disclosure but also do much more to prevent the 
manipulation of stock prices.38  
Even for signature New Deal financial regulatory statutes, like the Glass-
Steagall Act and the separation of investment and commercial banking, repackaged 
older Progressive and Populist concerns in a new language of technocratic 
macroeconomic management, where the problem was not one of a moral economic 
vision or democratic accountability of finance, but rather of economic efficiency 
and enhancing economic growth.39  This represents the second key shift from the 
discourse and ethic of earlier Progressive reformers: not only moving from a focus 
on democratic empowerment and mobilization to an emphasis on expertise, but 
also a tempering of the substantive goals of economic regulation itself, focusing not 
on the accountability of private power but rather on promoting macroeconomic 
growth and efficiency. 
Most New Dealers saw this shift as a pragmatic response to the realities of a 
complex economy. Despite Roosevelt’s own campaign rhetoric, the New Deal 
brain trust as a whole was largely dismissive of Progressive Era appeals to 
democratic accountability and the threat of concentrated private power.  For 
example, Raymond Moley, one of FDR’s main advisors on antitrust and financial 
regulation policy, saw big business as a key to promoting productivity, growth, 
                                            
38 See Steve Thel, “The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 
Stanford Law Review, 42:2 (1990), 385-464. 
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and higher standards of living, seeking to turn away “from the nostalgic 
philosophy of the trust busters.”40  
In part out of a fear that more aggressive economic regulation could be a 
pathway towards the kind of totalitarianism increasingly on view in Europe during 
and after World War II,41 New Dealers searched for more neutral and broadly 
acceptable foundations for the legitimacy of state policy.42 This shift to economic 
policy as compensation—for example, through welfare spending—represented an 
effort to ground the growing economic role of the state on a relatively 
uncontroversial vision of economic progress.43  Especially after World War II, 
policymakers had less enthusiasm for the earlier Progressive vision of powerful 
state regulation, instead shifting to this ideal of compensatory government where 
the state would use fiscal policy to facilitate growth without directly getting 
involved in the oversight, planning, and coordination of industries.44 This 
reconceptualization of the goals of regulation gradually alienated the older 
generation of Progressives who increasingly clashed with FDR.45 The development 
of these ideas of economic regulation during the late 1930s and 1940s is thus “the 
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story of a slow repudiation” of earlier Progressive Era commitments, and “the 
elevation of other hopes to replace them.”46 
 
From citizens to consumers 
Just as the late New Deal inaugurated a shift to a vision of government not 
as a tool for fundamental economic restructuring and regulation, but rather as a 
mode of compensation for the vagaries of an otherwise acceptable market 
economy, this period also saw a shift in understandings of how best to meet the 
needs of ordinary citizens themselves.  Where earlier Progressive Era thinkers had 
often emphasized the importance of empowering workers and consumers as a 
political force to check the excesses of corporations, by the late New Deal era, 
these understandings had been supplanted by a less overtly politicized idea of the 
consumer.  Thus, early New Deal efforts adopted the Progressive Era view of the 
consumer as citizen, where empowering consumer groups would promote the 
public good by enabling them to contest government and corporate actions to 
improve consumer rights, safety, and market fairness.47  For example, the National 
Recovery Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority all incorporated representatives of consumer interests alongside those of 
business and labor within the governing structures of these bodies.  Meanwhile, 
other agencies like the FDIC and the SEC sought to incorporate consumer interests 
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into their policies even if they lacked procedures for consulting consumer groups 
directly.48   
Indeed, although this Progressive vision of a politicized identity of the 
consumer as a form of countervailing power capable of pressuring corporations 
and the state remained central for postwar thinkers like John Kenneth Galbraith, 
the late New Deal moved instead to a vision of the consumer not as a matter of 
empowerment and representation, but rather as a way to boost economic demand 
and output, thus expanding growth and promoting the public interest without 
undermining the basic system of capitalism.49  ‘Consumers’ went from a political 
identity asserting rights against big business to a vague framework for promoting 
economic activity. Continued efforts at financial regulation increasingly shifted 
their focus on promoting disclosure, as a way of better optimizing activities of 
buyers within the market—rather than creating direct and political forms of citizen 
empowerment. 
Consumer interest programs were gradually dismantled by 1950s, while 
businesses themselves started to claim the  mantle of looking out for consumer 
interests.  The very idea of the consumer thus gradually became depoliticized: it 
was no longer a defined segment of society to be empowered as countervailing 
power, but rather as a shorthand category that encompassed everyone and no one, 
a group whose interests amounted to getting value for their purchasing dollars, 
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rather than having defined rights and powers as against the interests of 
corporations, or the state.50   
The New Deal thus consolidated and realized, but also narrowed, the 
aspirations of Progressive Era reformers.  It succeeded in establishing powerful 
regulatory agencies with a broad mandate to manage the modern market economy 
at the scale envisioned by earlier reformers battling ideas of laissez-faire and the 
upheavals of the new industrial economy.  At its height, this technocratic vision 
offered the promise of a solution to the Progressive dilemma: it provided a way to 
address the dangers of the modern market economy, through institutions that 
could themselves claim to be pursuing the public good free of the dangers of 
political corruption and special interest influence that, for laissez-faire critics and 
Progressive activists alike, afflicted traditional political processes of elections, 
parties, and legislation.   
But in so doing, the New Deal also shifted the terms of Progressive 
imagination in three ways: from a focus on democratic mobilization to an 
emphasis on technocratic expertise; from a focus on policies aimed at contesting 
private power and fundamentally reshape the workings of the market to policies 
that sought instead to simply manage and optimize the market; and finally from 
viewing citizens as political and economic agents to be empowered, to instead 
viewing them as consumers.  These altered understandings sowed the seeds of this 
technocratic vision’s own demise, for it made the argument for economic 
regulation against laissez-faire critics rest on the basic contention that expert 
regulators could better satisfy the needs of consumers and optimize the functioning 
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of the market.  As this faith in expertise declined in the late twentieth century, 
these same goals of market optimization and consumer welfare seemed to be better 
met through deregulation and the free market.  With the more moralized and 
aggressive overtones of democratic action to contest economic power left behind, 
the technocratic vision had few intellectual resources left to combat this resurgence 
of laissez-faire thought. 
 
Laissez-faire revived, technocracy chastened 
The erosion of the technocratic vision accelerated in the late twentieth 
century in the face of a renewed fear of economic regulation by the state motivated 
by Cold War politics, the rise of public choice theory, and the mobilization of 
conservative intellectuals aimed at rolling back the New Deal.  This assault 
prompted efforts to shore up the legitimacy of technocratic economic governance 
through the growth of administrative law and procedural constraints on 
regulation.  It also prompted the growing trend towards deregulation especially in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  To the extent that the technocratic vision survived the 
assault, it did so by retreating to an even more minimalist and chastened form, 
through institutional reforms aimed at maximizing regulatory expertise, and 
through increasingly market-friendly approaches to economic regulation.  
 
A renewed fear of the state 
This basic concern of expansive regulation through administrative agencies 
as a threat to liberty magnified in the postwar era, particularly as American 
thinkers and policymakers sought to differentiate themselves from the specter of 
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totalitarian politics in fascist and communist Europe.  These concerns combined 
with another intellectual trend to fuel a resurgence of laissez-faire thought in the 
late twentieth century: the rise of market based models of politics, and public 
choice theory. Where nineteenth century laissez-faire thought rejected state 
regulation out of a fear of legislative capture and corruption, this revived laissez-
faire critique focused the same arguments against the regulatory institutions 
inherited from the New Deal. 
The concerns about totalitarianism and liberty forced emerging disciplines 
of social science to confront the tension between their search for objectivity on the 
one hand, and their commitment to the moral ideals of democracy on the other—a 
tension which had been largely overlooked during the Progressive Era.  In the 
aftermath of the Depression and the New Deal, economists and political scientists 
searched for the value-free social science, leading to gradual emergence of public 
choice theory as the new mainstream conceptual framework for understanding the 
politics of the regulatory state. The result was a new science of politics that 
expressed deep skepticism about the possibilities of democratic governance and 
public interested regulation.51 
Public choice theory rested on an initial critique of the irrationality of 
collective choices. The Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow authored landmark series of 
studies in the 1940s which showed that there was no single way to aggregate 
diverse individual preferences into a rational collective preference. Although Arrow 
saw this critique relevant to both collective decisions made by the market and by 
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the state, most economists presumed that the decentralized system of the market 
which matched individual preferences with goods and services precluded the need 
for collective rationality in the first place.  As a result, Arrow’s theoretical critique 
was taken more as an argument against the rationality of collective democratic 
politics and state-driven public policy.52   
Arrow’s findings sparked a rich intellectual current of scholarship which 
over subsequent decades eroded faith and the very idea of effective democratic 
politics. First, public choice theorists like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock of 
the University of Virginia built on Arrow’s findings to recast politics as a 
marketplace for self-interested parties maximize their individual utilities, leading to 
transactions between policymakers seeking support and interest groups seeking 
favorable treatment from the state.53 This kind of political transaction created a 
skepticism of the very idea of the common good as the illusory at best, or 
legitimizer for state tyranny at worst.54  Second, another wave of theorists built on 
these findings to argue that the democratic public itself was irrational: either 
because it was cost-effective for individual voters to remain ignorant or uninvolved 
in the political process, or because this ignorance and demobilization magnified the 
likelihood that special interests would successfully “capture” state institutions, 
using them to further their own private interests rather than the public good.55 
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These intellectual currents established the ideas of free-riding, rent-seeking, 
and interest group capture as mainstays of the social science and broader public 
discourse. The public interest, according to these views, was illusory, and 
governmental failure endemic. The natural implication seemed to suggest that the 
public good could ironically be best served by deregulating large segments of the 
economy, removing the danger of interest or capture altogether.56 This theory of 
political power as a matter of economistic and self-interested transactions 
supplanted rival theories of collective and cultural power.  In contrast to the left’s 
growing focus on culture and consciousness as domains of power, or the previous 
generation of social scientists who examined the power of institutional, economic, 
and political structures, this economistic notion of power seemed more objective, 
simple, and tractable.57  Indeed, public choice theory purported to be more than 
conjecture; it also appeared to have empirical backing through case studies of 
governmental corruption and capture.58  Although many of these empirical 
foundations were themselves shaky as a matter of scholarship,59 the overall 
intellectual framework proved persuasive.  As Edward Purcell notes, in this new 
science of politics, “objectivism and skepticism concerning democracy went 
together,” as public choice theories and their empirical foundations “appeared to 
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confirm the arguments of those who claimed popular government did not and 
could not work.”60  
Business interests and conservative philanthropists helped bankroll and 
gradually popularize these revived laissez-faire critiques.61 By focusing not on 
electoral politics, but rather on the production of ideas, policy analysis, and public 
intellectuals, this growing conservative movement helped build the intellectual 
foundations for the deregulatory turn.62 As one historian notes, “the think tanks, 
radio stations, magazines, and intellectual organizations that were funded by 
business contributions during the 1950s helped to form the infrastructure for the 
rise of the conservative movement.”  From Hayek’s Mont Pelerin Society to the 
conservative journals like the National Review, and to more scholarly institutions 
like the Olin Foundation and the Heritage Foundation, “all of these organizations 
relied on the contribution of businessmen, and all of them sought to encourage 
businessmen to do what they could to fight the power” of the New Deal state, and 
its primary political constituents including labor unions.63 With these conceptual 
foundations in place, the conservative movement could shift to more explicit policy 
advocacy, through organizations like the Chamber of Commerce which by the 
1970s commenced a systematic lobbying effort aimed at promoting deregulation in 
defense of the “free enterprise system”.64 
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The political implications of this conceptual shift seemed clear: in place of 
the muscular faith of New Dealers in the capacity of expert regulators to promote 
the public good, postwar social science seemed to suggest—scientifically, no less—
that regulation was instead highly suspect, prone to capture, and inefficiency. 
Landis himself, by 1960 when he authored a special report on regulatory reform 
for the White House, saw the regulatory state as broken by inefficiency and 
threatened by the risk of interest group capture.65  Combined with a concerted 
political challenge by business interests on the New Deal state,66 this forced 
defenders of the idea of economic regulation to engage in successive waves of 
reform aimed at defusing these growing anxieties about the power of the emerging 
regulatory state.  Scholars of the regulatory state became increasingly skeptical of 
the desirability of New Deal-style regulation, further influencing the thought and 
practice of judges, policymakers, and practitioners.67  
In response, defenders of the regulatory state tempered their aspirations 
further in three ways: developing legal procedural constraints on the exercise of 
regulatory authority; dismantling those institutions through deregulation; and by 
pursuing a more chastened form of economic regulation focusing on market-
friendly policies.   
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Restraining technocracy through procedure 
One response to this growing unease with regulatory authority was to 
restrain regulatory agencies through legal procedures.68   
From the very beginning, the New Deal expansions of regulatory authority 
were met by stiff opposition, particularly from the legal elite.  The earliest debates 
pitted unapologetic defenders of the authority of expert regulators by New Dealers 
like James Landis—who saw scientific expertise and bureaucratic professionalism 
as sufficient guarantors of publicly-spirited regulation69—against legalists like 
Roscoe Pound and the American Bar Association who feared the reach of 
regulatory institutions that existed apart from the constitutional schema of 
separated adjudicatory, legislative, and executive functions—and therefore seemed 
to pose a threat for unaccountable and illiberal state power.70  The Supreme Court 
initially struck down one of FDR’s centerpiece New Deal programs, the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, which authorized the executive branch to approve codes 
of conduct and production set up by industries themselves. The Court saw this as 
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an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch, 
striking down the act in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.71  
These concerns gave rise to the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  
The legislative debate around the APA revolved around this central concern over 
preventing unchecked agency action and the risk of special interest influence and 
corruption.  Prior to the APA’s passage, supporters of the more strict Walter-
Logan bill saw tougher procedural constraints on agency adjudication and 
rulemaking as necessary to resist a drift into totalitarianism,72 while Roosevelt saw 
such strict procedures as actually undermining the power of the administrative 
state to pursue the public interest against the concentrated power of special-interest 
groups.73 The APA represented a turn to legalism as a reaction against the powers 
of the administrative state, seeking to constrain agencies not by the professional 
ethic of objective, neutral expertise, but rather through legal procedures.74  As 
Morton Horwitz notes, “every triumph of proceduralism occurred at the expense 
of professionalism.”75  
Nevertheless, these initial skirmishes in the immediate post-New Deal era 
left agencies with relatively broad powers; Congress could of course establish new 
constraints as well as new directives by legislation, but by and large the New Deal 
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faith in administrative expertise had won out.  The APA provided some minimal 
constraints but left agencies with much room to develop their policies. But as the 
scope of regulatory authority expanded in the 1960s and 1970s with broad 
delegations of authority on matters such as air and water quality, environmental 
protection, and consumer safety,76 so too did concerns about agency accountability 
and especially the risks of special interest capture of regulatory agencies.  
In light of declining faith in agency expertise and neutrality, courts and 
legislators began to shape exercise of agency discretion to require agencies to give 
adequate representation to the range of affected interests, through revised judicial 
doctrines of due process,77 standing,78 and through statutory participation rights.79  
This attempt to expand the diversity of interests represented within agency 
policymaking was a direct response to the growing concerns about agency 
capture—and the growing skepticism that any one institution could identify and 
represent the common good as Landis and the New Deal architects envisioned.80   
Courts temporarily became key guarantors of fair and balanced interest 
representation within regulatory agencies, less inclined to defer to agencies, and 
employing tougher doctrines of review.81  This framework of interest 
representation backed by judicial oversight responded to the problem of capture 
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and disparate political power.82  Alongside this renewed judicial oversight of 
agencies, Congress instituted statutory provisions to enable greater transparency 
and accountability of agencies in the 1960s.  The Freedom of Information Act 
made agency deliberations more readily transparent to the public, while citizen suit 
provisions in statutes like the Clean Air Act made it easier for citizens to challenge 
agency decisions in court.83  Similarly, Johnson’s War on Poverty created statutory 
requirements that anti-poverty programs experiment with “maximum feasible 
participation” when developing and implementing policies.84  
But these efforts were relatively short-lived. The more aggressive expansions 
of interest representation and participation through judicial review and statutory 
schemes like the War on Poverty were soon curtailed, after much controversy. 
Even defenders of such expanded interest representation came to view it as a 
flawed policy, making regulation even more gridlocked and controversial without 
necessarily yielding better policies.85  
 
Deregulation 
A second response to growing fears of the regulatory state was to simply 
dismantle it.  This view grew particularly in the 1980s, following the retreat from 
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efforts to thicken administrative procedures, and as the renewed laissez-faire 
critique became more mainstream.  This return to market-based mechanisms was 
partly the result of the persuasiveness of public choice theory, and market-based 
ideals of freedom.   In contrast to the corruption, inefficiency, and illiberalism of 
technocratic regulation, markets seem to offer an ideal of freedom, choice, and 
reason. Furthermore, as self-equilibriating systems, they seemed more effective and 
adaptable to a complex modern economy.86 
This deregulatory turn is well-exemplified in the politics of financial 
regulation, where regulatory agencies and policymakers themselves became the 
leaders of the deregulatory turn, resulting in a boom in the financial sector.  The 
provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, for example, had already been largely 
eviscerated through regulatory policy changes and court rulings even before the 
formal repeal of the provision in 1999.87  Formally, Glass-Steagall prohibited 
national and state banks from purchasing and selling securities except for 
treasuries, also prohibiting affiliates that were “principally engaged” in securities 
activities.  The terms of the statute left room for agencies to interpret these 
requirements, and as early as the 1960s, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) attempted to relax the requirements of the Act, only to be 
prevented by judicial rulings against such a shift.  But by 1989, renewed agency 
efforts to deregulate were being upheld by courts.88 The SEC also took a cautious 
approach to its activities during the 1980s and 1990s, while constantly facing 
                                            
86 Rogers, Age of Fracture, 42. 
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budgetary pressure from Congress with little support from either Republican or 
Democratic administrations on policy initiatives or appointments.89  The SEC 
increasingly failed to engage in enforcement of existing rules, its powers sapped by 
budget cuts and a growing ‘revolving door’ culture of interchange between 
regulators and financial firms.90 
These various deregulatory measures played a direct role in driving the 
boom of subprime lending,  foreclosures, mortgage-backed derivatives, short term 
commercial paper markets, and other contributors to what eventually became the 
2008 financial crisis.91  Under Alan Greenspan, the Fed declined to regulate the 
range of new financial products and securities that have emerged out of the 
deregulatory financial sector boom.92  Similarly, regulations on derivatives 
gradually eroded from the 1980s onwards, first by the overseeing agency, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issuing exemptions for swaps 
and declining to regulate derivatives, and then codified by the 2000 Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 exempted derivatives from restrictions, leading 
to an explosion of derivatives trading.93 Perhaps most glaringly, the SEC issued a 
ruling that exempted the largest investment banks from minimum capital 
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requirements, permitting these companies to engage in self-regulation with minimal 
SEC monitoring—a move that seemed to contribute significantly to the boom in 
the kinds of complex and risky mortgage-backed securities that were at the heart 
of the 2008 crisis, and which freed the hands of the major firms Bear Stears, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Lehman Brothers, nearly all of which are now 
defunct or absorbed by other firms following their collapses in 2008-9.94  
This return to ‘free markets’ was backed by an increasingly popular 
ideology of finance. In academic circles, innovations in theoretical economics led to 
conceptual frameworks such as the efficient markets hypothesis, which argued that 
well functioning financial markets would optimally price assets according to risk, 
and therefore allocate social resources most effectively. These academic accounts 
combined with the growing profitability of the financial sector to help drive a new 
generation of financial markets advocates and practitioners.95 The increasing 
economic sway of the financial industry also helped spread this ideology of finance 
throughout political discourse. In addition to direct political lobbying through 
campaign contributions an interest group politics, the financial sector was also able 
to create an environment where policymakers increasingly shared the same 
worldview and preferences as the industry itself, convinced that what was good for 
the financial sector will ultimately be good for the broader economy as a whole. 
Key policymakers like Alan Greenspan at the Fed and liberals such as Robert 
Rubin in the Clinton administration’s Treasury Department presided over but 
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continued deregulation and expansion of the financial sector, convinced that this 
approach would ultimately promote economic growth and social welfare.96 
In a triumph for the laissez-faire view, financial markets gradually came to 
be seen not only as an acceptable feature of the modern economy, but also as an 
attractive policy tool with which to promote economic efficiency, consumer 
welfare, and growth, further relegating the more radical and moralized visions of 
financial regulation into the background. By deregulating the financial sector, 
expanding credit for borrowers, and emphasizing consumption driven prosperity 
for all, policymakers were able to win the support of both consumer activist 
groups and business lobbies, while avoiding more explicit value judgments over the 
allocation of scarce social resources.  Thus, “policymakers’ reliance on market 
mechanisms did not plunge the state into divisive conflicts about how to allocate 
limited resources, … but rather allowed policymakers to dissolve emerging political 
tensions into what for the moment appeared to be a return to prosperity.”97  This 
allure of political neutrality not only helped drive the financialization of the 
economy and set the stage for the run-up to the 2008 crash; it also animated a 
broader shift in political discourse away from substantive questions of the good 
economy towards a more neutral focus on maximizing economic growth.  
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Technocracy redux 
In the face of this deregulatory onslaught, defenders of economic regulation 
reformulated their own ideals, attempting to absorb and thereby defuse the revived 
laissez-faire critique.  Thus, even defenders of the regulatory state after the 1980s 
began to speak in terms of minimizing the costs of regulation, of narrowing the 
purpose of state action to closing market failures, and of employing greater 
cooperative measures between regulation on the one hand and more efficient and 
less coercive market mechanisms on the other.   
This “new Chicago School” of regulation shared with the old Chicago 
school of Milton Friedman an awareness of the social and economic costs of 
regulation, but sought to rescue the technocratic ideal of welfare-enhancing public 
policy by developing new tools for expert regulators themselves.98  Regulators 
themselves thus increasingly turned to measures such as cost-benefit analysis to 
provide objective proof and legitimation for the social value of regulations,99 while 
reforming regulatory policies themselves to allow for more deregulation, market-
based regulation, and self-regulation where possible.100   This new vision of 
regulation would make it more efficient, flexible, and cost-effective.101 
In effect, these efforts to constrain agencies to prevent corruption, capture, 
and ineffectiveness have ironically resulted in a regime that increasingly relies once 
again on the professionalism and expertise of the regulators themselves.  The 
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rationality, professionalism, and expertise of regulators seems to protect against 
the dangers of interest group capture, and ensure effective policymaking.102  As 
Sheila Jasanoff writes, where earlier 1960s and 1970s efforts to reform regulation 
appealed to public participation, this more contemporary turn indicates a return to 
the ideal of expertise.103 This response to the laissez-faire critique thus ironically 
reconstituted the New Deal appeal to expertise and technocracy, but it was a 
different vision of technocracy than the one espoused by Landis and early New 
Dealers.  In place of their confidence in regulatory expertise and mastery, these 
new defenders of regulation appealed to the value of appropriately-constrained 
expertise—expertise bound by the requirements of cost-benefit analysis, 
transparency, and ultimately oversight by the democratically-elected Executive.  
Defenders of economic regulation thus absorbed the critique leveled by 
resurgent laissez-faire thought, moving towards a more minimalist, market-friendly 
approach to economic regulation—a more chastised regulatory state, in contrast to 
the kind of aggressive vision of early New Deal architects like Landis.   
 
A turn to democratic theory 
With the revived laissez-faire critique of the regulatory state we come back 
full circle to where this Part began, with the Obama era efforts to respond to the 
2008 financial crisis.  The trajectory of ideas of economic governance—from 
aggressive New Deal regulation that harnessed technocracy to pursue Progressive 
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Era reform visions, to a more chastised regulatory state that preserved its 
commitment to technocracy but increasingly took a more market-friendly 
approach to policy in an attempt to stave off controversy and anxiety over 
regulatory power—helps explain how the financial regulatory system inherited by 
Obama had become one that combined both unaccountable technocratic 
governance and increasingly market-friendly policies.  
The policy response to the 2008 crisis follows the recent tradition of 
managerial and technocratic regulation as outlined in this chapter, appealing to 
technocratic oversight, with relatively limited structural impositions on too-big-to-
fail firms, while still facing ongoing concerns about the exercise of technocratic 
authority.  This technocratic vision presents itself as the solution to the problems 
of the market: regulatory agencies possess the expertise and authority to correct 
the failures and mitigate the harms of market society, while their very expertise and 
insulation from ordinary democratic politics bind them to promoting only the 
public good.  But this approach is particularly problematic for, as Chapter 3 
outlined, the central force of the laissez-faire critique is the concern of corruption 
and capture on the one hand, and an appeal to markets as more effective social 
institutions for promoting the public good free of such corruption on the other.  It 
is the revived version of this critique that helped animate efforts to dismantle the 
New Deal state, and continues to bedevil efforts to expand and reform economic 
regulation today. The end result of these critiques was to create a more 
technocratic and chastened regulatory state, one that absorbed the laissez-faire 
celebration of markets, and which saw the role of the state in terms of the 
minimalist deployment of expertise to manage and optimize the market order. 
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But the technocratic approach to economic governance is not the only way 
to deliver on the critique of laissez-faire that animated Progressive Era thinkers, 
and which seems even more relevant today after the 2008 crisis. As these last two 
chapters suggest, early twentieth century critics of the market generated a much 
wider array of ideas, institutions, and aspirations than those that remain after the 
consolidation and erosion of the technocratic vision over the rest of the twentieth 
century. Indeed, this critique of the market can lead alternatively to a more 
aggressive approach to responding to the exercise of private and market power, 
through a democratically participatory, responsive, and accountable institutional 
channel than the technocratic managerial approach. This democratic alternative 
appeals to the political engagement of citizens themselves to drive checks on both 
markets and expert agencies. The democratic tradition of participatory Progressive 
Era thinkers like Dewey and Brandeis offers some starting points for a revived 
















5 ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AS A PROBLEM OF AGENCY  
 
The mainstream response to the 2008 financial crisis followed the New 
Deal-inspired playbook.  In the face of market failure and economic upheaval, 
reformers turned to the promise of insulated, expert regulators to manage financial 
markets.  But this was not the only way to understand or respond to the financial 
crisis.  A more radical group of reformers argued for a very different approach.  
Instead of focusing on the more limited goal of mitigating market failures, these 
reformers argued for more structural changes in an economy that had become too 
dominated by finance.  Instead of pursuing these policies through expert oversight, 
these reformers also saw a greater role for public mobilization and structural limits 
on the size and capacities of financial firms. As with the pre-New Deal Populists 
and Progressives, these radical voices in 2009-2010 saw economic governance not 
as a matter of technical management of the market, but as partly a moral problem 
raised by the economic power of finance, and partly a political problem of 
disparity of influence between industry and ordinary citizens. 
This tension among reformers suggests the potential of an alternative, more 
democratic approach to economic governance.  But the weakness of this alternative 
reform vision in practice speaks to its relatively emaciated form in contemporary 
political discourse.  We are familiar with the claim to self-optimizing markets or to 
expert oversight, but these more moralized, democratic arguments for strict limits 
on financial firms and a greater role for citizen mobilization raise skepticism.  
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These next three chapters outline a normative account of democratic economic 
governance that can ground such reform alternatives.    
This chapter argues that the problem of economic governance should be 
understood not as a technical matter of policy design to be addressed through 
scientific expertise, but rather as a fundamentally moral problem of power. First, 
there is the problem of private power, where individual actors or firms exercise 
undue influence over the wellbeing of individuals and society by virtue of their 
command over economic and political resources.  Second, there is the problem of 
market power, where the aggregate system of market exchange creates dynamics 
that unduly constrain individual or collective opportunities.  Both of these types of 
power threaten a core moral value of agency—the capacity of individuals and 
groups to author their own lives.  Recasting economic governance as a project of 
protecting agency against private and market power suggests a very different 
motivation for political action than the approach presumed by technocratic views 
of economic governance.  The turn to politics, in this more moralized account, is 
motivated out of a desire to secure the agency of citizens against private and 
systematic threats.  While this may involve complex policy responses, it is a 
fundamentally different motivation than the technocratic notion of optimizing 
market functioning.   
This focus on the moral value of agency also suggests a framework for 
shaping the exercise of state power to respond to the moral threats of the market. 
The ideal of agency suggests that there is a legitimate moral critique of technocratic 
regulation.  Even if the regulatory state addresses the moral problems of the 
market, it poses its own threat to agency if such actions are too distanced from our 
own roles as democratic citizens.  For critics of the market, then, there is an 
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additional challenge of structuring our response to the problems of private and 
market power in ways that express, rather than displace or undermine, citizen 
political agency.    
 
The market as a threat to agency 
As outlined in Part I above, the technocratic view of economic governance 
built on critiques of the market by harnessing the capacities of neutral expertise to 
promote the public good.  But this technocratic turn represents only one possible 
manifestation of the rich criticisms of laissez-faire developed during that pre-New 
Deal period of economic upheaval. From legal realist thinkers like Morris Cohen 
and Roger Hale to jurists like Louis Brandeis and philosophers like John Dewey, 
these Progressive Era thinkers developed a sophisticated critique of market society 
that still carries force today.  Drawing from these thinkers, a common theme 
emerges: the problem of the market is not fully captured by economistic concepts 
such as “market failure.”  Rather, the most pressing moral challenge of the market 
is in its threat to the agency of individual citizens, groups, and the polity as a 
whole.  Market actors and aggregate market forces can undermine the individual’s 
agency to live a meaningful life; at the same time, these actors and forces defy the 
abilities of the individuals and groups affected to contest and check these 
constraints on their agency.  Specifically, these threats take two forms: the problem 
of concentrated private power such as that of large corporations, and the problem 
of systematic market power, where the aggregate dynamics of market forces 




Whether in the form of highly influential economic elite such as hedge fund 
managers or powerful “too-big-to-fail” firms like Lehman Brothers, there are a 
number of entities who possess the power to impact a wide range of economic 
actors, through their direct impact on the economy, as well as through their 
abilities to leverage this economic power into political influence on public policy.  
Yet these actors are accountable to only a very small subset of those who are 
potentially affected by their actions.  Nor do these private entities arise out of a 
‘natural’ process of achieving efficient economic production; the powers and 
capacities of these firms are themselves a product of a legal regime that has often 
been influenced to favor firm interests.1 
This threat of concentrated private power can take a number of forms.  The 
most familiar threat arises from the danger that elites of this kind can dominate 
those in less powerful positions beneath them.  Within the firm, owners and 
managers possess disproportionate authority over the livelihood, wellbeing, and 
life opportunities of workers within the firm.  The hierarchical structure of most 
corporations create “islands of command” within the ‘free’ market,2 as the 
experience of most workers within the workplace is very much one of subjection to 
managerial authority.3 This “arena of authority and control” of managers over 
workers within the firm belies the laissez-faire defense of the market as a domain 
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of free exchange that generates greater freedom, productivity, and social progress.4 
These forms of power in market society have long since informed turns to 
regulation in an effort to mitigate such unchecked authority over workers, for 
example through regulations protecting labor standards and shareholder rights. 
Such private power also creates repercussions for those outside the 
immediate authority of corporate managers or owners.  In a market society, 
entities that command greater wealth can exercise indirect control over the flow of 
money, goods, and opportunities in society—for example, by shaping market 
prices, influencing other buyers and sellers, or leveraging their wealth for political 
and social advantage.5 While capitalism as a system is premised on competition, 
the modern economic landscape does not match the ideal of small firms in a 
competitive market; rather, many industries are marked with large, powerful firms 
that have high concentrations of wealth and power within the industry.  These are 
precisely the kinds of concerns that animated Progressive Era antitrust activists; in 
contrast to contemporary anti-trust discourses, these reformers sought to curtail 
concentrated economic power not in the name of consumer welfare and lower 
prices for goods.  Monopoly pricing was noted, but it was not the main offense; it 
was, rather, a symptom of the power exercised by big firms over the well-being of 
citizens who had no control over the decisions of these firms.6  
There is another related manifestation of private power, where large firms 
or highly wealthy individuals leverage their economic wealth to influence the 
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political process, skewing public policy to favor their interests over the general 
public.   This is part of the concern arising in context of large firms from the 
Standard Oil monopoly of the nineteenth century to the threat of too-big-to-fail 
(TBTF) banks today. The problem here is not one of direct or indirect economic 
power, but rather the degree to which economic power is translated into political 
power and influence.  This concern manifests, for example, in debates over 
lobbying influence, revolving door policies for state officials, and campaign finance 
reform efforts. This influence can take the form of both direct pressure, as well as 
more subtle forms of cultural, ideological, or prestige-based influence.    
In all of these cases, the core problem is that a particular set of private 
actors have, by virtue of their accumulated wealth, the capacity to dominate others 
in society whether directly, indirectly, or through their capture of the policy 
process. The problem, in other words, is the lack of sufficiently powerful channels 
through which citizens can contest the exercise of power by the economic elite.  
The remedy to this problem may involve familiar mechanisms of redistribution or 
social insurance but the root of the problem is not just a matter of disparate 
economic resources; it is one of disparate power.   
Today this concern with private domination by concentrated economic 
interests is relatively underemphasized.  In the prevailing technocratic 
understanding of economic policy, these concerns are understood in more narrow 
economistic terms, robbed of their political-emancipatory potential.  For example, 
to the extent that anti-trust efforts exist today, they focus more narrowly on unfair 
pricing and competitive practices.  In the financial crisis, the problem of TBTF 
banks has been predominantly understood in terms of the economic costs that such 
firms might impose through the risk of their potential collapse.  But TBTF is 
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arguably better understood as a problem of political and economic domination 
threatened by such concentrations of economic influence.  
 
Market power 
Distinct from the concentrated power of private actors, there is another 
threat to agency that arises from the aggregate system of the market.  This threat 
arises in two mechanisms.   
First, although markets nominally allow voluntary choice, market 
exchanges are in fact structured coercive interactions, depending on the differential 
bargaining power of conflicting groups—buyers and sellers, employers and labor.  
Where differences in bargaining position are too great, market outcomes can be 
exploitative.  This critique was forcefully made by legal realist thinkers as 
described in Chapter 3 above.   
Second, markets create a more indirect form of decentralized or diffused 
coercion, where systematic and structural effects arise from the aggregation of 
individual transactions that impose a constraint on individual freedom and well-
being. Unlike the problem of private power, the impact on others here arises from 
no single blameworthy actor, but rather from the aggregation of actions under 
existing incentive and rules.  Market power points to the ways in which the 
decentralized system of market transactions aggregates into market forces that 
narrow the choice set of individuals, particularly when arising against a 
background condition of economic inequality.  These market forces are socially 
constructed—they can be reshaped and channeled in different ways depending on 
the background structure of private law of contract, property, torts, and through 
state regulation.  But to each individual, these forces seem exogenous, seemingly 
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natural order, against which individuals must optimize or to which they must 
adapt.  
This more diffuse form of “market power” can manifest in different ways. 
Markets can be thought of as coercive in that they condition freely-chosen benefits 
on meeting unrelated conditions which themselves are harmful to the chooser.7 
Markets may also be seen as coercive in that free choices provide people with 
better outcomes than the otherwise would have enjoyed, but these outcomes 
remain below what might be considered normatively preferable.  For example, 
choosing to sell one’s labor may make the worker better off by providing more 
income, but if the wages are insufficient, then the worker’s well-being while 
improved remains below a moral baseline.  Finally, markets can be seen as systems 
which narrow our choice sets in the first place.  Thus, while the actual choice may 
be voluntary, a choice between two unsavory options is hardly meaningful 
freedom.  Viewed in this way, markets need to be supplemented by an expansion 
of individual capabilities and agency.  “The fact that these evils [of suffering in 
market society] are the product of voluntary choices hardly justifies them: free 
choice within a set of options does not justify the set of options itself,” argues 
Elizabeth Anderson.  “The primary subject of justice is the institutional 
arrangements that generate people’s opportunities over time.”8  Further, “people’s 
real or hypothetical market choices offer no guidance whatsoever to what citizens 
are obligated to provide to one another on a collective basis.”9   
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Consider an individual job-seeker in a highly competitive market.  To cut 
costs, firms will necessarily seek to reduce labor costs by offering lower wages, 
creating a “race to the bottom” as wage levels drop.  The decline in wages is the 
product of human action, aggregated across firms and participants in the market 
for that particular good.  But in the aggregate, it is experienced as an exogenous 
constraint on the job-seeker: of all the jobs she can seek, the wage levels remain 
too low to provide sufficient basic income.  To the extent that other essential 
goods for living such as food, healthcare, and the like, are also subject to market 
forces of supply and demand, the constraint experienced from declining wages 
magnifies the vulnerability of the job-seeker in these other markets where her 
ability to acquire the necessary goods for life is dependent on her wage income.  
The financial crisis offers another telling example.  The crisis itself arose 
from a combination of subprime lending, securitization, and risky financial 
innovations like credit default swaps that created a highly instable system of 
financial risk with harmful effects for many workers, homeowners, and pensioners.  
Although there certainly was widespread fraud and abuse, this system arose not 
through any one actor’s malfeasance but rather through the aggregated impact of 
individually rational and legal decisions.  The systemic nature of the financial crisis 
captures a broader feature of market society: markets clearly have an effect on 
individual capacities, options, and choices, but these constraints arise from a 
combination of disparities in bargaining power between individual parties to a 
market transaction and aggregate effects of otherwise unintentional or legitimate 
transactions. At the same time, such diffuse systemic market forces are largely 
immune to contestation or check: while we are all harmed by systemic financial 
risk, very few of us have the economic or political resources to influence every 
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individual actor who contributed to the entire system of securitization, lending, 
and systemic risk.  
Thus, unlike paradigmatic cases of state tyranny or monopolistic 
malfeasance, markets are defined by patterns of behavior in which no single actor 
is responsible, but where the aggregation of thousands of transactions can create a 
systemic force that poses a very real threat to individual freedoms.  In this way, a 
diffused and decentralized system such as the market can nevertheless constrain 
individual freedom and agency—whether by creating risks for economic collapse, 
or, for example, low wages through “race to the bottom” competition for cheap 
labor. Such structural or systemic power represents another form of domination, 
albeit one that arises from a diffused and decentralized system.  
 
Politics as a response to private and market power 
Viewing the market economy as a moral problem of power suggests that 
our response must expand the capacities of individuals and groups who are 
affected to contest and challenge such exercises of power.  Private power and 
market power constrain the agency of individuals to live meaningful lives, 
subjecting them to the direct effects of powerful entities like large corporations or 
to the indirect and aggregate effects of market forces.  But these threats are 
magnified because individuals as individuals lack the capacities to contest or 
challenge these imposed constraints.  
The most pernicious moral threat of the market is therefore the way in 
which it undermines the very concept of political agency. The market as a concept 
seems to remove these kinds of problems of private and market power outside the 
 168 
realm of politics and human agency.  We refer to “market forces” and “the 
market” as a monolithic entity that decides things like prices or wages in the 
manner of akin to the forces of nature, the weather, or the turning of the planets.10 
The very decentralized nature of market society that makes it difficult to justify 
economic regulations, for they appear as unduly coercive constraints on an 
otherwise seemingly free market system.11  But as noted by Progressive critics of the 
market explored in Chapter 3, the market is not simply a natural system, but 
rather a product of background policies, laws, and distributions of power and 
wealth.  These background conditions are themselves a result of political decisions, 
and are not necessarily morally perfect or socially optimal.  The veneer of market 
freedom obscures realities of power, intimidation, coercion, and manipulation.12  
The market as a concept constrains the realm of political and conceptual 
                                            
10 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Books, 2001).  As Polanyi notes, 
laissez-faire rests on a view that the economy is governed by ‘natural’ laws beyond the scope of 
human agency.  Such a conceptualization of economic order implies “no less than the running of 
society as an adjunct to the market” (60).  It is this mindset that can undermine efforts to promote 
economic welfare and poverty-reduction policies.  “The true significance of the tormenting problem 
of poverty now stood revealed,” argues Polanyi. “Economic society was subject to laws which were 
not human laws” (131).  
11 See e.g., Friedrich von Hayek, “Social or Distributive Justice”, in Chiaki Nishiyama and Kurt 
Leube, eds., The Essence of Hayek (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 62-99.  The 
decentralized nature of market society makes it difficult to justify decommodifying intervention and 
welfare state provisions against the charge that such policies represent undue coercion and 
interference with individual freedom. Hayek himself tellingly refutes such claims of social justice 
precisely on the grounds that there is no identifiable coercer or violator who has “caused” poverty 
or unemployment, and thus without a coercer, there can be no legitimate claim of justice.  For 
Hayek, the market is a decentralized and impersonal process.  Incomes and distributive shares “are 
the outcome of a process the effect of which on particular people was neither intended nor foreseen 
by anyone when the institutions first appeared,” and “to demand justice form such a process is 
clearly absurd, and to single out some people in such a society as entitled to a particular share 
evidently unjust” (65).  Since these claims of justice cannot identify a specific person who has been 
unjust, there is no one against whom to make a claim.  As a result, the idea of justice “has no 
application to the manner in which the impersonal process of the market allocates command over 
goods and services to particular people: this can be neither just nor unjust, because the results are 
not intended or foreseen, and depend on a multitude of circumstances not known in their totality to 
anybody” (70).  Hayek thus rejects claims of socioeconomic rights and efforts to establish a welfare 
state, because in a decentralized market system, it is unclear against whom these claims are make. 
12 See e.g., Lindblom, The Market System, 90-2, 171-2, 188. 
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possibility, constituting a deeper threat to the very idea of agency. Although any 
wealthy society can afford a range of different socioeconomic regimes, a real 
interrogation of alternatives is limited by a constrained discourse that is overly 
bound by the market as a way of thinking.13  
The challenge, then, is to repoliticize the functioning of the market—to 
make it a subject of political debate, a system amenable to reformulation and 
human agency.  This repoliticization can partly be achieved through private 
association.  The trade union and consumer rights movements, for example, 
highlight how individuals can form associations to force accountability and 
changes in the behavior of private actors and market participants.  In the financial 
crisis, NGOs and community groups played a large role in mobilizing to pressure 
banks to alter their lending policies.  But the state must necessarily play a role, for 
the state offers a source of coercive power that can be deployed to oversee and 
regulate such exercises of private and market power at a macro level. Indeed, it is 
equally notable that the efforts of citizen and consumer watchdog groups were 
insufficient to prevent predatory lending prior to the 2008 crash—and the 
successes of such popular mobilization often depend on eventual policy responses 
from the state to generate broad impact.  It is through the state that we achieve the 
collective capacities and power to reshape the economy as a whole.   
Where there is a problem of private power, the need is to ensure democratic 
accountability of economic—and governmental—elites.14 To respond to the 
problems of market society, the state emerges as a critical instrumentality through 
                                            
13 Charles Lindblom, “The Market as Prison,” Journal of Politics 44:2 (1982), 324-36, at 333-4. 
14 See e.g. Lindblom, Market System, 65-8. 
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which affected citizens can be sufficiently empowered in their ability to contest and 
check the exercises of private or market power.  The problem of private power 
suggests a motivation for some forms of regulation like antitrust, workplace safety, 
and campaign finance. Where there is a problem of systemic or market power, the 
need is to develop policies that ensure basic minimum standards of welfare and 
well-being.  The problem of market power points to the value of other major 
innovations in economic and social policy: minimum standards such as wage floors 
and consumer protections;15 subsidies to enable basic needs to be accessible to all 
such as food stamps; and social insurance schemes that seek to insulate individuals 
from the dynamics of market supply and demand in key areas,16 such as 
unemployment insurance and health insurance.  
More broadly, such policies can be justified as providing, through politics, 
the collective goods that we all require to enjoy fulfilling life opportunities.17  This 
grounding for economic regulation contrasts with market-based views of freedom 
as individual choice over commodities valued on the basis of their market price.18  
This agency-based view of regulation also contrasts with technocratic 
understandings of economic policy that view the substantive goals of regulation in 
more narrow terms of closing of market failures or optimizing market functioning.  
In mainstream contemporary discourse, regulation rarely refers to the ultimate 
                                            
15 See e.g. Joseph Singer, “Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Standards 
for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society,” Harvard Law and Policy Review 2 
(2008), 139-160.   
16 See e.g. David Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
17 See e.g. Elizabeth Anderson, “The Ethical Limitations of the Market,” Economics and 
Philosophy 6 (1990), 179-205, at 192-5. 
18 Anderson, “Ethical Limits of the Market,” 180-2. 
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moral ends of markets, preferring to focus on more neutral goals of efficiency and 
growth.  The purposes of regulation can be understood more broadly as providing 
collectively-valued moral ends and goods—goals which necessarily require 
institutional coordination across individuals and groups to jointly produce these 
ends and goods.19  
This emphasis on agency, however, also carries implications for the process 
by which such economic policies are developed.  If private power and market 
power threaten individual agency, so to does the potential power of the state.  
Democratic accountability and voice offer the promise of checking such state 
power, by transforming the action of the state from an external imposition into an 
expression of our own collective agency. Agencies should not be seen as sites of 
rationality, but rather as sites of democratic action—spaces in which citizens can 
participate, engage, and thereby experience democratic self-government.  Indeed, 
this view of agency requires that we create institutions that can facilitate the 
collective action of citizens, particularly on matters of economic justice, for it is 
through collective political action that these substantive goals can and must be 
met.20  This poses a challenge for regulatory institutions, which operate at a 
remove from democratic politics.  
 
                                            
19 See e.g. Seumas Miller, “Global Financial Institutions, Ethics, and Market Fundamentalism,” in 
Ned Dobos, Christian Barry, and Thomas Pogge, Global Financial Crisis: The Ethical Issues 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), 24-51, at 32, 38. 
20 See e.g. Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” 309-10, 313. 
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Technocracy as a threat to agency 
Much of the substantive policies of the modern regulatory state can 
therefore be justified as addressing the moral problems of private and market 
power.  But this agency-based view also carries important implications for the 
ways in which such regulation is structured and exercised.  The instrumentalities of 
the state, even if directed to these justified goals of contesting private and market 
power, pose their own threat to agency to the extent that state regulatory 
institutions fall prey to interest group capture, unaccountability, and 
unresponsiveness. The financial crisis, for example, suggests the need for greater 
oversight by regulatory agencies like the SEC, while also underscoring the degree 
to which these agencies, insulated from ordinary channels of democratic 
accountability, are themselves at risk for being captured by industry, or being 
inadequately responsive to the public. If private and market power undermine the 
claims of free market defenders, so too does this concern with public power 
undermine the appeal to technocracy as a response to the problems of the market.  
In the same way that the concept of agency highlights the problems of the 
market economy, it also lends credence to laissez-faire critiques of the state. As 
suggested in Chapter 3, laissez-faire thought drew on an institutional sociology 
describing the market as more robust to corruption, more efficient in its use of 
information, more adaptable and responsive to the diversity and complexity of 
modern society.  The market, in this view, is an effective social institution can 
organize and coordinate social activity not through central planning, but through 
the aggregated interactions between individual market participants; as a result the 
market can achieve socially beneficial collective outcomes such as product 
innovation, growth, and the allocation of goods and services without relying on 
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the superhuman knowledge or virtue of individual rulers or decision-makers.21  The 
normative vision of freedom as negative liberty is thus paired with an institutional 
sociology that presents the market as a more reliable, effective, and relatively 
corruption-proof mechanism for realizing these normative ideals and promoting 
overall social welfare and justice.22  This is what makes the laissez-faire critique so 
compelling an attack on technocratic institutions: it is not just a rejection of the 
state, but a combined moral and institutional critique of the state—and a 
constructive defense of the market as an alternative.  To the extent that modern 
societies have failed to promote justice or growth, it is because our institutions for 
public policy lack the robustness to corruption, the efficiency, and the 
responsiveness to individual preferences and changing conditions exhibited by the 
market system itself; we would instead, in this argument, be better served by 
promoting decentralized preference-aggregating institutions like markets to better 
promote welfare, justice, and liberty.23  
As suggested in Chapter 4, the modern technocratic vision tries to absorb 
these concerns by doubling down on the expertise, neutrality, and objectivity of 
regulators themselves.   It also attempts to restore the legitimacy of technocratic 
regulation by adopting market-based regulatory strategies, such as the use of cost-
benefit analysis, public-private partnerships, and minimalist light-touch regulatory 
                                            
21 See e.g. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in Essence of Hayek, 211–24; Lindblom, 
The Market System, 4-50. 
22 See e.g. John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
23 See e.g. Margaret Somers, Fred Block, “From Poverty to Perversity: Ideas, Markets, and 
Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate,” American Sociological Review 70:2 (2005), 260-
287 (arguing that the rise of market fundamentalism in welfare reform debates in the 1980s and 
1990s arose in part from the epistemic clout of free-market thinking that explained the persistence 
of poverty and the failures of public policy as a result of both a moral and an institutional-
sociological failure.) 
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strategies like disclosure aimed at optimizing rather than constraining market 
functioning.24 But these efforts cannot overcome the laissez-faire challenge because 
the technocratic ideal ultimately undermines the same value of agency that 
motivates the turn to the state in economic governance in the first place.  In other 
words, while the policies problems of private and market power pose threats to 
individual and collective agency—thus motivating the turn to state regulatory 
regimes—the technocratic regulatory state itself institutionalizes these policies in 
ways that risk undermining agency from a different direction. 
First, the appeal to insulated, technocratic institutions of governance is 
insufficient to overcome the danger of potential domination of citizens by private 
actors and social elites. While the model of insulated technocratic decision-making 
is often motivated as a response to the dangers of special interests capturing 
institutions of the state to pursue their own private agenda, the narrowing of space 
for participation can just as easily facilitate the situation of various forms of elite 
domination.  Without the check provided by robust participatory institutions, it 
seems likely that economic and political elites will arrogate unto themselves excess 
state and private power.25 Indeed, well-connected and sophisticated political 
actors—such as regulated industries, corporations, and social elites more 
                                            
24 See e.g. Chapter 4 above. 
25 See John McCormick, “Machiavelli Against Republicanism: On the Cambridge School’s 
Guicciardinian Moments,” Political Theory 31:5 (2003), 615-643; “Contain the Wealthy and 
Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government,” American Political 
Science Review 100:2 (2006), 147-163; and Machiavellian Democracy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).  McCormick argues that the elites who threaten contemporary democracies 
are in fact the wealthy, and that greater participatory institutions are needed to strengthen the 
political power of ordinary citizens as a check on elite interests. See also Ian Shapiro, The State of 
Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).  Shapiro argues that “democracy 
is better thought of as a means of managing power relations so as to minimize domination,” (3) but 
that in so doing, democracy must therefore expand the range of political contestation and pay 
particular attention to problems of economic domination and inequality. 
 175 
generally—are more likely to continue to be able to influence policy making 
despite the range of barriers erected to protect technocratic bodies, while it is 
precisely those less organized, less sophisticated actors who are likely to be 
screened out by such insulation.  The effort to construct insulated regulatory 
bodies thus risks creating and compounding problems of misrepresentation and 
inequalities of political power.  
Second, the efficiency and effectiveness gains of technocratic policy making 
often presume that the public good is a determinate object to be executed, having 
already been identified or established through some legislative or other political 
mechanism. Yet it is precisely in the effort to articulate and construct a common 
good in a complex society that democratic politics emerges as vital. The 
participation of the public and the groups beyond technocrats and elites, it is 
unclear what exactly the common good might be. It is only for inclusive political 
discussion and participation that provisional understandings of the common good 
can be articulated in the first place.  Nor is it sufficient to rely solely on the 
national legislature, since the same normative value considerations and balancing 
of interests reappears at various stages of regulatory policymaking.  Both the threat 
of elite influence and the need for inclusive participation to construct the public 
good suggest the technocratic regulatory state, with its focus on insulated expert 
policymakers, undermines political agency even as it attempts to resolve problems 
posed by market society. 
There is a deeper problem, however: the very structure of depoliticizing 
technocratic governance threatens the broader vitality of democratic agency itself.  
While the technocratic impulse may promote the common good by insulating 
certain policy decisions from the influence of the democratic majority or other 
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special interest groups, as this impulse becomes more widespread, the very concept 
of democratic self-governance becomes displaced. These technocratic institutions 
“usurp” the democratic agency of citizens—even if their policies were to effectively 
track the common good.  As Patchen Markell writes, depoliticization 
might be at the same time useful for and dangerous to democratic politics: 
the very mechanisms by which we effectively avoid certain forms of 
domination (like majoritarian tyranny) may simultaneously have the effect 
of undermining citizen involvement in the everyday practice of governance 
by presenting certain matters as the special province of experts or 
professionals, or by removing the conduct of depoliticized institutions from 
public view.26 
 
Citizen participation contestation is critical to check the arbitrary power of 
the state, as well as the power of other interests, but citizens will only participate if 
they see such engagement as intrinsically valuable.27   The danger of the 
technocratic framework is that not only does it narrow the scope for democratic 
agency, it gradually contaminates and hollows out the very concept.  The 
proliferation of depoliticized bodies devalues political participation at best, openly 
feeds a rejection of the value of democratic participation at worst.  The result can 
be a dangerous undermining of the participatory ideal, to the point where citizens 
themselves become increasingly demobilized and disconnected from politics.  The 
effort to curtail participation because of a fear of majority tyranny by placing 
greater power in insulated technocratic bodies is therefore problematic because of 
its broader demobilizing effects. 
 
                                            
26 Patchen Markell, “The Insufficiency of Non-Domination,” Political Theory 36:1 (2008), 9-36, at 
29. 
27 Markell, “Insufficiency of Non-Domination,” 29.  
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In search of a more democratic regulatory state 
The problems of the market and of technocracy suggest that the value of 
agency takes on multiple dimensions.  Not only are there threats to agency from 
private and market power as identified by Progressive critics of the market; there 
are also threats from unaccountable state institutions as highlighted by laissez-faire 
thinkers.  Taken together, these critiques point to the value of a more democratic 
approach to economic regulation.  It suggests that we view regulation not as the 
province of insulated, neutral experts managing the market economy in the name 
of the public good, but rather that we approach regulation as a distinctly 
democratic project, where citizens collectively engage in the practice and 
experience of self-government, through direct participation in the crafting of those 
regulations and rules that shape the workings of the economy itself.    
In this “agency conception” of the regulatory state, regulation becomes 
more than a residual response to the market, or even a system for redistribution 
and provision of basic needs mechanism; instead it is more importantly a political 
apparatus for facilitating cooperation and political action on economic matters.28  
The purpose of the regulatory state, in this broader view, is to enable the ongoing 
political capacity of individuals to reshape economic society—the state provides 
both the forum in which these debates can take place, and the instrumentalities 
through which responses are made real.  In turn, these state institutions must 
themselves be contestable by individuals so as not to create another threat of 
unaccountable public power.   
                                            
28 See e.g. Joseph Heath, “The Benefits of Cooperation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 34:4 
(2006).  
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Further, by putting the normative value of agency at the center, this account 
of economic regulation also suggests that regulatory agencies themselves must be 
constituted in a particular way.  It is not enough, for example, to implement a 
redistributive program through a highly centralized and insulated bureaucratic 
apparatus, since the goal is not purely a shift in income or risk.  Rather, these 
policies must themselves be enacted in ways that continue to facilitate and expand 
the agency capacity of individuals—their ability to be political actors empowered 
to continually remake their economy and society as needed.  This suggests that 
regulatory agencies cannot simply implement policy directives; rather they must do 
so in ways that supplement rather than supplant the political agency of citizens 
themselves.  For example, economic regulation may well require the use of experts, 
and an insulation from certain kinds of electoral politics.  But this turn to expertise 
and insulation can be dangerous if it results in a supplanting of the political agency 
of ordinary citizens, by further narrowing the scope for and contexts of political 
action.29  The challenge then becomes a matter of navigating this tension between 
harnessing the institutions of the state to respond to the problems of the market, 
while also ensuring that such state action remains accountable and responsive to 
the citizenry itself.  
This agency-based argument thus distills and clarifies the fundamental 
challenge for economic governance today.  On the one hand, the problems of the 
market economy—private and market power—demand the creation of state 
institutions and policies that can address these threats to individual and collective 
agency.  These institutions would not only check exercises of private and market 
                                            
29 See e.g. Markell, “Insufficiency of Non-Domination”. 
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power; they would do so in a way that magnifies the agency of citizens to govern 
their own economic futures.  But the very institutions we create to meet this need 
themselves pose a threat to agency.  To the extent that the complexity of 
addressing private and market power induces us to build regulatory agencies that 
emphasize expertise over the seemingly dangerous instabilities of democratic 
politics, these institutions by their very separation from democracy raise their own 
potential threats to agency.  As Gerald Frug writes,  
Bureaucracy is the primary form of organized power in America today, and 
it is therefore a primary target for those who seek liberation from modern 
forms of human domination.  The ideology that reassures us that 
bureaucracy is legitimate is demobilizing because it conceals the need to 
reorder American society to bring to life better versions of the ideal of 
human freedom.30  
 
The only alternative, for Frug, is to build an alternative institutional 
structure that ensures such an ideal of freedom where citizens can “creat[e] for 
themselves the form of organized existence within which they live.”31   
Viewed from the standpoint of agency, then, both free markets and 
technocracy do not simply rationalize economic governance; they sterilize it, and 
remove it from the scope of our collective agency.  This makes their failures 
particularly difficult to undo, overcome, or revise.  Like the market, the appeal of 
technocracy is precisely that regulators themselves are insulated from the 
corruption, irrationality, and political distortions of ordinary democratic politics. 
By removing policy decisions from the reach of democratic politics, technocracy 
attempts to at once depoliticize these issues, to immunize them from democratic 
                                            
30 Gerald Frug, “The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law,” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983-
4), 1276-1388, at 1294. 
31 Frug, “Ideology of Bureaucracy,” 1296. 
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contest, and in so doing achieve the necessary latitude to make socially-optimal 
policy decisions.  Such depoliticization emaciates the very value of agency at both 
the level of individuals and societies.32  
This commonality points to the reasons why technocracy cannot generate 
the kind of response needed to the laissez-faire critique.  In its distrust of politics, 
and in its effort to absorb the criticisms of laissez-faire, it divorces itself from the 
moral energies that could animate and sustain the reform aspirations with respect 
to the market—a substantive vision of economic justice, or an appeal to the 
democratic agency of citizens.  But what then is the alternative? To the extent that 
technocratic institutions suffer from potential problems of capture, corruption, or 
unresponsiveness, the laissez-faire solution of deregulation is untenable because 
that simply trades one threat to agency for another, the threats of the market for 
the threats of the regulator.  The answer, I suggest, is to reconstitute the state’s role 
in economic governance as a more deeply democratic project. The problem of 
economic governance thus suggests the need for both a more robust regulatory role 
for the state, and institutions and practices to subject such regulatory actions to 
democratic contestation, sanction, and ownership.  Where the instrumentalities of 
the state are too removed from such democratic contest, then the state’s actions 
however well-intentioned as a response to private and market forms of domination 
itself raises the specter of unaccountable and potentially arbitrary power. 
This concern about the tension between democratic self-rule and the 
exercise of regulatory authority has been a central concern in debates over the 
regulatory state since the New Deal.  Contemporary administrative law purports to 
                                            
32 See e.g. Patchen Markell, “Rule of the People: Arendt, Arche, and Democracy,” American 
Political Science Review 100:1 (2006), 1-14. 
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have resolved this tension through institutional arrangements that bind regulatory 
agencies to serving the public good as determined by legitimate democratic 
procedures.  But as we shall see in the next chapter, these attempts are flawed, in 
effect sanctifying and reproducing the basic problem of technocratic authority that 
is exercised too far removed from the contestation and voice of democratic citizens.  
We therefore need a better theory of democracy that rescues and reconstitutes the 
regulatory state as a vehicle for addressing the problems of private and market 
power.  As the next chapter suggests, administrative law claims but fails to provide 
such an account—but it does provide some resources for the development of such a 




6 THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
 
The challenge for the modern regulatory state is to find a way to harness its 
capacities for responding to the threats of private and market power, but to 
structure its authority such that it is an expression of the democratic citizenry.  The 
moral value of regulation derives from the degree to which the practice of 
regulation manifests the collective capacities of the citizenry to self-govern—to 
remake the social and economic order through politics.  The more regulation is 
seen as an external imposition, an exercise of authority unaccountable and 
unresponsive to the citizenry, this moral foundation erodes.  This is the very 
concern raised both by critics of technocracy and laissez-faire attacks on the state.   
Contemporary administrative law purports to reconcile the exercise of 
regulatory authority with the ideals of democratic self-government through one of 
two main theories: binding agencies to the democratically-sanctioned public good 
through robust oversight of regulation by elected officials; or by recasting agencies 
as sites of expert-led deliberation over the common good in which citizens may be 
consulted.  But these accounts ultimately fail.  Even as they proclaim on the surface 
the moral importance of constituting regulation as an expression of democratic 
self-government, the dominant theories of regulation in administrative law create 
too large a gap between the role of citizens on the one hand, and the actual 
exercise of regulatory authority on the other.  To the extent that administrative 
law offers resources for reconciling democratic self-rule with regulation, it is by 
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pointing to the value of institutionalizing greater forms of representation and 
participation within regulatory agencies.  
 
Oversight, Non-domination, and their limits 
Starting in the late 1990s, Jeffrey Skilling, the leader of Enron, led his 
company to an unprecedented run of record returns.  Skilling’s use of new financial 
leverage and accounting techniques earned him a reputation as a genius.  Yet by 
2006 Skilling was in jail, his company and his accounting firms collapsed. 
Skilling’s success had been built on an accounting illusion that, once revealed, led 
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  In retrospect, the Enron scandal was a dress 
rehearsal for Dodd-Frank. The techniques used by Skilling would later be perfected 
by Lehman Brothers and other Wall Street firms, who used similar “special 
investment vehicles” and “special purpose entities” to engage in massively 
leveraged risky bets without appearing on official balance sheets.1  The response to 
the accounting scandal, like Dodd-Frank eight years later, sought to prevent future 
disasters by creating a new regulatory agency to oversee the accounting industry: 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCOAB).  To ensure the 
Board’s protection from special interests, it was constituted as a highly expert 
body, whose members would be chosen by, but would serve independently of, the 
SEC commissioners—who themselves were chosen by but independent of the 
president.   
                                            
1 See e.g., William Bratton, Adam Levitin, “A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael 
Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs,” University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and 
Economics, Research Paper No. 12-26; Georgetown University Law Center, Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series No. 2126778 (August 13, 2012). 
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In 2010, the Supreme Court struck down this “dual for-cause” structure in 
the case of Free Enterprise Fund v. PCOAB.2  The case is notable because the 
argument between majority and dissent in the case highlights the two main rival 
theories of the regulatory state in contemporary administrative law: the majority’s 
theory of regulation under robust oversight by elected officials, and the dissent’s 
theory of regulation guided by insulated expertise as a legislatively-sanctioned 
process.  Both of these theories justify broad regulatory authority as consistent 
with, and an expression of, the ideal of democratic self-government.  Yet the 
debate between the two sides underscores the degree to which both of these 
accounts are misleading, for in practice, neither does much to address the criticisms 
of technocratic governance as too far removed from the political agency of citizens 
themselves.  
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts argued that to be 
consistent with democratic self-rule, agencies had to be directly accountable to and 
overseen by the democratically-elected president.  The dual for-cause structure was 
therefore unconstitutional, for it created too large a gap between the PCOAB’s 
activities on the one hand, and their accountability to the public through the figure 
of the President on the other.  As a result,  
neither the President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor even an 
officer whose conduct he may review only for good cause, has full control 
over the Board.  The president is stripped of the power our precedents have 
preserved, and his ability to execute the laws—by holding his subordinates 
accountable for their conduct—is impaired.3  
 
                                            
2 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).  
3 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct., at 3154.   
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The problem with such a “diffusion of power” is that it “carries with it a 
diffusion of accountability,” muddling the “clear and effective chain of 
command,” and ultimately undermining public’s ability to hold agencies and 
president to account.4  
In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer leads the liberal bloc on the Court 
defending the insulation of the PCOAB as a necessary protection for regulatory 
expertise. The majority opinion, writes Breyer, “threatens to disrupt severely the 
fair and efficient administration of the laws,” which in turn undermines the ability 
of the state to promote the public good.5  In order to achieve efficient and effective 
governance, Congress must have the flexibility to develop alternative institutional 
forms for agencies.  In some cases, good public policy will require heavy insulation 
from politics—just as Ulysses tied himself to the mast, so too must the political 
branches divest themselves of direct oversight of certain policy areas.6  Such 
delegation is sanctioned by—and thus represents an expression of—the democratic 
public will. The majority opinion, for Breyer, creates the terrifying prospect of 
undermining much of the vast apparatus of the modern regulatory state: 
Reading the [majority’s] criteria above as stringently as possible, I still see 
no way to avoid sweeping hundreds, perhaps thousands of high level 
government officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, putting their 
job security and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally 
at risk.7  
 
                                            
4 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct., at 3155.  
5 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct., at 3162.   
6 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct., at 3168-69. 
7 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct., at 3180.   
 186 
To the extent that unaccountable agencies are a problem, the technocratic 
nature of the agencies should be sufficient, in Breyer’s view, to assuage any 
concerns of unaccountable agency power.  The PCOAB members are “technical 
professional experts,” working in an apolitical independent agency, who must be 
“insulate[d]” from “political influences”.8   
Both Roberts and Breyer couch their theories of regulation in a similar 
appeal to the fundamental ideal of democratic self-rule. In his other writings, 
Breyer espouses a commitment to the “freedom of the individual citizen to 
participate in the government and thereby to share with others the right to make or 
to control the nation’s public acts.”9 Expert deference is consistent with such 
“active liberty” as a way of respecting the implicit will of the democratic 
legislature in empowering such experts in the first place—and as a way of ensuring 
that public policy promotes the common good, as understood by these experts.10 
Roberts counters Breyer’s appeal to politically-insulated and neutral expertise by 
emphasizing the moral value of self-government: 
One can have a government that functions without being ruled by 
functionaries, and a government that benefits from expertise without being 
ruled by experts.  Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to 
govern themselves, through their elected leaders.  The growth of the 
Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches almost every 
aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it may slip from the 
Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.  This concern is 
largely absent from the dissent’s paean to the administrative state.11  
 
                                            
8 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct., at 3174.   
9 Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2005), 3. 
10 Breyer, Active Liberty, 103-6.  
11 Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct., at 3156. 
 187 
But this assumption of the mantle of democratic self-government is belied in 
both theories by the tremendous gulf they create between the role of citizen action 
on the one hand, and the exercise of regulatory authority on the other. Roberts 
and Breyer each instantiate two rival normative traditions of democratic self-rule 
applied to the modern regulatory state.  Roberts’ oversight view builds on a 
traditional view of democratic self-rule as secured by the republican separation of 
powers.  Breyer’s defense of expertise, by contrast, rests on an underlying theory of 
non-domination which provides a different reconciliation between democratic self-
rule and regulatory expertise.  But both of these theories, for all their democratic 
veneer, ultimately place the citizen far removed from the actual exercise of 
regulatory authority.  For the oversight and separation of powers view, citizens 
engage in political contestation, but far upstream from regulatory policymaking.  
For the non-domination view, citizens have a greater role within regulatory 
agencies, but only as apolitical deliberators, without the full range of political 
powers to actually contest regulatory policies.   
 
The limits of oversight  
In traditional Constitutional theory, the exercise of state authority is 
rendered legitimate and consistent with the public good when it is subjected to 
adequate political contestation, secured through the constitutional scheme of the 
separation of powers.  By dispersing state power and ensuring checks and balances 
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between the branches of executive, legislature, and judiciary, tyrannical state 
action could be prevented and liberty guaranteed.12   
The separation of powers served as the first normative and institutional 
framework that critics of the emerging regulatory state harnessed to reconcile 
regulatory authority with political freedom.  These early critics saw agencies as a 
threat to liberty precisely because they defied this constitutional separation of 
legislative, executive, and adjudicatory functions: agencies, although formally part 
of the executive branch, threatened to exercise legislative or adjudicatory 
functions. Thus, the Court strove to prevent agencies from exercising judicial 
functions as a violation of the Constitutional grant of judicial authority to the 
courts, or from being empowered by overly broad delegations of legislative 
authority as a violation of the Constitutional grant of legislative authority to 
Congress.  These measures sought to limit agency authority, preserve the 
separation of powers, and therefore ensure liberty.13 But because legislative, 
executive, and judicial functions could not be so easily disentangled,14 and because 
of the persistent concern about the need to ensure “effective functioning of a 
                                            
12 Rebecca Brown, “Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty” University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 139 (1990-1), 1513-1566, at 1513-16.  See also James Madison, Federalist Papers, Nos. 47, 
48, 51 in Ian Shapiro, ed., The Federalist Papers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
13 See e.g., Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding Congressional 
interference with Presidential removal powers); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act as an impermissible 
delegation of legislative powers). 
14 Bowsher v Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).  See especially 478 U.S. at 751: “One reason that the 
exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial powers cannot be categorically distributed among 
three mutually exclusive branches of government is that governmental power cannot always be 
readily characterized with only one of those three labels.  On the contrary, as our cases 
demonstrate, a particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on the aspect of the office to 
which it is assigned.” 
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complex modern government,”15 the Court shifted to a more permissive stance.16  
Thus, although the Court occasionally ruled against agencies for mixing the 
different constitutional functions,17 by and large agencies would be left alone.18 
Today, this separation of powers framework reappears in a different guise 
through the oversight approach.  This theory appears not only in the 
administrative law decisions of Justices John Roberts and Antonin Scalia; it is also 
prominently associated with Justice Elena Kagan’s prior work as a legal scholar.19  
                                            
15 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), J. White dissenting, 462 U.S. at 989 (“If the effective 
functioning of a complex modern government requires the delegation of vast authority which, by 
virtue of its breadth, is legislative or ‘quasi-legislative’ in character, I cannot accept that Article I—
which is, after all, the source of the non-delegation doctrine—should forbid Congress from 
qualifying the that grant with a legislative veto.”) 
16 See e.g. Peter Strauss, “Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—
A Foolish Inconsistency?” Cornell Law Review 72 (1986-7), 488-526. Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52 (1926), J. Brandies, dissenting at 85 (noting friction between the constitutional branches is 
designed to prevent autocracy). 
17 See e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S., at 944 (rejecting claim to administrative efficiency in defense of 
constitutional liberty). 
18 For the weakening of Article I restraints on delegations of legislative authority to agencies, 
compare for example, Schechter, 295 U.S. with Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 
531 U.S. 457 (2001) (delegations of legislative authority to agencies is permissible so long as these 
delegations come with an “intelligible principle” that guides the agency’s exercise of the delegated 
authority), and Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(Judicial deference to agency interpretations of law justified as deference to inferred Congressional 
intent to delegate discretionary authority to the implementing agency). For the weakening of Article 
III restraints on agencies exercising judicial powers, see for example, Bowsher and related cases.  
The same “flexible understanding of the separation of powers” animating Bowsher v. Synar led the 
Court to uphold a delegation of rulemaking power to the Sentencing Commission placed under the 
judicial branch, since this delegation did not “trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch” and 
was “appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 
(1989), at 381 and 388.  Similarly, after early attempts to limit their reach to “public” rather than 
“private” rights,18 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), now departures from Article III courts are permissible in light of the 
policy considerations that may drive Congress to allocate certain adjudicatory functions to expert 
agencies. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), and 
Northern Pipeline, 485 US, White dissenting.  See also Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (Upholding adjudicatory actions by OSHA 
against a Seventh Amendment challenge on grounds of administrative efficiency and institutional 
competence). 
19 See e.g. Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration,” Harvard Law Review 114 (2001), 2245-
2385. 
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In the oversight theory of democratic regulation, once policies are forged through 
the political process involving electoral contestation around the selection of 
representatives plus political contestation through inter-branch checks and 
balances between legislative, executive, and judicial functions, they bear the stamp 
of the public will, and can then be straightforwardly implemented by regulatory 
institutions that are positioned ‘downstream’ from the domain of political 
contestation.  In this view, the problem of regulatory authority is defused and 
reconciled with democratic ideals by ensuring the smooth functioning of core 
democratic processes of contested elections and checks and balances between 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches.  These modes of contestation would 
ensure that the exercise of regulatory authority, so long as it is subject to oversight 
by politically and constitutionally accountable branches of government, remains 
consistent with democratic agency.   
But the problem with this oversight approach is that such political 
contestation through elections and inter-branch checks and balances is ultimately 
too attenuated from the political and moral judgments that inextricably are part of 
regulatory policymaking. As Richard Stewart rightly noted long ago, such 
“transmission belt” understandings of regulation as merely “implementing 
legislative directives in particular cases” are far-fetched.20 Regulatory agencies 
routinely have to make both technical and normatively-inflected policy judgments 
within a relatively wide range of discretion and authority accorded under 
Congressional sanction and presidential oversight—they do not simply execute 
specific Congressional commands.   
                                            
20 Richard B. Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law,” Harvard Law Review 
88:8 (1975), 1669-1813, at 1675. 
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Furthermore, neither Congress nor the executive directly oversees or 
controls every regulatory rule or judgment; the scope of the regulatory state is too 
vast. Although the theory of presidential administration holds that agencies are 
checked by the ability of a democratically-elected executive to coordinate and 
guide policymaking, top-down direction of agencies may not be enough to fully 
respond to concerns of agency accountability and legitimacy. Presidential oversight 
appears as more of a placeholder, “a sign of how desperately we needed a way to 
legitimate the regulatory enterprise and to answer growing criticism of the 
procedural and substantive rationality of regulation.”21  Meanwhile, regulatory 
agencies are legally empowered to offer their own interpretations of ambiguous 
Congressional statutes.22 The Supreme Court has justified such agency deference as 
couched in respect for implicit Congressional sanction.  But this simply papers over 
a persisting anxiety that regulatory agencies exercise legislative authority beyond 
the scope and oversight of Congress.23  Indeed, there is continuing unease in legal 
doctrine over when and how much courts should defer to agency interpretations of 
                                            
21 Cynthia Farina, “Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism,” Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 22 (1999), 227-238, at 232.  See also Cynthia Farina, “Statutory 
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,” Columbia Law Review 89 
(1989), 452-528, at 515 (noting that the presidency is not a substitute for democratic legislative 
control as it reflects a different political base and presidential policy does not develop through 
procedures requiring representative debate and acceptance). 
22 See Whitman, 531 U.S. (2001) (delegations of legislative authority to agencies is permissible so 
long as these delegations come with an “intelligible principle” that guides the agency’s exercise of 
the delegated authority), and Chevron, 467 US (1984) (Judicial deference to agency interpretations 
of law justified as deference to inferred Congressional intent to delegate discretionary authority to 
the implementing agency). 
23 See Farina, “Statutory Interpretation, at 456 (“By portraying the choice of deference as an 
affirmation of legislative primacy and an enhancement of democratic control over the regulatory 
process, Chevron appeals to our deepest constitutional unease about allocating power in the 
administrative state. Ultimately, however, we cannot embrace Chevron's vision of deference as the 
handmaiden to separation of powers and legitimacy principles without substantially recasting those 
principles-a recasting in which some aspects of existing theory would have to be abandoned and 
others radically reformulated”). 
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Congressional statutes.24 Finally, voters themselves have an even more attenuated 
connection to the final rules and judgments issued by agencies.   
 
Non-domination and its limits 
In contrast to the oversight theory, Breyer’s defense of regulatory expertise 
is part of a broader normative account of democracy and regulation shared with a 
range of other thinkers like Philip Pettit and legal scholars like Cass Sunstein. 
These “non-domination” theories provide a stronger normative foundation for 
expansive state regulation.  In these accounts, the problem of domination—
nonarbitrary interference with individual actions—can take place not only through 
unaccountable state actors but also through unaccountable private actors such as 
corporations or market actors.  The state is therefore justified in regulating such 
exercises of power in the name of protecting, rather than undermining, individual 
freedom.  In these accounts, the ideal of non-domination can motivate and justify 
forms of state intervention that, while responding to social challenges such as 
domination and economic hardship, may otherwise trouble defenders of the more 
narrow liberal or libertarian view of the state.25   
                                            
24 See e.g. United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (attempting to limit when 
Chevron applies); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (denying deference for regulations that 
simply restate statutory language, in an effort to prevent agency self-dealing); Food and Drug 
Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 529 U.S. 120 (2000) and MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) 
(articulating a “nondelegation canon” for narrowly interpreting statutory grants of agency 
authority).  See also, Farina, “Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State,” 456; Farina, “Deconstructing Nondelegation,” Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 33 (2010), 87-102, at 95.    
25 See e.g. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 148-62; Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning 
About the Ends of Policy (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), 28.   
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These non-domination theories thus possess a number of compelling 
features.  First, they recapitulate much of the Progressive critique of laissez-faire, 
by highlighting the dangers of private power as well as public power.  This in turn 
provides a substantive justification for why the powers of the state should be 
deployed to make economic policies and regulations.  Second, they suggest that 
these policies must themselves be formulated in a manner consistent with 
democratic principles, in order to prevent the state from itself posing a risk of 
domination to citizens.  This seems to speak to the anxieties surrounding the 
insulated, unaccountable expert regulator.   This ideal of citizen deliberation and 
contestation of policymakers can ensure that such state power is not itself arbitrary 
or dominating, as it is bound to follow the results of deliberative procedures that 
ensure state action promotes the common good.26 
Third, non-domination theories also suggest the democratic value and 
potential of regulatory agencies themselves. Following the non-domination 
approach, regulatory agencies should seek policies promoting the common good, 
arriving at these policies through deliberation. Rather than a raw conflict between 
interest groups seeking political power, such institutional structure could instead 
facilitate good faith deliberation over the common good, yielding more effective 
and normatively desirable public policies.27  Agencies thus become more than 
simply the transmission of electoral or legislative democratic consensus, nor are 
they repositories of pure elite or expert authority; rather they are important sites of 
democratic politics, providing “an integral part of our distributed democratic 
                                            
26 Pettit, Republicanism, 107; Richardson, Democratic Autonomy, 50-1. 
27 See e.g. Richardson, Democratic Autonomy; Cass Sunstein, “Interest Groups in American Public 
Law,” Stanford Law Review 38 (1985), 29-87, at 30-32.   
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reasoning about what we ought to do” through their structure facilitating good 
faith deliberation.28  These qualities make agencies potentially superior to 
legislatures since they can “nurture public deliberation and the discovery of shared 
public values.”29 As professionals and experts, regulators could facilitate a good-
faith deliberative dialogue between stakeholders without prejudice.30 By contrast, 
Congress had too often failed to make difficult political choices, blocked by 
conflicting interest group pressures, and hobbled by an unwieldy and inefficient 
legislative process.31  
In this “deliberative conception of administration,” the regulator emerges 
not as a mere bureaucrat or expert, but rather as the central figure in driving 
democratic dialogue.32  As Cass Sunstein, himself a legal scholar and later 
administrator within the regulatory state, argued,  
the role of the administrator is not merely to reflect constituent pressures or 
to aggregate private interests.  Instead, the purpose of the regulatory process 
is to select and implement the values that underlie the governing statute and 
that, in the absence of statutory guidance, must be found through a process 
of deliberation. …In deciding how to implement the statute, however, the 
administrator must deliberate about the relevant interests and not respond 
mechanically to constituent pressures.33   
 
                                            
28 Richardson, Democratic Autonomy, 250.  
29 Robert Reich, “Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay,” Yale Law 
Journal 94 (1984-5), 1617-1641, at 1617. 
30  See e.g. Jerry Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).  
31 See Mark Seidenfeld, “A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,” Harvard Law 
Review 105 (1991-2), 1511-1576, especially 1518-22. 
32 Cass Sunstein, “Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946,” Virginia Law 
Review 72 (1986), 271-296, at 282.  
33 Sunstein, “Factions,” 282.  
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Administrative deliberation seems to offer a way to engage the range of 
affected interests without collapsing into the dangers of deadlock or capture that 
accompany interest group politics.34  To the extent that agency policymaking 
involves normative and value considerations, it is the agency administrator that 
emerges as the preferred deliberator, who can neutrally and rationally engage and 
weigh all the relevant interests before choosing a course of action.35  Such a model 
of administration seems to fulfill the aspirations of non-domination views of 
democracy and regulation.36 
This account thus offers an even more robust normative defense of 
regulation as an expression of democratic freedom—both in its substantive policies 
in combating domination, and in its process of engaging stakeholders in rational, 
expert-facilitated deliberation.  But in practice, this ideal of deliberation within 
regulatory agencies does little to check or channel the decisions of regulators 
themselves.  Indeed, Pettit explicitly steers away from the idea of popular political 
participation as a mechanism for checking the arbitrary power of the state and 
other social actors, arguing that “such a participatory ideal is not feasible in the 
modern world, and in any case the prospect of being subject to the will of all is 
scarcely attractive.”37  Pettit’s account reserves to these expert bodies, and not to 
the democratic public, the ability to author and initiate public policies. 38 Pettit 
                                            
34 See e.g. Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 14-15.   
35 Sunstein, “Factions,” 282; Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? 33.  
36 Seidenfeld, “A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State.” 
37 Pettit, Republicanism, 81. 
38 Pettit,  “Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization,” in Ian Shapiro and Casiano 
Hacker-Cordon, eds., Democracy’s Value (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 163-
 196 
argues in favor of a range of institutions and depoliticized technocratic bodies as 
the optimal means of preventing majority tyranny, and tracking common 
interests.39 
Democratic participation in this account is therefore reduced to being the 
product of a virtuous elite class of policymakers who engage in public dialogue not 
because of a fundamentally equitable distribution of political power but out of his 
own civic-mindedness.  In language evocative of the most glowing defenses of the 
wisdom and rationality of the technocratic state found in early defenders like 
James Landis, non-domination theorists like Pettit and Sunstein celebrate the 
regulatory state for its role in making public policy rational.  Democracy becomes 
more of an afterthought, orchestrated by virtuous administrators at their discretion 
to win greater social support or glean relevant information from citizens.   
This appeal to expertise and regulator-led deliberation reproduces the very 
anxieties of technocracy raised by critics of the regulatory state. It leaves too much 
room for elite influence and capture; it does not engage a broad swath of citizens 
to ensure balanced contestation of regulatory policies; it undermines the value of 
participation by filtering it through the policy preferences of the regulator.40  This 
approach also raises a moral concern that in this appeal to deliberation, we may 
undermine core democratic values by placing too much faith and authority in the 
                                            
190; Pettit, “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma,” Philosophical Issues 11 (2001), 
268-297. 
39 Philip Pettit, “Depoliticizing Democracy,” Ratio Juris 17:1 (2004), 52-65.  
40 See e.g., Martin Shapiro, “APA: Past, Present, Future,” Virginia Law Review 72 (1986), 447-482, 
at 478. 
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powers of neutral expertise, to the detriment of the political empowerment of 
citizens themselves.  
 
Participatory theories of regulation 
Oversight and non-domination approaches to reconciling democracy with 
regulation are limited because they place the citizen either too far upstream from 
regulatory authority, or do not provide meaningful opportunities for participation 
within regulatory policymaking.  These theories do, however, suggest two 
important insights for reconciling democratic agency and regulation.  First, self-
rule requires citizens be empowered to engage in political contestation as in the 
oversight and separation of powers approach to check and channel state authority.  
But second, citizens have to be incorporated into regulatory policymaking itself—
as in the nondomination view.  More recently, a variety of administrative law 
scholars have sought to develop this kind of a more participatory view of 
regulation that provides a more robust role for citizens within the regulatory 
process.  These accounts by themselves remain limited, but they provide some 
resources for imagining a more democratic regulatory state. 
 
The lost promise of interest representation  
As noted in Chapter 4 above, during the 1960s and 1970s, concerns about 
regulatory capture motivated courts and legal scholars to advocate for greater 
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interest representation within the regulatory process.41  Meanwhile, War on 
Poverty legislation under the Johnson administration included a variety of 
provisions to ensure “maximum feasible participation” of stakeholders within the 
regulatory process.42  With this emphasis on interest representation, late-century 
administrative law took as its goal “the provision of a surrogate political process 
to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process 
of administrative decision.”43 These efforts were abandoned, but they retain an 
unrealized potential as a mechanism for democratizing the regulatory state. 
Consider for example the case of Office of Communications of United 
Church of Christ v. FCC.44  In this case, the United Church attempted to intervene 
in an Federal Communications Commission (FCC) licensing decision for a local 
TV station in Mississippi arguing that the station was promoting a pro-segregation 
agenda.  The FCC denied the church standing to participate in the proceeding, 
arguing that only full parties, applicants, or those suffering a “direct substantial 
injury” had the right to participate.  The court, however, expanded the standing of 
stakeholder groups such as the church to participate in the licensing proceedings.  
Although the FCC itself represented the public interest, it could not, the court 
reasoned, effectively represent a full understanding of the public interest “without 
                                            
41 See Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law”; Christopher Edley, Jr., 
Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990), 215-222. 
42 See Noel Cazenave, Impossible Democracy: The Unlikely Success of the War on Poverty 
Community Action Programs (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007).  
43 Stewart, “Reformation of American Administrative Law,” at 1670. See also Thomas Merrill, 
“Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 72 (1996-7), 1039-1117 
(describing the 1967 – 1983 period as one of greater judicial scrutiny of agencies in an effort to 
maintain the goals of active state regulation in the face of greater skepticism of agency effectiveness 
and neutrality).  
44 Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.3d 995 (1966).  
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the aid and participation” of other representatives such as the church, community 
organizations, unions, and other such civil society groups actively participating in 
the regulatory process to convey their needs and interests.  Simply relegating these 
citizen and advocacy groups to the mere practice of submitting letters and 
comments was insufficient.  “While attracted by the potential contribution of 
widespread public interest and participation in improving the quality of 
broadcasting,” the court continued, “the Commission rejects effective public 
participation by invoking the oft-expressed fear that a ‘host of parties’ will descend 
upon it and render its dockets ‘clogged’ and ‘unworkable,’” but such a burden 
would ultimately be manageable.   
Indeed, the Supreme Court briefly expanded the constitutional due process 
requirements for agency policymaking to require greater stakeholder participation 
within agency procedures.  Traditionally, constitutional due process claims against 
agency procedures have been held to require the right to a hearing in adjudicatory 
proceedings,45 but not requiring any further participatory rights for administrative 
rule-makings,46 on the grounds that such participation was not feasible or desirable 
in a modern world marked by a large population of citizens and complex 
policymaking tasks that would be slowed down by a requirement that every 
affected citizen have a voice in the regulatory policy decision.47  Yet in 1970, 
Goldberg v. Kelly briefly inaugurated a more robust regime of procedural due 
process protections, requiring a pre-termination hearing on top of other notice and 
                                            
45 Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).  
46 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
47 Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445-46 (Holmes).  
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contestation procedures before an agency eliminated welfare benefits.48  Goldberg 
expressed a concern not with administrative efficiency but with a deeper normative 
value of the  “dignity and well-being of all persons.”49  This appeal to dignity 
justified both the welfare provisions themselves, as well as the right to an oral 
hearing.50  But Goldberg lacked a well-defined theory of democratic accountability; 
indeed, the Goldberg majority was surprisingly hesitant to articulate exactly what 
a better procedural framework would look like.51  Its core motivation, instead, was 
to prevent unjust state action by regulatory agencies.  As with the APA before it, 
Goldberg was more indicative of a persisting anxiety over the power of regulatory 
agencies than it was of a particularly well-conceptualized response to that power.  
Although lauded as a major breakthrough in assuring the citizen’s 
participatory rights—as well as socioeconomic welfare benefits—for citizens, the 
Goldberg shift proved short-lived.  The decision was criticized for creating undue 
administrative burdens and going beyond the textual scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,52 culminating in an effective neutering of the procedural protections a 
few years later in Mathews v. Eldridge.53  In Mathews, the Court argued that 
procedural protections would be justified only if they passed a three-part balancing 
test, weighing the private interest of the individual against the risk of erroneous 
                                            
48 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
49 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65. 
50 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65. 
51 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268 (“We are not prepared to say that the seven-day notice currently 
provided by New York City is constitutionally insufficient per se.”). 
52 See e.g. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271-78 (J. Black, dissenting).  
53 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
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deprivation of benefits, and the governmental interests—which for the Mathews 
court meant an examination of the administrative burdens and costs that greater 
procedural protections would entail.54 Where Goldberg’s animating ethic was a 
focus on individual dignity, the Mathews court suggests a greater skepticism of 
both the importance of the welfare benefits themselves,55 and the desirability of 
greater participatory engagement with agency decision-making. Indeed, like 
Holmes in Bi-Metallic, the Mathews majority exhibits an overwhelming concern 
with costly procedural protections undermining administrative efficiency, citing the 
already “elaborate character of the administrative procedures,” and the existing 
“torpidity of the administrative review process.”56  The end result was a relatively 
rapid abandonment of the full potential of Goldberg’s Due Process holding; despite 
the concerns about unaccountable agency power, the expansion of due process 
rights seemed too inefficient, further bloating an already expansive and 
increasingly beleaguered regulatory state.  As Horwitz comments, “ one man’s due 
process is another man’s delay.”57 
Even advocates of such interest representation such as legal scholar Richard 
Stewart saw it as a failed policy, more likely to create gridlock and magnify the 
influence of sophisticated interests rather than creating genuine accountability and 
participation.58  Courts, meanwhile, gradually eroded the doctrines they developed 
                                            
54 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
55 See e.g. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349-50 (J. Brennan, dissenting).  
56 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342. 
57 Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 246. 
58 Stewart, “Reformation of American Administrative Law,” at 1670.  
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to bolster the procedural requirements for agencies to engage stakeholder groups.59  
The result has been a thinning out of procedural requirements, as agencies 
themselves are granted more leeway in choosing what procedures to use when 
formulating policies.60 
More recently, scholars like Steven Croley61 and Tino Cuellar62 have 
suggested that a revamped administrative process can provide such a balance 
between engaging all affected interests while structuring political contest and voice 
with an eye towards regulation as problem-solving.  For scholars in this vein, 
administrative process offers the potential for fostering a more balanced form of 
participation and voice that can make policymaking more publicly-interested even 
than legislation, by managing and structuring citizen engagement effectively.63 A 
simple appeal to interest group pluralism by itself does not solve the challenges of 
facilitating collective action by diffuse and under-resourced groups.64  Instead, 
agencies must proactively engage and consult all affected interests, for example 
through independent agency units specializing in structuring public consultation 
processes, or with officials who can act as “regulatory public defenders” tasked 
                                            
59 See e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 
519 (1978). 
60 Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, cert. denied, (1978); Chemical Waste 
Management Inc., v. USEPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 
(1983).  
61 See Steven Croley, Regulation and the Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
62 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, “Rethinking Regulatory Democracy,” Administrative Law Review 
57 (2005), 411-500. 
63 Croley, Regulation and the Public Interests, 134-41. 
64 Croley, Regulation and the Public Interests, 54-55.  
 203 




More recently, another group of scholars have argued for a turn to 
“collaborative governance,” aiming to create a more participatory regulatory 
process that avoids the failures of the interest representation framework. This 
framework consists of several elements.66 First, it focuses on collective problem-
solving, where stakeholders are forced to articulate reasons, seek consensus, and 
find creative mutually beneficial solutions.67 Second, this framework calls for a 
broad level of participation; the engagement of all interested and affected 
stakeholders is supported both for its epistemic value in bringing information to 
the policymaking process, and its normative value in fostering meaningful 
participation in the business of governance.68 Third, the policies that result from 
these collaborative engagements between stakeholders and regulators are 
understood to be provisional, and experimental: through iterated interaction and 
discussion, regulators and stakeholders should be able to propose a range of 
policies that can be adapted over time, and tested in practice at the federal, state, 
                                            
65 See Cuellar, “Rethinking Regulatory Democracy,” 491-97. 
66 Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought,” Minnesota Law Review 89 (2004), 342; Jody Freeman, 
“Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” UCLA Law Review 45 (1997), 1-97; 
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,” Columbia Law 
Review 98 (1998), 267-473. 
67 Freeman “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 23, Lobel, “The Renew Deal,” 
377. 
68 Freeman “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 27, Lobel, “The Renew Deal,” 
373. 
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and local levels.69 This same basic approach has also been advanced by other 
scholars under different rubrics, of “reflexive regulation”, “experimentalism,” or 
“pragmatist regulation”.   
For its advocates, this approach offers a more robust form of participation 
by all affected parties, recasting the regulatory process as one of collaborative 
problem-solving between groups of citizens who participate in all stages of 
regulatory policymaking, implementation, and revision, supplemented but not 
displaced by the expertise of regulators.  In the process, citizens would expand 
their own capacities as problem-solvers, and regulation would be more of a 
bottom-up rather than top-down project of policymaking.70 Such expansive 
participation provides multiple forms of accountability,71 facilitates fluid and 
adaptive agency policymaking,72 and fosters the long-term development of 
epistemically and normatively valuable participation.73 This approach emphasizes 
collaboration between stakeholders and policymakers, in theory avoiding the 
dangers of deadlock by distributing responsibility for the policymaking process 
across the range of stakeholders and viewing policymaking as more than zero 
                                            
69 See e.g. Dorf and Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism”; Lobel, “The Renew 
Deal,” 395-96. 
70 See e.g. Dorf and Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism”; Christopher Ansell, 
Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); Jack Knight and James Johnson, The Priority of Democracy: Political Consequences 
of Pragmatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, 
Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992).   
71 Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 96 
72 Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 9-14 
73 Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 27, Lobel, “The Renew 
Deal,” 384. 
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sum.74 Further, instead of viewing agencies as reactive to an adversarial process of 
interest group bargaining, collaborative governance sees agencies as more dynamic, 
playing a role in fostering an ongoing dialogue over public policy.75  
Regulatory agencies are critical to this vision of collaborative and 
experimentalist governance, because they function as conveners, guides, and 
capacity builders, providing the structure, resources, and benchmarks critical to 
facilitating productive and collaborative engagement between stakeholders.76  They 
also serve as crucial focal points for citizens to mobilize around.77  Indeed, under 
this framework the process of regulatory policymaking can be reformed to better 
encourage participation by a wide range of affected stakeholders beyond the more 
passive system of notice and comment contemporary rulemaking.78 To the extent 
that other governmental bodies such as Congress or the courts are involved, their 
role is to support this collaborative and experimentalist policymaking process by 
providing financial resources, and external checks.79  
Collaborative governance comes closest to articulating a theory of 
meaningful participation in the regulatory state.  The biggest weakness of the 
collaborative governance framework, however, is its emphasis on consensus and its 
ultimately frictionless view of regulatory politics. The scholars writing in the 
                                            
74 Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 5-6. 
75 Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 18-19. 
76 See Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,” 7, 31; Lobel, “The Renew 
Deal,” 400, 457; Dorf and Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,” 345-56. 
77 Ansell, Pragmatist Democracy, 144-6. 
78 See e.g. Cuellar, “Rethinking Regulatory Democracy,” 491-97. 
79 Dorf and Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,” 288-89. 
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collaborative governance framework all emphasize the pathologies of interest 
group pluralism as a foil for their arguments. While it is true that such cooperative 
engagement between stakeholders and regulators might be socially desirable, it 
seems unlikely that such regulatory policymaking can be sterilized of disagreement 
or contentiousness. But while these scholars are correct to point out the problems 
of political conflict and agency deadlock that arises out of the interest group 
pluralism framework, they ultimately conflate two distinct concepts. The problem 
with interest group pluralism framework is not the fact of political conflict per se; 
rather, its failures arise from a particularly toxic combination of political conflict 
with winner-take-all institutional structure where all interest groups must 
concentrate their energies at the initial policymaking moment. Because the stakes 
are so high, these groups are incentivized to begin push as hard as possible for their 
particular viewpoint. But rather than trying to sterilize policymaking of political 
conflict altogether—an impossibility outside of the world of theorizing—a 
compelling framework of democratic regulation should instead find ways to 
productively channel and contain such political disagreement. Indeed, this is the 
basic Madisonian insight: political disagreement is here to stay, and the task of 
institutional design to channel this disagreement in ways that are ultimately 
productive to society as a whole. 
The collaborative governance framework is compelling not because of its 
emphasis on consensus, but rather because it provides a framework for 
understanding how political contest and democratic participation can be 
productively channel by looking beyond the initial moment of policymaking by the 
powerful regulator itself. As William Simon suggests, the most important element 
of the collaborative and experimentalist mode of regulation is its focus on enabling 
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citizens to directly experience the project of self-government, allowing for internal 
conflict but structuring it in a way that thickens the accountability and 
participatory capacity of citizens over time.80  By suggesting ways in which groups 
can participate in debating policies, experimenting with them at local levels, and 
engaging in ongoing iterative debate, the collaborative governance framework 
suggests the way forward for a more productive form of democratic contest. The 
key seems to be to create conditions where policies can be initiated, evaluated, and 
then revised—and where citizens can be brought into the policymaking process, 
given the state, and thus encouraged to develop norms, knowledge, and capacities 
of self-government over time.  This practice of experimentalism and ongoing 
engagement can be consistent with—and may even require—some degree of 
political disagreement to drive debate and innovation. 
 
Towards a more democratic regulatory state 
Though it purports to reconcile democratic self-rule with the modern 
regulatory state, contemporary administrative law falls short.  Both the oversight 
and non-domination theories of regulation cast the regulatory state as an 
expression of the political agency of citizens.  But they both ultimately position the 
citizen in a limited position, unable to actually contest or shape the exercise of 
regulatory authority.  In the oversight theory, citizens can contest state policies, but 
they are positions far too upstream from the formulation and exercise of 
regulatory authority; contestation through elections is too removed from the actual 
                                            
80 William Simon, “New Governance Anxieties: A Deweyan Response,” Wisconsin Law Review 
727 (2010), 728-36. 
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practice of regulation and policymaking.  In the non-domination theory, citizens 
are engaged more directly in the regulatory process but their role is limited and 
their actions filtered through a screen of expertise, and non-contestatory 
deliberative consultation.   
Prevailing approaches in administrative law thus fall far short of this ideal 
of regulation as an expression of the political agency of citizens. Successfully 
articulating such a model may seem a Sisyphean task, one that administrative law 
will perennially grapple with.  As Richard Stewart notes despondently in his 
seminal essay,  
The administrative state will abide, successfully resisting efforts to abolish it 
or reduce its operation entirely to market analogues. The only conceivable 
way out of the labyrinth would seem to be a new and comprehensive theory 
of government and law that would successfully reconcile our traditional 
ideals of formal justice, individual autonomy, and responsible mechanisms 
for collective choice, with the contemporary realities of decentralized, 
uncoordinated, discretionary exercises of governmental authority and 
substantial disparities in the cohesiveness and political power of private 
interests. Such a conception may well be unattainable, and in any event will 
not be achieved in the foreseeable future.81   
 
There are, however, some potential resources for a richer democratic theory 
of regulation in administrative law.  The efforts to expand the representation and 
participation of citizens within regulatory agencies suggest a set of tools that might 
be pressed into service of such a broader theory of democratic regulation.  To 
overcome these limitations and reconcile regulation with democratic self-
government, the next chapter suggests an alternative approach to democratic 
agency and institutions of economic governance.  
                                            
81 Stewart, “Reformation,” 1807. 
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7 DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL AGENCY 
 
For Progressive Era reformers responding to the realities of a new industrial 
economy and the politics of Gilded Age America, the problem of democracy was 
primarily one of disparities in political power.  Trusts, corporations, and party 
machines possessed a degree of political influence that was unrivalled, and almost 
certainly trumped the capacities of ordinary citizens.  Today, similar concerns have 
animated recent efforts at democratic revival, whether in the form of Obama’s 
2008 campaign emphasizing civic engagement, or the appeal of left and right 
reform movements like Occupy and the Tea Party who shared a concern with the 
political power of big business and its impact on governmental policy.  These 
concerns are not fundamentally about the grounds of democracy; rather they are 
about its practice.  Whether we ground the value of democracy in claims of equal 
moral worth, epistemic value, or instrumental benefits to policymaking, growth, or 
other outcomes, democratic theories converge on a shared view that each citizen 
ought to possess an equal opportunity for political voice.1  The anxieties of 
contemporary democracy stem from the intuition that such equal voice is far from 
a reality.  This intuition is increasingly borne out in empirical studies highlighting 
the degree to which American political institutions are responsive not to the broad 
                                            
1 Jack Knight and James Johnson, “What Sort of Political Equality Does Deliberative Democracy 
Require?,” in James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and 
Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 279-319. 
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range of citizens, but to particular demographics and especially to wealthier 
citizens.2 
At the same time, unease over lay citizens’ lack of knowledge and reasoned 
judgment motivates the turn to elite decision-makers, experts, or markets.  All 
seem to offer a more dependable and socially-optimal mode of making collective 
judgments free of irrationality, passion, or tumult. Indeed, defenders of the 
regulatory state present it as a way to meet both concerns: on the one hand, it 
sterilizes policymaking of the ignorance, partiality, and corruption of democratic 
politics; on the other hand, it claims to further the ideal of self-government by 
pursuing the common good as refined through elected officials and delegated 
expert authority.  But as the persisting anxieties over technocratic governance 
suggest, this resolution leaves much to be desired.  
This chapter draws inspiration from the radical democratic voices of the 
Progressive Era, especially John Dewey and Louis Brandeis.  For these thinkers, the 
problem of markets and economic upheaval demanded a specifically democratic 
response, where new institutions had to be devised to unlock the agency and 
capacities of citizens to address these economic concerns themselves.  This 
democratic ethic of economic governance represents a very different tradition from 
the technocratic inheritance through the New Deal and in contemporary economic 
policy debates.   
The technocratic view, as suggested in previous chapters, suggests economic 
governance be addressed through institutions that are centralized, expert-led, and 
                                            
2 See e.g., Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in 
America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Larry Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The 
Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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which pursue policies aimed at managing and optimizing the market.  By contrast, 
in this chapter, I develop a democratic conceptualization of economic governance. I 
argue below that we should embrace the promise of regulation as an expression of 
the political agency of the public to address the kinds of concerns that arise in the 
modern market economy, such as from the threats of private or market power.  
But to make this promise a reality, we must change how we think about both 
“democracy” and “regulation” as concepts. I suggest below a normative rethinking 
of democracy not just as a matter of input or voice, but as a matter of experience 
in governing.  This in turn suggests a revised understanding of regulation as forums 
and spaces where such experience is fostered, catalyzed, and housed.   
First, citizens must have access to the actual exercises of political power 
through mechanisms assuring representation or participation. Rather than relying 
on experts who can engage citizens on an ad hoc basis, and who exercise authority 
under the overview and directives of elected officials, we must reconstitute 
regulatory institutions as forums for citizens to engage in active and direct 
experience with the challenges and tensions of governing.   
Second, these governing institutions must themselves be reorganized to serve 
as forums for democratic action.  These institutions must be sufficiently 
consolidated and visible such that citizens can organize around them, targeting 
their claims to these institutions.  But these institutions must also possess sufficient 
powers to respond to these citizen claims.  
Third, citizens must be able to contest matters of public policy on moral, 
not just technical, grounds.  Economic policy implicates moral and political 
judgments.  Submerging these considerations under a veneer of technical problem-
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solving not only mis-describes the issues at stake, it also narrows the scope for 
democratic agency on the part of non-experts.   
 
Democracy and regulation as experience 
In a democratic society, citizens are not just bearers of preferences or 
sources of information.  They are—or ought to be—co-authors of government.  In 
light of the reach, size, and complexity of modern governance, however, such self-
governance has been most conventionally achieved through indirect modes of 
political power, where citizens sanction the workings of government pursued 
through the authority delegated to representatives and experts.  Direct democracy 
through mass referenda, by contrast, seems ineffectual in such a complex 
environment.  But the failures of contemporary democracy are the results of a 
particularly emaciated set of democratic institutions and practices.  
In laissez-faire and technocratic economic governance, these pathologies of 
democratic disagreement, conflict, corruption, and ignorance are resolved by 
sterilizing, limiting, and screening democratic activity away from the actual work 
of policymaking; these systems place their faith for economic order in apolitical 
markets or neutral experts.  By contrast a more democratic approach rests its faith 
on the capacity of citizens to learn over time, to forge common solutions when 
presented with actual problems that they experience and for which they are 
ultimately responsible.  Expanding rather than limiting citizens capacities so that 
they experience both the challenges of governing and the repercussions of their 
actions thus offers an alternative to either markets or experts.  Such direct 
experience with governance will not transform democratic citizens into consensus-
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seeking rational policy experts.  Democratic politics will remain conflictual, messy, 
chaotic.  But it provides a means through which disagreements can be mediated 
and judgment developed.   
How can citizens, placed in such a central role, actually govern effectively? 
A standard response from democratic theory suggests the role of civic virtue: 
citizens must be educated, must engage in good faith and rational discourse.  But 
this turn to individual virtue is misleading, implicitly rooted in a declining faith in 
the viability of political engagement at the macro institutional level.3  The capacity 
for political agency is primarily is not only a product of individual qualities, but 
rather is dynamically generated under particular social and institutional contexts 
that enable effective political functioning.4 Institutions are vital for creating the 
spaces in which citizens can partake in meaningful participation in the project of 
governance.  Institutional structure is crucial to empower citizens and facilitate 
contestation and participation in ways that are productive and effective.5   
Absent such institutional support to foster effective and meaningful 
democratic engagement, it is no wonder that democratic politics seems 
                                            
3  Iris Young, Responsibility for Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 40. 
4 See e.g., James Bohman, “Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, 
Resources, and Opportunities,” in Bohman and Rehg eds., 321-48. As Dana Villa notes, sustaining 
citizen engagement with politics requires that we “care for the public world,” that we “create and 
preserve a set of laws, institutions, and public spaces that make active citizenship possible.” Dana 
Villa, Public Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 347. As Melvin Rogers notes, 
“to the extent that government institutions are complicit in this process of political alienation and 
domination, citizens are well within their right to rethink the purpose and boundaries of those 
institutions.” Melvin Rogers, “Democracy, Elites, and Power: John Dewey Reconsidered,” 
Contemporary Political Theory 8:1 (2009), 68-89, at 87. 
5 See e.g. Charles Beitz, Political Equality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 98 
(“Popular participation in political decisions is possible only within an institutional framework that 
organizes and regulates it”).  See also Carole Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited,” 
Perspectives on Politics 10:1 (2012), 7-19, at 10 (The “capacities, skills, and characteristics of 
individuals are interrelated with forms of authority structures”). 
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unproductive and ineffective. Meaningful democratic agency can only be realized 
when citizens are put in positions of engaging in the actual practice of governing: 
judging alternatives, weighing tradeoffs, living with the results of these decisions—
not as a lone moment of citizen engagement but as an ongoing practice through 
which we as citizens develop knowledge, judgment, and experience.  It is here that 
the institutions of regulation arise not as a threat to democratic vitality, but as a 
potential site for democratic political agency. 
There is a growing literature on how institutional innovations can foster 
effective citizen roles in governing placing citizens alongside experts, from citizen’s 
juries, to participatory budgeting, to deliberative polling.6  But these accounts have 
yet to produce a more systematic theory of the principles of institutionalizing 
democratic agency that can scale up.  Many of these innovations focus too much 
on seeking consensus and ensuring rational deliberation, but the real value of these 
small-scale deliberative experiments lies not in their attempt to foster consensus or 
deliberation, but rather in the degree to which these practices create regular 
institutions for empowered participation.7 A more systematic institutionalization of 
citizen agency must focus on this contestatory view of catalyzing and channeling 
the mobilization of citizens.  This in turn points to a very different view of the 
regulatory state. 
                                            
6 See e.g., James Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Archon Fung, Empowered Participation: Reinventing 
Urban Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Patrick 
Heller, and Marcelo K. Silva, Bootstrapping Democracy: Transforming Local Governance and 
Civil Society in Brazil (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011); Archon Fung, “Reinventing 
Democracy in Latin America,” Perspectives on Politics 9:4 (2011), 857-871. 
7 Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited,” 8.   
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Where technocratic Progressives like Landis or Sunstein cast the regulatory 
state as a space for cultivating expert-led rational deliberation over public policy, 
these institutions can be reformulated to act as spaces in which citizens can 
experience the demands and difficulties of governance, where they can learn 
judgment and exercise meaningful political agency. As Elizabeth Anderson notes, 
democracy depends on “the social conditions of autonomy people need to 
articulate, change, and promote their own values in ways they can reflectively 
endorse.”8   As institutions tasked with the development and implementation of 
specific policies, regulatory agencies can serve as a unique “nexus of democracy 
and governance,” creating spaces for citizens to engage directly in policy 
formulation and implementation in a way that is difficult in context of traditional 
democratic institutions of elections and legislatures.9  Through the political and 
cooperative project of regulation, citizens reshape the workings of the economy.10  
Part of this is out of necessity: the realities of regulatory policymaking are that 
substantive moral and political judgments have to take place in the regulatory 
process. The ends specified by legislatures are necessarily broad and vague, and not 
all disagreements can be worked out in the traditional elected branches.11  There 
will always be moral judgments to be made by those institutions charged with 
                                            
8 Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
211. 
9 See Chris Ansell, Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-4. See also Mark Warren, “Governance-Driven 
Democratization,” Critical Policy Studies 3:1 (April 2009), 3-13. 
10 See e.g. Joseph Heath, “The Benefits of Cooperation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 34:4 
(2006), 313-351, making a similar argument about reconceiving the welfare state as a constructive 
realization of a socially desirable form of cooperation, rather than as merely a residual response to 
the market economy. 
11 Henry Richardson, Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press 2002), 13.  
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devising the final end result policies and implementing them.  These judgments 
cannot be sidestepped through expertise.12  
But the democratic potential of regulation is not just a product of necessity 
in specifying public policy.  Regulatory institutions—those governmental bodies 
charged with formulating and implementing final policies—have affirmative civic 
value as spaces where citizens can experience the tasks of policymaking.  We 
conventionally understand “regulation” as the technical implementation that 
follows legislation and elections, which serve as the primary sites of democracy.  
But instead we ought to understand regulation broadly, not as the technical 
implementation of legislative directives, but as the practice of governance where 
broad principles and goals are translated into actual policies, implemented, and 
carried out.  On this understanding, “regulation” encompasses not only centralized 
federal agencies like the SEC, which develop and implement national policies that 
craft and implement regulations, but also local level bodies like municipalities, 
which constitute a second key domain where the practice of governance meets the 
“front-line” of implementation and affecting citizens.  Viewing regulations as a site 
of democratic agency thus broadens our scope of what regulatory institutions do, 
and what kinds of institutions—national and local—count as potential sites for 
democratic governance.   
But how should these institutions be reformed to fulfill this promise? 
Inspired by the thought of Dewey and Brandeis, the rest of this chapter outlines 
several conditions for such citizen empowerment.  In particular, there are three key 
conditions for democratic agency.  First, citizens must be empowered to participate 
                                            
12 See Richardson, Democratic Autonomy, 114-129.  
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in economic decision-making alongside experts.  Second, citizens require 
institutional forums to house and catalyze political action.  These forums provide a 
focal point against which citizens can organize, mobilize, and make claims.  The 
existence of these institutions thus enables citizens to act on the kinds of diffuse 
and systematic challenges that otherwise would be beyond any one individual or 
group’s reach.  But at the same time, these institutions must have the capacities and 
powers to respond to the claims raised by citizens effectively. Weak regulatory 
bodies do little to sustain citizen action for without the likelihood of an effective 
response, political engagement is less worthwhile.  Third, the content of the issues 
in question must be understood in moralized, rather than technical or depoliticized 
terms.  Without moral stakes, it is difficult to catalyze and enable meaningful 
citizen action. Citizens must therefore be empowered to contest economic policies 
along their moral and political dimensions.   
 
Participation, representation, and expertise 
In the midst of Progressive Era reform movements from issues of antitrust, 
corporate power, and financial panics, both Dewey and Brandeis argued for a 
specifically democratic approach to these economic issues, where citizens where 
empowered as the key drivers of state action.  For both thinkers, an active and 
engaged citizenry did not necessarily mean a rejection of representatives and 
experts; rather, democracy would require that representatives and experts operate 
in ways to facilitate rather than supplant the political agency of citizens.   
Representation could help citizens mobilize and magnify citizen voice. 
Dewey argued that through representative political associations, individually 
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disempowered citizens could to educate themselves, coordinate action, to develop 
political power.13 Brandeis emphasized the importance of citizen mobilization 
through trade unions and other groups as a form of countervailing power against 
monopolies and corporations.14 Once organized through such associations, citizens 
would be better equipped to counteract the excesses of private power, assert their 
own interests, and engage with the policymaking process.  Such political 
association would improve the representation of different social groups in decision-
making within firms and in governments, check abuses of private power, and 
direct the state to regulate the market economy.  Thus, Brandies advocated worker 
representation and collective bargaining with firms as a way of balancing 
representation within corporations to check the exercise of private corporate 
power.15  
Similarly, citizen action had to operate alongside, rather than being 
displaced by, expertise.  Because the administrative burden of fully regulating the 
market economy was beyond the scope of any possible commission or set of 
experts,16 Brandeis argued that such regulation would have to proceed through the 
iterative and ultimately democratic process of policy experimentation, where 
citizens could propose particular regulatory schemes, and then revise them based 
                                            
13 John Dewey, Public and Its Problems (Athens: Swallow Press, Ohio University Press, 2004), 138-
142.  
14 See e.g. Brandeis, “How far have we come on the road to industrial democracy? An interview,” 
in Osmond Fraenkel, ed., The Curse of Bigness: Miscellaneous Papers of Louis Brandeis (New 
York: Viking Press, 1935), 43-7; “Efficiency Systems and Labor,” in Fraenkel, ed., Curse of 
Bigness, 48-50; “On Industrial Relations,” in Fraenkel, ed., Curse of Bigness, 70-95, at 79.   See 
also Philippa Strum, ed., Brandeis on Democracy (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 74-
78. 
15 See Brandeis, “On Industrial Relations,” in Fraenkel, ed., Curse of Bigness, 76, 79. 
16 Brandeis, “Competition”(1913), in Fraenkel, ed., Curse of Bigness, 112-24. 
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on experience. Brandeis saw regulation not as a technocratic system, but rather as 
a democratic one where citizen participation was integrated with the knowledge of 
experts—in contrast to the valorization of expertise articulated by many other 
Progressives.  As Gerald Berk argues, while Brandeis shared the Progressive 
“commitment to applied science, state building, wealth redistribution, trade 
unionism, and the welfare state,” he ultimately thought these other Progressives 
“reified economic power, overestimated the ability of science to overcome human 
fallibility in government and the economy, and underestimated the capacity of 
common people to achieve public ends.”17  Despite his admiration of the new 
techniques of expertise and “scientific management,” Brandeis routinely argued for 
the linking of labor representatives alongside expert policymakers in the making of 
trade, antitrust, and workplace regulations.18 
Dewey theorized this interaction between citizens and experts somewhat 
more broadly than Brandeis, but he shared this intuition that effective and 
democratic policymaking required citizens to work alongside experts.  While 
Dewey agreed with other Progressives such as Walter Lippman that professional 
expertise was needed to develop effective public policies, he argued that such 
expertise had to be integrated with democratic engagement. Experts did indeed 
possess factual knowledge that was vital to effective policymaking, but it is 
“impossible” for such experts to “secure a monopoly of such knowledge as must 
be used for the regulation of common affairs.”19  “A class of experts,” argued 
                                            
17 Gerald Berk, Louis D. Brandeis and the Making of Regulated Competition, 1900-1932 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 88. 
18 See e.g., Brandeis, “Efficiency Systems and Labor,” in Fraenkel, ed., Curse of Bigness, 48-50.  
19 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 206.  
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Dewey, “is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with 
private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge 
at all.”20  In an argument akin to later defenses of the market as a mode of 
aggregating diffuse knowledge and information in society,21 Dewey argued that 
local knowledge of lay citizens was crucial both to defining social problems and in 
evaluating the effectiveness of policy responses.22  Such participation was also 
crucial to keeping policymakers themselves accountable. “No government by 
experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts,” argued 
Dewey, “will be anything but an oligarchy in the interests of a few.”23  Expert 
policymakers therefore had to be embedded in political debate, discussion, and 
persuasion—in short, in democratic politics—where citizens could express their 
needs, values, and interests, and judging whether policy outcomes fulfilled those 
aspirations.24  Through such empowered participation alongside experts, citizens 
would become more knowledgeable and capable over time; the current limits to 
citizen capacities were products of their institutional position in governance, rather 
than an intrinsic failure on the part of lay persons.25  
                                            
20 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 207. 
21 See e.g., John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).  
22 See also Rogers, “Democracy, Elites, and Power,” 73-80. “Where decision-making is based less 
on the continuous input from public hearings, town hall meetings, advisory councils and other 
deliberative bodies there is greater reason to be concerned about the ends to which those decisions 
aim.” 
23 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 208. 
24 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 208-209. See also Rogers, “Democracy, Elites, and Power”: 
“Where decision-making is based less on the continuous input from public hearings, town hall 
meetings, advisory councils and other deliberative bodies there is greater reason to be concerned 
about the ends to which those decisions aim.” 
25 Dewey, “Public Opinion,” The New Republic, May 3, 1922;  “Practical Democracy,” The New 
Republic, December 2, 1925. 
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These views of Dewey and Brandeis are instructive.  Thickening citizens’ 
experience of governing does not necessarily require pure direct democracy.  But it 
does require inverting the relationship between citizens and elite government 
officials—representatives and experts.  Where today both representatives and 
experts exercise political agency as the main decision-makers sanctioned by a 
mostly passive citizenry, these offices should instead function as advisors and 
supporters, not displacers, of citizen agency.  As Carole Pateman argues, “it is only 
if the individual has the opportunity directly to participate in decision making that, 
under modern conditions, he can hope to have any real control over the course of 
his life or the development of the environment in which he lives.”26 Rather than 
deferring or delegating authority to these elite individuals on the grounds that they 
possess better judgment, citizens would, in this view, develop their own capacities 
for judgment over time, through the ongoing experience with the difficulties, 
challenges, and reversals of governing. 
So long as representatives are seen as either purely transmissive of public 
opinion, or overly powerful appointed rulers, the scope for political contest, 
fluidity, and responsiveness is closed off.27 This problem of elite rule can be 
resolved by expanding the ability of citizens to contest political elites and 
participate in the ongoing and day-to-day routines of policy and politics.28 Under 
this approach, representation must be understood not as a delegation of 
                                            
26 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), 110. 
27 See e.g. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006), 229.  
28 See e.g. Melvin Rogers, “Democracy, Elites, and Power: John Dewey Reconsidered,” 
Contemporary Political Theory, 8:1, 68-89, at 81-2. 
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responsibility and action from a now-passive citizenry, but instead as embedded in 
and catalytic of ongoing political contest.29  Representatives articulate positions 
that help engage, mobilize, and educate their constituents, while constituents 
themselves shape the views and actions of their representatives through such 
mobilization.  
Similarly, experts should not be abandoned, but nor should they trump 
democratic judgment.  Rather, the role of expertise must be subordinated to 
democratic contest.  Experts can provide information, advice, and knowledge as 
inputs into democratic debate, but it is this democratic debate that must hold sway 
to check, guide, and channel the use of expert knowledge.  In contrast to the 
technocratic celebration of experts as operating apart from ordinary politics, 
experts are not simply neutral purveyors of fact. Experts are partly political agents 
whose conceptualizations and arguments help shape and create social world.30 
Further, expert accounts of social matters especially such as economic policy are 
intertwined with normative as well as factual understandings.31  The judgments of 
                                            
29 Lisa Disch, “Toward a Mobilizational Conception of Democratic Representation,” American 
Political Science Review 105:1 (Feb 2011), 100-114. As Hannah Pitkin argues in her classic study 
of representation, even the ideal of representation ultimately hinges on some form of democratic 
empowerment: “we show a government to be representative not by demonstrating its control over 
its subjects but just the reverse, by demonstrating that its subjects have control over what it does.” 
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 
232. 
30 David Kennedy,  “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance,” Sydney Journal 
of International Law 27 (2005), 5-28. See also Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and 
the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain,” Comparative Politics 25:3 (1993), 275-
296, at 279 (“policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, 
but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing”). 
31 See e.g. Charles Taylor, “Neutrality in Political Science,” in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 
Third Series, Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), 25-57; Elizabeth 
Anderson and Richard Pildes, “Slinging Arrows At Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Pluralism, 
and Democratic Politics,” Columbia Law Review 90 (1990), 2121-2214. 
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experts must therefore be subject to broader political judgment by citizens.  Such 
ongoing citizen engagement is crucial to ensuring expertise is directed to 
collectively chosen ends and the normative dimensions of policy choices are 
assessed as such.32 Experts may still contribute vital knowledge to policy debates, 
but democratic citizens must have a broader role than commonly recognized in 
determining the political implications of those expert findings.33 
 
Regulatory institutions as forums 
The idea of democratizing the exercise of state policy through greater 
representation and participation of citizens is a familiar one in participatory 
democratic theory.  But it is less commonly noted that providing citizens with such 
access to decision-making bodies by itself is not enough to achieve meaningful 
democratic agency.  The democratic potential and value of such participatory 
access also depends on the broader institutional and discursive context in which 
such participation takes place.  A key enabling condition for democratic agency, 
then, is the very creation of institutional forums that are readily visible as clear 
targets for citizen mobilization and action, and easily accessible.   
The presence of such forums is especially significant in context of economic 
governance.  The substantive challenges of modern social and economic order too 
often are of a structural or diffused nature that makes them seem as beyond the 
                                            
32 Elizabeth Anderson, “Epistemology of Democracy,” Episteme 1:2 (2006), 8-22.  See also Rogers, 
“Democracy, Elites, and Power,” 79 (“Where decision-making is based less on the continuous input 
from public hearings, town hall meetings, advisory councils and other deliberative bodies there is 
greater reason to be concerned about the ends to which those decisions aim.”) 
33 Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), at 115-26, 138-9.  
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scope of individual agency. This is particularly a challenge for structural forms of 
injustice or acting to alter diffused systems such as markets or other aggregated 
social processes that create forms of domination or narrowed capacities for some, 
and greater capacities for others.34  In these settings, “individuals experience social 
structures as constraining, objectified, thing-like,” constraining the terrain of 
possibility.35  Institutions of government provide “mediated instruments for the 
coordinated action” of citizens implicated in and troubled by these macro 
structures.36  This suggests that state institutions are critical in rendering structural 
and diffuses dynamics subject to human agency.  
 
Regulatory institutions as consolidated targets for mobilization 
In his attempt to theorize the conditions for democratic agency, Dewey 
suggested the importance of state institutions as focal points for political action. 
Without these institutions, it would be difficult for citizens to organize, mobilize, 
and know where to target their claims.   
The problem of the modern economy, for Dewey, was primarily one of 
political institutions: the threats that market forces and private power posed to 
individual and collective well-being were pernicious because they appeared beyond 
the scope of individual agency. Individuals in the modern economy, Dewey wrote, 
was the individuals felt disempowered and “paralyzed,” “caught in the sweep of 
                                            
34 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 52.  Structural injustice “exists when social processes put large 
groups of persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop 
and exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or to 
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to them.” 
35 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 53.  
36 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 112.  
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forces too vast to understand or master.”37  This political disempowerment was 
inequitably distributed across society; too often, powerful vested interests such as 
business corporations possessed sufficient technical expertise, knowledge, and 
power to engage in political action, while ordinary citizens did not.38 The failures 
of democratic politics—citizen apathy, disproportionate political power among 
business and wealthy interests, alienation of citizens from politics, and prevalence 
of machine party politics and factional bargaining—stemmed from the fact that 
existing routes for democratic action—parties and representative electoral 
democracy—were incapable of effectively organizing the “inchoate and 
amorphous” public into a form capable of “effective political action relevant to 
present social needs and opportunities.”39 As a result, “the prime difficulty” for 
Dewey was “discovering the means by which scattered, mobile in manifold public 
may still recognize itself as to define and express its interests.”40  
Given the challenges of overcoming structural challenges of the market and 
concentrated private power, individuals required political institutions to facilitate 
their very capacity to respond to these problems of the economy. State institutions 
for Dewey served a dual purpose: in addition to making and implementing policies, 
these institutions were also key “structures which catalyze action,” providing a 
“mechanism for securing to an idea [the] channels of effective action.”41  State 
institutions offered a mechanism for citizens to organize and take action on issues 
                                            
37 John Dewey, Public and Its Problems (Athens: Swallow Press, Ohio University Press, 2004), 135.  
38 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 136.  
39 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 125.  
40 Dewey, Public and its Problems, 146. 
41 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 54, 143.  
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that otherwise would be so diffuse in effect and consequences that they would pose 
difficulties to resolve on an individual basis.  As such, the state was critical to 
facilitating genuine democratic self-rule—and particularly for enabling citizens to 
take control over market dynamics which would otherwise be too diffused and 
decentralized to be reshaped on the basis of apolitical individual action alone.   
Dewey’s sketch points to an important condition for democratic agency 
today.  To be effective political agents, citizens require institutions that can help 
focus and coordinate mobilization.  Thus, for regulatory institutions to act as 
viable forums for participation, they must be sufficiently visible and empowered to 
act as focal points for meaningful engagement by citizens, targets against which 
citizens can mobilize or make claims. Unless these institutions are visible with clear 
authority and responsibility for a given set of issues, it is difficult for citizens to 
mobilize and know whom to address.  While sophisticated interests can navigate a 
confusing ecology of fragmented and submerged authorities, equal democratic 
voice is fostered by the presence of clear targets for citizen engagement.   
Sometimes this requirement can be discharged by geographically-based 
jurisdictions, such as legislative districts, cities, and states.  But often, particularly 
in expansive issues such as economic policy, the range of interests will be diffuse 
and national, requiring a topically-focused rather than geographically-focused 
policymaking institution.  Rather than relying on geographically-determined 
districts as in legislative elections, agencies can be designed in a more variegated 
fashion, facilitating the mobilization and empowerment of different ‘publics’—for 
example, those affected by environmental concerns who would engage with the 
Environmental Protection Agency; those from the small business sector engaging 
with the Small Business Administration, and the like.  Regulatory agencies thus 
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have the “capacity to bring into existence dynamic, serial, and overlapping peoples 
and constituencies based on the ‘all affected’ principle in contrast to pre-defined 
and relatively static territorial constituencies,” defining constituencies not through 
region and territory but through who actually possesses a stake in the issue in 
question.42 
At the same time, these institutions must also have sufficiently broad powers 
to be able to respond to citizen concerns. The very motivation to engage in 
political participation requires that individuals feel a “sense of political efficacy.”43  
While many democratic theories emphasize the need to resist exercises of power, 
“simply blocking the exercise of power is often a bad solution;” instead modern 
democracy “needs more collective power to solve the growing number of collective 
action problems.”44  Thus, participation in weak, fragmented, or submerged 
regulatory bodies is not efficacious or valuable, since these institutions are either 
difficult to identify and mobilize around, or are too incapacitated to actually 
respond to the concerns that citizens may voice, or both.  The idea of target and 
capacity suggest civic benefits to consolidated, powerful regulatory bodies.  
 
Multiplying democratic forums 
Another way to promote democratic agency is through the multiplication of 
such institutional sites for citizens to target and in which citizens can experience 
                                            
42 Warren, “Governance-Driven Democratization,”6.  
43 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 46.  
44 Jane Mansbridge, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” Political Science and Politics 
45:1 (2012), 1-8; at 5. 
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the demands of governance. This view cuts against traditional calls for 
decentralization as a way to limit state power; to function as effective spaces for 
democratic action, these forums must retain broad authority.  But this view also 
challenges traditional calls for centralized authority which also tends to seek 
uniformity.  In their place, this approach to democratic forums would create 
multiple sites, each of which possess broad authority to act.  The result would be 
to provide more—and more accessible—spaces for democratic action.   
The value of this commitment to multiple democratic spaces is nicely 
captured by Brandeis’ arguments for decentralization. Brandeis is traditionally seen 
as a defender of localism, federalism, and decentralization, in contrast to the 
centralizing tendencies of the New Deal.  Indeed, Brandeis often invoked the 
tradition of police power to justify state-level experiments with policies aimed at 
addressing economic upheaval, from minimum wages to regulations of 
corporations.45 But at root, Brandeis’ turn to states was not a celebration of states 
so much as it was a search for instruments through which citizen agency could be 
fostered.  As such, his account carries valuable insights for the creation of 
institutions today that can similarly provide spaces for meaningful democratic 
agency, whether at the local or national level.  
Brandeis saw the problem of economic governance as requiring not the 
elevation of insulated expert managers, but rather the creation of spaces where 
citizens could experience meaningful political power, overcoming the challenges of 
the changing economy through their own experimentation and political judgment.  
                                            
45 See Louis Brandeis, “The Constitution and the Minimum Wage,” in Fraenkel, ed., The Curse of 
Bigness, 52-69. 
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In Liggett v. Lee (1932),46 the Supreme Court struck down a Florida state law 
designed to limit the spread of newly-emerging chain stores such as A&P by 
imposing a graduated tax on chain stores that would increase with the number of 
branches the store had in the state.  Brandeis dissented, arguing in favor of 
upholding the Florida law, less out of a defense of state sovereignty, and more out 
of a concern about tackling the growing private power of large corporations 
through mobilized democratic action.  
Brandeis opens by arguing that corporate privileges are a matter of state 
policy, granted or limited to promote the state’s public ends.47  The historical fear 
of corporations—a “fear of encroachment upon the liberties and opportunities of 
the individual… of the subjection of labor to capital…of monopoly”—had 
animated prior waves of social reform and public policy, through traditional limits 
on corporate power such as legal constraints on capital stock, corporate powers, 
and corporate size.48  These limits, however, had gradually eroded out of concern 
by states that corporations would simply circumvent local regulations.49  Florida’s 
legislation was valuable not necessarily as an expression of Florida’s intrinsic 
sovereign authority, but rather as a tool in the “struggle to preserve” independent 
retailers against the power of large corporate chains “menacing the public 
welfare.”50  Indeed, this struggle was more than simply a matter of political 
                                            
46 Liggett v. Lee, 283 U.S. 517 (1932) (J. Brandeis, dissenting). 
47 Liggett, 283 U.S., 545. 
48 Liggett, 283 U.S., 548; 550-7. 
49 Liggett, 283 U.S., 557. 
50 Liggett, 283 U.S., 568, 569. 
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convenience or efficiency; rather it was tied to a deeper moral commitment to an 
egalitarian and democratic economy.  Thus Florida’s legislators  
may have believed that the chain store, by furthering the concentration of 
wealth and of power and by promoting absentee ownership, is thwarting 
American ideals; that it is making impossible equality of opportunity; that it 
is concerning independent tradesmen into clerks; and that it is sapping the 
resources, the vigor and the hope of the smaller cities and towns.51 
 
Given this matter of public concern, the state of Florida, in Brandeis’ view, 
was well within its rights to impose a tax that fell differentially on different chain 
stores at different levels: the “state may prohibit a business found to be noxious 
and, likewise, may prohibit incidents or excrescences of a business otherwise 
beneficent.”52  For those concerned that states may abuse such authority, Brandeis 
argued that such power was grounded in the democratic will of citizens.  
Therefore, such exercises of power would be legitimate.  More importantly, they 
would foster the capacities of ordinary citizens to continue to govern and reshape 
their own social and economic destinies.  “Only through participation by the many 
in the responsibilities and determinations of business,” wrote Brandeis, “can 
Americans secure the moral and intellectual development which is essential to the 
maintenance of liberty.”53  By arguing for the power of the state of Florida to “give 
it [the public will] effect and prevent domination in intrastate commerce by 
subjecting corporate chains to discriminatory license fees,” Brandeis sought to 
ensure that “citizens of each state are still masters of their destiny.”54  
                                            
51 Liggett, 283 U.S., 568-9. 
52 Liggett, 283 U.S., 574.  
53 Liggett, 283 U.S., 580. 
54 Liggett, 283 U.S., 580. 
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Brandeis’ defense of local spaces is instructive, for it highlights the 
importance of ensuring not just one national forum for political action, but rather 
multiple such spaces, particularly at the local level.  Each of these spaces would 
still have to possess the features described above—participatory access, clear 
targets for citizen action, sufficient powers to respond to claims.  But multiplying 
these spaces creates more ready access of citizens to a forum for experiencing 
political agency.    
 
Balancing consolidation and multiplication of spaces  
These multiple objectives—creating a sufficiently powerful forum to focus 
citizen action and respond to it, while also remaining accessible to the citizens 
themselves—suggest the importance of balancing between centralization of 
regulatory authority in few, powerful bodies on the one hand, and multiplying 
regulatory spaces to be closer to more localities and communities on the other.  
Institutional consolidation has some civic democratic benefits—by centralizing the 
debate and power in one arena, it becomes easier for would-be participants to 
identify (worthwhile) targets against which to make claims and specific institutions 
to hold accountable for policy failures.  The consolidation ethic also promises 
consistency and a certain kind of stability.   But these benefits come at the risk of 
creating a high-stakes political dynamic that inhibits innovation and 
experimentation, while narrowing the capacity of many to participate in the 
process, as not all citizens or groups are equally capable of engaging in policy 
debate at the federal level. Decentralization, meanwhile, allows for a multiplying of 
public spaces, creating more opportunities for empowered engagement, and 
creating spaces where views that are defeated elsewhere may find refuge and 
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expression.  This facilitates experimentation and wider participation.  Yet to the 
extreme, such fragmentation can make it difficult to hold on to substantive gains 
achieved elsewhere, or can create a chaotic public terrain such that it becomes even 
harder for individuals and groups to mobilize and engage—if there are too many 
equally salient public arenas, how are participants to know let alone choose where 
to stake their claim?  Such confusion and dissipation of mobilizational energies 
favors more sophisticated and well-resourced interest groups.   
These considerations suggest changes to ‘horizontal’ divisions of 
policymaking authority between regulatory agencies. As with the problem of 
decentralization, the multiplication of specialized regulatory agencies works to 
dissipate the abilities of many countervailing groups and associations to engage, 
while powerful interest groups are likely to manipulate such divisions to their 
advantage.  Thus, splitting state authority across different agencies all of which 
have some degree of responsibility for a topical area of policy creates similar 
challenges for democratic participation.  On the one hand, different agencies may 
be more accessible to different interest groups.  But on the other hand, such a 
regulatory patchwork creates a policymaking ecology where all but the most 
sophisticated players are left in the dark as to which agency they should engage to 
respond to a particular problem. Instead, we must reconsider the proliferation of 
federal regulatory agencies.  There is a civic benefit that is often overlooked to 
consolidating and centralizing regulatory authority in ways that make the relevant 
policymakers more readily visible to and contestable by citizens—rather than being 
hidden within a confusing cacophony of competing and overlapping regulatory 
bodies, a complexity that not only frustrates citizen agency but also creates 
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multiple opportunities for more sophisticated parties to lobby, influence, and 
manipulate the regulatory process. 
These considerations also suggest a different approach to ‘vertical’ forms of 
decentralization: specifically, the question of local power in a complex political 
order.   Localities are often hamstrung in their policymaking capacities, hemmed in 
by state limits on local power and deep unease about local partiality, corruption, 
and policy incoherence.  Instead, we must revive the viability of the locality as a 
space for democratic mobilization and effective policymaking.  This in turn 
requires reconceptualizing familiar discourses of decentralization and localism.  
Traditionally, we are accustomed to understanding localism in terms of “local 
autonomy”—the freedom for a locality to make whatever policies it sees fit.  This 
necessarily creates an anxiety for those instances where localities abuse their 
autonomy, for example to violate civil rights or basic liberties. This conventional 
view also suggests major efficiency losses to having localities pursue their own 
autonomous policies, creating the specter of a “patchwork” of regulations that 
undermine the efficiency of regional, national, and international economic and 
social activity.  But instead of a zero-sum opposition between local autonomy (and 
potential corruption), and national uniformity, the goal of democratic agency can 
be better served by an approach to localism that emphasizes not the autonomy of 
the local, but rather the capacity of localities to initiate and innovate policies.   
 
Moral judgment and democratic mobilization 
Democratic political agency requires not only the institutional spaces in 
which to act and the access to participate in those spaces; it also requires 
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substantive moral stakes that can animate and mobilize democratic political action. 
In democratic economic governance, the substance of economic policy should be 
understood not in technical or economistic terms, but as fundamentally moral and 
political judgments about what kind of economy we as a society hope to create.   
As suggested in Chapter 5 above, the problem with technocratic governance 
is two-fold: not only does it tend to exclude citizens from the political power, but it 
also works to sterilize and depoliticize matters of substantive moral concerns, 
supplanting moral disagreements with technical ones that are amenable to 
resolution through recourse to expertise. Similarly, laissez-faire approaches shift 
economic concerns out of the domain of politics to the diffused ordering of the 
market, while converting these moral questions into a register prioritizing 
efficiency, growth, and market returns. But moral values are irrevocably embedded 
in complex policy disputes, particularly on such central issues as economic 
regulation. Just as a more democratic political economy requires a greater balance 
between citizen and expert in the policymaking process, it also requires a shift 
away from the aspiration to neutral technocratic discourse of policy, to a more 
openly moral debate that incorporates rather than being displaced by technical 
considerations.  
As an example of this point, consider another famous Brandies dissent.  In 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,55 Brandeis argued in dissent that the Supreme 
Court should have upheld Oklahoma’s effort to confer a state-sponsored 
monopoly for the production of ice.  This dissent is notable because in it, Brandeis 
articulated a distinctly Progressive view of economic policies as fundamentally 
                                            
55 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 263 (1934) (J. Brandeis, dissenting). 
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political and moral concerns.  According to Brandeis, when companies provided 
necessities of life, these companies could be regulated more stringently as public 
utilities to ensure that the production and distribution of these goods were 
managed in accordance with the public good.  Ice qualified as a necessity, and 
though private individuals were capable of manufacturing their own ice, the 
structure of production lent itself to a monopoly.56  This view represents a very 
different understanding of public goods and the purposes of economic regulation 
that the kind employed today by the technocratic view of economic governance.  
Public goods in contemporary understandings are defined in economic terms, as 
goods whose production involves high sunk costs, increasing returns to scale, and 
are nonrival and nonexcludable.  By contrast, Brandeis views public goods simply 
as those goods whose social value and importance justifies more robust political 
oversight.  The role of regulation, then, is not purely economic; it is political, a 
way to ensure that we the people have a voice in shaping our economic order to 
achieve moral goals of economic justice.   
Indeed, Brandeis argued that the “business of supplying to others, for 
compensation, any article or service whatsoever may become a matter of public 
concern,” depending upon “the conditions existing in the community affected.”57  
The public interest overrode any claims to insulation from state interference: “if it 
is a matter of public concern, it may be regulated, whatever the business.”58 
Brandeis argued that “so far as concerns the power to regulate, there is no 
                                            
56 New State Ice, 285 U.S., 287-95. 
57 New State Ice, 285 U.S., 301.  
58 New State Ice, 285 U.S., 301.  
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difference, in essence, between a business called private and one called a public 
utility or said to be ‘affected with a public interest.’”59  As the power and 
importance of an industry increased, so too did the moral demands that this 
industry be subject to democratic accountability.  Only the democratic public 
could determine which utilities or necessities were important enough and 
sufficiently concentrated in private ownership to warrant such aggressive public 
regulation.  In contrast to contemporary views of private markets as inviolate, or 
of state regulation as limited to closing market failures, this Brandeissian account 
contemplates a more aggressive role for the state in regulating necessities through 
the exercise of political authority. 
Economic policies are thus not purely a matter of ‘private’ market order, 
nor technical or economistic expert regulation, for they implicate moral and 
political concerns. Repoliticizing our understanding of economic policy has two 
important agency-enhancing effects. First, it opens these morally-weighty issues to 
greater democratic contestation by making the issues at stake more accessible to 
citizens, drawing them into political debate.  Second, it facilitates a more nuanced 
and appropriate form of political judgment: if economic policies are inextricably 
moral as well as technical, ignoring the moral dimensions and delegating these 
policies purely to expert or market orderings submerges those moral judgments, 
resulting in pathological and problematic outcomes.   
Engaging the moral dimensions of economic policies draws a wider array of 
citizen voices into these policy debates, thus broadening democratic agency.  For 
citizen mobilization to be worthwhile in the first place, the issues at stake must be 
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understood as political in the sense that they are actionable through political 
mobilization.60 As political scientist Deborah Stone explains,  
Difficult conditions become problems only when people come to see them 
as amenable to human action.  Until then, difficulties remain embedded in 
the realm of nature, accident, and fate—a realm where there is no choice 
about what happens to us.  The conversion of difficulties into problems is 
said to be the sine qua non of political rebellion, legal disputes, interest-
group mobilization, and of moving policy problems onto the public 
agenda.61 
 
The mobilizing effects of such moral discourses is particularly important for 
complex social problems that are, absent such a mobilizing narrative, difficult for 
isolated individuals to understand or make sense of.  In these settings, it is only 
through the articulation of narratives and symbols that citizens can create new 
meanings and joint political action.62  By tapping the concerns and passions of 
individual citizens and social groups, narratives draw them into the political 
arena.63  By drawing people into a political debate, rhetoric and narrative can open 
up a more genuine space for political action.64 
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This moral mobilization also allows for a more appropriate form of 
political judgment.  While it is tempting to delegate economic policies to neutral 
experts or markets, such a transference does not avoid moral controversy; it 
submerges it, moves it beyond the scope of citizens to contest.  A more openly 
political language of policymaking helps counter the resultant subterranean value-
judgments, opening them up to more broad-based scrutiny and contest.65  
This view of democratic discourse and judgment thus provides a way to 
engage in meaningful democratic empowerment of citizens without necessarily 
appealing to heroic civic virtue of citizens as dispassionate public reasoners, but 
neither does this approach imply an adoption or resignation towards the relatively 
limited capacities of current democratic citizens.66 Despite anxieties of 
manipulation, pandering, or explosive conflict, moralized political discourse is 
crucial for engaging our individual and collective capacities for judgment, where 
decisions are reached not through technical rationality or consensus, but through 
persuasion, and provisional decisions that can be revisited in the future.67 Non-
deliberative conflict, bargaining, and debate can be a complement to deliberation, 
                                            
65 Note that this is a very different approach from most critiques of “backroom politics”—the 
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for example by forcing an actual decision, or by creating a background set of 
commitments and threats that facilitate genuine deliberation between parties.68  
This appeal to the “ideal of rhetorical deliberation” is vital for protecting 
and expanding the scope for democratic politics itself: “In a time when we find our 
lives increasingly governed by the standardized rules of large bureaucracies and 
corporations and by the technocratic decisions of policy-making experts, it is 
important not to lose track of our natural human capacity to make sense of 
complex situations for ourselves,” rather than alienating our judgment as citizens 
to other political actors supposedly better situated to achieve understanding and 
agreement.69  Such an abandonment of political passion undermines the scope for 
democratic agency, reducing citizens and actual victims of injustice to “passive 
roles, as objects of pity and as potential beneficiaries of properly rationalized 
decision making.”70 In turn, this exclusion of an active role for citizens is likely to 
magnify the very pathologies of democratic discourse that we rightly fear.  By 
distancing citizens from the project of governance and political judgment removes 
them from the practice of argument and decision-making, as well as from the 
outcomes of those decisions.  This distance ironically creates a greater scope for 
dogmatic forms of rhetoric and unfocused or irresponsible forms of political 
discourse, even as it narrows the scope for meaningful political engagement.71    
                                            
68 See e.g. Jane Mansbridge, with James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund, Andreas 
Follesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard Manin, and Jose Luis Marti, “The Place of Self-
Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 18:1 
(2010), 64-100. 
69 Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 175. 
70 Stout, Blessed Are the Organized, 65.  
71 See Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 175.  
 240 
 
Democracy as a response to economic crisis 
Where the tradition of technocratic economic governance as manifested in 
the New Deal and Obama era economic policy responds to economic upheaval 
through an appeal to neutral, centralized expertise, a different normative tradition 
turns instead to the potential of empowered democratic citizens.  This tradition has 
roots in the radical democratic thought of the Progressive Era, and carries 
important implications for today.   
Indeed, Brandeis explicitly tied his call for democratic agency through local 
governments and public utilities as an imperatives of the Great Depression itself. 
Brandeis closes his New State Ice dissent with a clarion call for democracy as a 
response to the economic crisis. “The people of the United States are now 
confronted with an emergency more serious than war,” Brandeis intoned.72   
Misery is widespread, in a time, not of scarcity, but of overabundance. The 
long-continued depression has brought unprecedented unemployment, a 
catastrophic fall in commodity prices, and a volume of economic losses 
which threatens our financial institutions. Some people believe that the 
existing conditions threaten even the stability of the capitalistic system. 
Economists are searching for the causes of this disorder and are re-
examining the basis of our industrial structure. Business men are seeking 
possible remedies. 
 
While the Depression drove many commentators to call for “some form of 
economic control,” how exactly a democratic society could effectively manage the 
tempests of the modern economy remained unknown. “The economic and social 
sciences are largely uncharted seas,” and current policymakers “have been none 
too successful in the modest essays in economic control already entered upon.”  
                                            
72 New State Ice, 285 U.S., 310-11. 
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The formulation of perfect policies in such complex settings would require “some 
measure of prophecy,” given that “man is weak and his judgment is at best 
fallible.” As a result, Brandeis argued, there was no choice but to allow for social 
learning through the actual experience of policy innovation, development, and 
experimentation:   
There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through 
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing 
social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, or the states which ratified it, intended to deprive 
us of the power to correct the evils of technological unemployment and 
excess productive capacity which have attended progress in the useful arts. 
… To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave 
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious 
consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country. 
 
Similarly, Dewey saw the economic upheaval of the new industrial economy 
as a fundamental threat to liberty that had to be met through a renewal of 
democratic institutions.  Liberty, for Dewey, meant “effective power to do specific 
things.”73   Promoting human freedom meant expanding the capacities of 
individuals to achieve self-realization.74  Freedom as experienced in the world was 
necessarily relational and constituted by social arrangements: “the liberties that 
any individual actually has depends upon the distribution of powers or liberties 
that exists, and this distribution is identical with actual social arrangements, legal 
and political–and, at the present time, economic.”75   The task of promoting 
                                            
73 John Dewey, “Liberty and Social Control,” (1935), in Later Works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, 
vol. 11: 1935-1937, 359-363, at 359. 
74 John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Prometheus, 2000), 34.  
75 Dewey, “Liberty and Social Control,” 362. 
 242 
human freedom would therefore require reforms to existing economic 
arrangements–and the creation of genuinely democratic modes of economic 
governance:  
Effective liberty is a function of the social conditions existing at any 
time…as economic relations became dominantly controlling forces in setting 
the pattern of human relations, the necessity of liberty for individuals which 
they proclaimed will require social control of economic forces in the interest 
of the great mass of individuals.76   
 
The very socioeconomic upheavals that created the urgency for greater economic 
regulation driven by democratic action also created “new conditions” that would 
enable “the release of human potentialities previously dormant.”77  By tapping 
greater possibilities of social welfare and democratic empowerment, Progressives 
could realize genuine human emancipation and freedom.78  
To achieve such self-rule, however, required new institutional structures. 
Dewey argued there was “no sanctity” to particular received “devices” of 
democratic elections.79  Instead, institutions could take a variety of forms so long 
as they ensured that a “scattered, mobile and manifold public may so recognize 
itself as to define and express its interests.”80  As Dewey wrote, 
The old saying that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy is 
not apt if it means that the evils may be remedied by introducing more 
machinery of the same kind as that which already exists, or by refining and 
perfecting that machinery.  But the phrase may also indicate the need of 
returning to the idea itself, of clarifying and deepening our apprehension of 
                                            
76 Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, 43. 
77 Dewey, Public and its Problems, 98. 
78 Dewey, Public and its Problems, 99-100. 
79 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 145.  
80 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 146.  
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it, and of employing our sense of its meaning to criticize and re-make its 
political manifestations.81 
 
Neither Dewey nor Brandeis offered a systematic theory of democratic 
agency, but their ideas—informed crucially by their own experiences as activists 
and reformers—point us towards three key conditions for democratic political 
agency in context of economic reform debates: participatory access, institutional 
forums, and moralized terms of debate.   
These three conditions combine and reinforce one another to provide 
citizens with meaningful political agency as co-authors of economic policy, 
operating alongside experts without being supplanted by them. Moral discourses 
help catalyze and mobilize citizen action, opening economic policy issues to a 
broader normative debate.  To engage this debate, citizens must have political 
power to shape policies alongside experts.  But to channel these citizen energies 
effectively, there must be institutions that can act as forums, targets, and spaces for 
democratic judgment.   
This democratic approach to economic governance suggests a very different 
alternative to either the reliance on markets in laissez-faire thought, or the turn to 
neutral expert management in technocratic thought.  The technocratic view of 
economic governance responds to the challenges posed by the market economy by 
appeals to neutral purposes of market optimization, and by relying on the idyll of 
neutral experts pursuing an objectively verifiable public good.  By contrast, this 
democratic economic governance view takes a different approach.  Institutions of 
regulatory governance become a way to respond to the threats of the market 
                                            
81 Dewey, Public and Its Problems, 144.  
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economy by magnifying, fostering, and catalyzing the democratic agency of citizens 
themselves. 
The final three chapters show how these themes might inform concrete 
policy and institutional debates in financial regulation and public law of 
democratic institutions more generally.  
Chapter 8 examines the structure of the modern regulatory state to outline 
how it might be reformed to provide a more consolidated target and forum for 
democratic action, with a more participatory role for citizens, and a more openly 
normative discourse of policymaking.  Regulatory agencies already possess broad 
powers, but they lack these other democratizing conditions described above.  As 
spaces for democratic action, cities, by contrast, have the inverse problem: they 
offer more opportunities for participation and political judgment, but they lack 
expansive political authority, thus undermining their value as democratic forums.  
Chapter 9 therefore examines this problem of city power, as a way of recovering 
the democratic potential of cities as a second front-line institution for democratic 
economic governance.  
Chapter 10 examines the importance of moralized judgment over economic 
policy matters, showing how the technocratic impulse to depoliticize these 
economic policy issues limits our menu of reform alternatives by taking more 
moralized policy options off the table.  This chapter also argues that this effort to 
depoliticize economic policy drives us to build technocratic institutions for 
economic governance that cut against the democratizing approaches argued for 
above, by centralizing authority in expert-led institutions divorced from moral and 
political judgment.  But in our attempt to sidestep moral controversy, we instead 
displace it into a set of proxy debates over the reach of regulatory authority.  These 
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proxy debates in turn create their own pathologies that paradoxically worsen, 
















8 DEMOCRACY THROUGH REGULATION 
 
Economic policy is not just a technical matter to be delegated to expert-led 
regulatory institutions.  These issues concern fundamental moral and political 
judgments.  But addressing these moral dimensions also requires an institutional 
context conducive to democratic contestation by citizens. As discussed in Part II, 
regulatory institutions can facilitate democratic empowerment by providing 
participatory access for citizens to policymaking decision; providing a clear focal 
point for citizen action; and by engaging with moral and political concerns and 
debates.  This chapter develops each of these themes to highlight some avenues 
through which national regulatory agencies can be reconstructed as more 
democratic, rather than technocratic, forums.   
 
Participation and representation within agencies 
While the phrases “public participation” and “public involvement” appear 
codified hundreds of times in the US Code and thousands of times in the Code of 
Federal Regulations as requirements for regulatory agencies, these terms are not 
formally defined, and rarely come with specific requirements or processes.1 Indeed, 
on paper, the regulatory state includes a variety of channels for citizen 
participation, including requirements for public notice-and-comment, and ad hoc 
                                            
1 Lisa Bingham, “The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure for 
Collaborative Governance,” Wisconsin Law Review 2010, 297-357, at 317-23. 
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stakeholder forums convened by agencies.  But these mechanisms do not provide 
meaningful political power for citizen groups.  Notice-and-comment, for example, 
is used by agencies selectively as a source of information, data, or justification for 
already-determined policies, while sophisticated interest groups are most successful 
and influencing agency rulemakings.2  To make regulation a more genuinely 
democratic process, citizens must be able to participate in more meaningful ways, 
as co-authors of regulatory policies. There are two possible vectors for such 
empowered participation in regulation.  First, regulatory agencies can incorporate 
greater forms of interest representation, facilitating the mobilization and voice of 
stakeholder groups within regulatory policymaking.  Second, agencies can engage 
citizen participation in a more ongoing fashion, in the implementation and revision 
of policies themselves.   
 
Representation in regulation  
During the 1960s and 1970s, judicial doctrine attempted to promote 
interest representation and greater citizen participation in regulation, but these 
measures were extremely controversial and quickly abandoned. From a democratic 
perspective, the failure of this interest representation approach is not surprising; 
simply opening the regulatory process to interest group pluralism as attempted 
with limited results earlier does not solve the challenges of facilitating collective 
action by diffuse and under-resourced groups.3 Empirical studies suggest that while 
                                            
2 See e.g. Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, “Rethinking Regulatory Democracy,” 57 Administrative 
Law Review 411 (2005).   
3 Steven Croley, Regulation and the Public Interests: The Possibility of Good Regulatory 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 54-55.  
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influence may be more balanced then resources of different groups, business 
interests generally participate more, and groups that can offer more sophisticated 
input through comment procedures—particularly more resourced groups—tend to 
have greater influence.4   
To address these difficulties, a revamped administrative process that 
structures stakeholder representation and citizen engagement can facilitate more 
balanced contestation of regulatory policies.5  Instead of passively relying on 
interest groups to mobilize and lobby agencies, regulatory institutions must 
proactively engage and consult all affected interests.  Furthermore, these 
consultations with stakeholders must have real policy stakes and repercussions, 
rather than simply providing input to regulators. Stakeholder engagement requires 
institutions that build in contestation, diversity of views, and empower the 
countervailing power of citizen and public interest groups.6 
This kind of more empowered consultation can be achieved by taking 
advantage of untapped opportunities in the regulatory state for more meaningful 
representation of stakeholders.  Indeed, existing mechanisms to consult 
stakeholders in regulatory policymaking have been understood not as channels for 
democratic representation and deliberation, but rather as an epistemic task of 
securing more expert information and input for technocratic regulation.7  The 
                                            
4 See Croley, Regulation and the Public Interests, 125-33, Cuellar, “Rethinking Regulatory 
Democracy”. 
5 Croley, Regulation and the Public Interests, 134-41. 
6 Christie Ford, “New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty: Lessons from Financial 
Regulation,” Wisconsin Law Review 2010, 441-489, at 485-86. 
7 Mark Brown, Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2009), 242. 
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General Services Administration guidelines for agencies employing advisory 
committees under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) describe FACA as 
“not a participation statute,” though it is a “means of obtaining public 
involvement.”8  But when initially proposed, the issue of whether FACA was meant 
to facilitate stakeholder representation or input for technocratic regulation was 
hotly contested.9  The early drafts of FACA in the House called for committees to 
be “fairly balanced in terms of points of view represented,” and included a specific 
list of stakeholders to be granted representation, such as conservation, 
environmental, consumer, and public interest groups.10  The Senate versions of the 
bill, however, avoided specific the representational requirements of the House 
version.11  The final compromise bill took a more middle path requiring that 
advisory committee membership “shall be representative of those who have a 
direct interest in the purpose of such committee.”12  While the conference 
committee report adopted the more representational formulation of HR 4383, 
subsequent judicial rulings used the Senate language to interpret the representation 
requirements along the more permissive lines envisioned by the Senate.13  The use 
                                            
8 41 CFR parts 101-6, 102-3, FR 37728-37750 (2001), cited in Brown, Science in Democracy, 243. 
9 Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 36-7. 
10 HR 4383 (1970), cited in Brown, Science in Democracy, 94-103. 
11 See S. 1637 (requiring at least one third of members to be “knowledgeable and competent to 
represent the interests of the public); S. 1964 (with a more vague requirement of fairly balanced 
advisory committees); S. 2064 (requiring committees be “representative of all those legitimately 
interested” in the committee functions; cited in Brown, Science in Democracy, 94-103. 
12 S. 3529, in Brown, Science in Democracy.  
13 National Anti-Hunger Coalition v Executive Committee of the President’s Sector Survey on Cost 
Control (557 F Supp 524, DDC 1983); Public Citizen v National Advisory Committee on 
Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F. 2d 419, DC Cir 1989), cited in Brown, Science in 
Democracy. 
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of FACA thus generally presumes that experts on the commission do not have 
specific interests, while representatives of interests do not have expertise.14  Instead, 
the role and power of these committees could be altered to play a more direct role 
in shaping regulatory policy, with a charge to ensure balanced representation of all 
affected interests.   
Dodd-Frank itself took some tentative steps towards greater stakeholder 
representation in financial regulation. Many of the industry-friendly financial 
regulations like the SEC’s capital adequacy rules—which were relaxed in the run-
up to the 2008 crash—were developed through what on paper appeared as a 
consultative process engaging with industry stakeholders.  Yet the lack of an 
institutionalized representation or countervailing voice from public interest groups 
and other citizen organizations removed a vital check that could prevent such 
consultations from being overly favorable of and solicitous to industry interests.15  
Although its primary focus is on the expansion of expert regulatory oversight, the 
Dodd-Frank financial reform bill included some provisions aimed at promoting a 
more balanced representation of interests in financial regulation.  One example of 
this approach is the Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of an Investor Advisory 
Committee, which is tasked with advising the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) on regulatory reforms to protect investors.16 The Committee is comprised 
of a mix of representatives of various stakeholder interests, such as state 
                                            
14 Brown, Science in Democracy, 103.   
15 See e.g. Robert Weber, “New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: 
The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation,” Administrative 
Law Review 62 (2010), 783-870.  
16 Dodd-Frank Act § 901-911 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78). 
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governments, senior citizens, and pension funds, in addition to relevant experts.17 
Further, the Committee includes an Investor Advocate, who is explicitly 
empowered to head an advocacy unit within the network of financial regulatory 
agencies.18 The office of the Investor Advocate lobbies the SEC to promote policies 
favorable to investor interests,19 and also provides a forum for individual investors 
to lodge complaints and report lapses in compliance with financial regulations.20  
Other provisions in the pieces of legislation attempt to achieve balanced 
representation of interests by requiring stakeholder membership on rulemaking or 
advisory boards. For example, the financial reform act includes a provision to 
establish a Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, comprised of experts and 
representatives of brokers, investors, and the general public, to set standards for 
municipal securities advisors.21  
 
Participation in implementation and revision 
Such participation and engagement of citizens should also extend not only 
to the initial formulations of agency policies, but also to the implementation, 
monitoring, and revision of policies as they are put into practice.  This more 
expansive view of participation would provide citizens with a more meaningful 
experience of governance, involving them in multiple stages of the policy process.  
                                            
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Dodd-Frank Act § 915 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11 note). 
20 Dodd-Frank Act § 919D (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d). 
21 Dodd-Frank Act § 973-976 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78). 
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For example, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provided avenues for 
community groups to participate in and put pressure on the permitting process for 
licensing the sites of potentially hazardous industrial activities.22  Revision of 
regulations also would benefit from participatory review.23  Indeed, many agencies 
already employ some form of retroactive review of existing regulations, sometimes 
mandated by statute, but more often the result of a more ad hoc, informal intra-
agency policy process.  These reviews are, as a result, of minimal impact, often 
lacking support from agency management, with limited public engagement, and 
unclear standards or best practices.24   
In context of financial regulation, the most compelling example of this kind 
of participatory democratic engagement is the role of community groups in 
enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act.  The Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) of 1977 encourages federally insured banks and thrifts to meet local 
community credit needs.25 Federal agencies examine these financial institutions to 
rank their CRA performance.26 These rankings, in addition to public comments on 
                                            
22 See e.g. Luke Cole, “Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots Activists: Three Models 
of Environmental Advocacy,” Virginia Environmental Law Journal 14 (1994) 687-710 (arguing for 
the need to build on the access granted by the NEPA permitting procedures by mobilizing local 
citizens into community groups capable of influencing firms and regulatory overseers).   
23 See e.g. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981), Marshall dissenting for a similar 
argument (arguing that complex agency policies should include a formal ‘safety valve’ procedure 
allowing affected and public interest groups to raise concerns about the policy as it is implemented 
and as social conditions change). 
24 GAO, “Reexamining Regulations: Opportunities Exist to Improve Effectiveness and 
Transparency of Retrospective Reviews,” Report to Congressional Requesters, July 2007 (GAO-07-
791). 
25 See 12 USC 2901-8 and 1831u(b)(3) (CRA provision for interstate mergers) and 1843(l)(1)-
(2)(CRA requirement for financial companies to expand financial activities); see also Michael Barr, 
“Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics,” NYU Law Review 74 
(2005), 100-233, at 104-5. 
26 Different agencies are responsible for overseeing different kinds of financial institutions.  The 
CRA applies to each of these agencies as they oversee their relevant financial institutions.  Thus, the 
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the CRA activities of these firms, are considered when financial regulatory agencies 
examine merger applications and requests by these firms for opening and closing 
new branches.   Further, individuals and community groups can request to review 
a firm’s CRA records, comment on it CRA activities, and file challenges when these 
firms apply for regulatory approval of the CRA contingent transactions such as 
mergers. Where agencies find banks to have insufficiently met their CRA 
obligations, these community groups can propose alternative lending practices and 
projects, leading to a negotiation between the firm, the community, and the 
regulatory agency.27  This regulatory oversight became more effective after 1995 
regulations and revisions which specified three tests by which these firms would be 
evaluated: a lending test, and investment test, and the service test.28  
The evidence suggests that banks have, as a result of the CRA, changed 
their behavior, forming multibank Community Development Corporations, 
investing in locally based Community Development Financial Institutions, and 
dedicating special units to focus on meeting the needs of local low and moderate 
income borrowers within the geographic area of the bank orders or branch.29  
Ultimately, the CRA has proven to be an effective response to discrimination in 
mortgage lending and capital flight, driving the expansion of low income and 
                                            
OCC oversees national banks, the Federal Reserve oversees state-chartered banks that are members 
of the Federal Reserve system, the FDIC oversees state-chartered banks that are not members of the 
Federal Reserve system.  See Richard Marisco, “Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and 
Reform of the Community Reinvestment Act,” New York Law School Law Review 49 (2004), 712-
726, at 718. 
27 Raymond Brescia, “Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the 
Community Reinvestment Act,” South Carolina Law Review 60 (2008), 618-677, at 635-6. 
28 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 112. 
29 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 147-48. 
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minority borrowing and locally rooted community investment— while maintaining 
sound lending practices and bank profitability.30 
But the real unique strength of the CRA framework lies in its harnessing of 
democratic participation as part of its enforcement regime. The CRA bolsters local 
community involvement both by incentivizing banks to lend to local businesses, 
and empowering community-based organizations as local brokers who can match 
worthy borrowers with willing banks.31  This mobilization is what made the CRA 
effective in changing bank behavior. In a number of cities, the CRA’s provision 
allowing community groups to invoke federal regulatory involvement helped 
catalyze a broader effort among community organizations to organize and expand 
their engagement with local banks.32 The background threat of federal regulatory 
enforcement incentivized banks themselves to engage with these community groups 
and negotiate for mutually agreeable community lending programs.   
For example, in Boston in the 1990s, groups like the Community 
Investment Coalition formed out of a combination of labor unions, community 
development corporations, and the state Affordable Housing Association.  The 
CIC then developed neighborhood reinvestment plans for the Roxbury area of 
Boston, and prepared CRA challenges.  In response, many of the larger banks of 
the area including the Bank of Boston and that Bank of New England agreed to 
negotiate, culminating in an affordable mortgage lending plan for the region.33 
                                            
30 See Barr, “Credit Where it Counts”; and Brescia, “Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure.” 
31 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts”, 128. 
32 Gregory Squires, “Rough Road to Reinvestment,” in Gregory Squires, ed., Organizing Access to 
Capital, (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 2003), 1-26. 
33 William Tisdale and Carla Westheirn, “Giving Back to the Future: Citizen Involvement and 
Community Stabilization in Milwaukee,” in Squires, ed., Organizing Access to Capital, 42-54. 
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Similarly, in Pittsburgh, the Community Reinvestment Group formed a multiracial 
advocacy coalition in 1988 to conduct research on CRA scorecard data provided 
by federal agencies. Invoking the CRA, this group was able to organize and 
empower other community development corporation leaders, and negotiate with 
local banks to channel more investment to poorer neighborhoods. The group even 
convinced the city of Pittsburgh and the Board of Education to put its money in 
banks that performed better on their CRA obligations.34 
The participation and engagement of these community groups exemplifies 
an important way in which democracy can facilitate the implementation and 
enforcement of regulatory policies. First, citizen participation can help identify 
practices which contravene the goals of the regulation, by harnessing defused 
grassroots networks of observers and participants who collectively have greater 
monitoring capacity than any centralized agency. Second, the presence of 
organized community groups can help better balance of viewpoints represented 
during the implementation of regulations.  Such empowerment of community 
groups can provide a counterweight to hold both regulated firms and federal 
agencies accountable for their actions—or, more likely, their inactions.  In the 
absence of active community groups mobilizing to pressure local banks, it seems 
likely that these banks’ CRA failures would have gone unnoticed, or ignored by the 
agency. Even if failures were noted, without the vocal engagement of community 
groups, it would be easier for banks to nominally discharge their CRA obligations 
without necessarily needing the actual needs of the local community.  Third, by 
fostering ongoing participation and engagement, the CRA approach can help drive 
                                            
34 Stanley Lowe and John Metzger, “A Citywide Strategy: The Pittsburgh Community Reinvestment 
Group,” in Squires, ed., Organizing Access to Capital, 85-101. 
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the emergence of social norms about the local economy and greater civic education 
and sophistication over time.  Citizen participation of this form thus offers 
epistemic benefits for implementing regulations; political benefits by shifting the 
balance of power in a way that gives more effective voice to community groups 
that might otherwise be silent; and normative benefits of fostering norms and civic 
engagement. 
Today, the CRA has less of an effect on bank lending or on community 
participation. CRA oversight is now more generally a process of agency 
rubberstamp approval, while courts have been hostile to legal challenges from 
individuals and groups seeking judicial review of agency decisions under the 
CRA.35   These trends have diminished the ability of community groups to monitor 
bank and agency conduct. However, as a model, the CRA experience is instructive. 
By establishing a mutually reinforcing interaction between regulatory agencies and 
local citizen and community groups, the CRA suggests ways in which citizen 
participation can be harnessed to improve the enforcement and implementation of 
regulations, and to help check the actions of both industry groups and agencies 
themselves. Further, such democratic engagement helps foster a broader public 
discourse about social norms, values, and civic empowerment.   Indeed, the CRA 
approach of fostering participation is arguably more effective than other regulatory 
approaches such as disclosure, product regulation, or legal enforcement of 
antidiscrimination laws, in large part because of the of the ways in which 
                                            
35 Brescia, “Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure,” 652-5.  See e.g. Lee v. Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 118 F.3d 905 (2d Cir 1997) and Lee v. Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, SDNY 1997, discussed in Brescia, 655-61. 
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participation enables broader more effective monitoring of compliance, and fosters 
longer-term generation of social norms and civic empowerment.36 
This virtuous dynamic of democratic engagement and effective regulatory 
enforcement derives from a particular institutional configuration of the CRA 
enforcement approach.  Several conditions in particular stand out. First, there are 
clear metrics with which to evaluate banks CRA performance, provided publicly 
by federal agencies.37 Second, community groups are empowered to request 
examinations or hearings focusing on the CRA activities of local banks. Third, the 
conditioning of merger approval on a good CRA scorecard in context of a period 
of intensified merger activity gave the CRA review process actual bite, thus 
creating a strong incentive for banks to engage with community groups and 
agencies to achieve a better CRA score.38 Fourth, the CRA evaluations conducted 
by agencies and the public hearings requested by community groups are all public, 
with multiple groups involved, making rent-seeking hard to conceal.39 Indeed, only 
a fraction of a percent of community investment funds arising from CRA 
negotiations went to the community organizations themselves,  suggesting very 
little rent seeking.40  Finally, the CRA specifies a standard of the meeting the needs 
of the local community, rather than specifying a rule for what this might mean. 
Not only does this standards-based approach offer a more flexible and adaptable 
framework, it also helped generate citizen participation in interpreting what local 
                                            
36 See Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 210-29. 
37 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 113. 
38 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 113. 
39 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 173. 
40 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 174. 
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needs might be, and evaluating whether those needs have been met. This 
standards-based approach thus enabled a more democratically-driven form of 
norm creation as local citizens participated in defining what their needs were and 
monitoring compliance against those needs.41 
 
Empowering citizens in regulation  
Such expanded and empowered participation can be facilitated by the 
political branches.  Explicit statutory schemes enabling participation and standing 
can overcome the ambiguities of legal doctrine and provide a more robust 
institutional structure for participation.  Similarly, executive orders could establish 
baseline procedures that systematize and thicken ad hoc agency practices of citizen 
participation, stakeholder consultation, and retrospective reviews.  Such executive 
orders could also provide defined standards and criteria for participation.42 It is 
telling that under the current Executive Order 12866, the regulatory review 
process run by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) focuses almost 
entirely on the cost-benefit analysis and regulatory impact analysis prepared by 
agencies, with little attention paid to who the agency consulted, and how.  Further, 
OMB and its sub-agency the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
are required under EO 12866 to accept requests from individuals and groups 
seeking meetings to voice their concerns about a particular regulation, but these 
meetings are one-way sessions, not open deliberations.  In part this narrow 
                                            
41 Barr, “Credit Where it Counts,” 183-6. 
42 Bingham, “The Next Generation of Administrative Law,” 350-6 (proposing language for a new 
executive order).  
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structure is meant to allow some form of voice without further plunging the 
regulatory review process in political debate, on the assumption that such deeper 
debate took place at the agency level.  But a better structure for regulatory review 
might require more of agencies at the initial policymaking stage in terms of 
participatory engagement and consultations, while tasking OIRA with reviewing 
not just the technocratic policy analysis, but also whether agencies have adequately 
complied with such participatory requirements.  More generally, participation can 
be fostered through the formation of a regulatory agency that is itself specialized in 
structuring participatory processes, and dedicated to establishing overall goals, 
processes, training, incentives, and measures of success for enabling participation.43 
Meanwhile, administrative law can play a role in helping realize this 
approach of participatory regulation.  First, legal doctrine and judicial review 
should be changed to expand judicial protections for citizen participation in 
regulatory policymaking.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, legal doctrine 
provided greater support for citizen participation in agency policymaking.44  
Second, legal doctrine can broaden standing requirements enabling citizens and 
associations to challenge agency actions in courts—particularly by enabling citizen 
suits to challenge violations of procedural harms in the regulatory process. 
Doctrine has often backed away from broad readings of standing with respect to 
administrative agencies, casting a shadow over the ability of citizens and groups to 
challenge agency actions even when these actions seem to violate some procedural 
                                            
43 Charles Sabel and William Simon, “Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative 
State” (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, 2011), at 27-30; Cuellar, “Rethinking 
Regulatory Democracy,” 491-97. 
44 See generally, Richard B. Stewart, “The Reformation of American Administrative Law,” Harvard 
Law Review 88:8 (June 1975), 1669-1813.  
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requirement or the interests seemingly promoted by Congressional statute.45  
Establishing a more firm right to challenge regulatory procedural harms in court, 
combined with greater statutory and agency policies to institutionalize 
consultative, representative, and participatory processes discussed above, would 
help consolidate the ability of citizens to engage directly in the business of 
regulatory policymaking. 
 
Agencies as democratic forums 
Suppose you are one of the many citizens who suffered as a result of the 
2008-9 financial crisis and the subsequent economic downturn.  You may have lost 
your job as one of the many newly-unemployed, or you may be a homeowner who 
is now underwater with a house worth less than the mortgage.  You may have 
been victim to predatory lending, or you may have lost your pension.  As a 
political actor, you may be motivated to support, advocate for, or help drive some 
policy response.  In traditional democratic politics, your primary avenue to do so 
involves selecting a party or candidate to vote for, or to join a civil society 
advocacy organization. But before such participation or advocacy can take place, 
there is an even more fundamentally prior question: where would you even go to 
make your claims?  This question is not so simple as it may seem at first.  A visit to 
your local Congressperson’s office may help, but the gap between your complaint 
as a constituent and a final resultant policy is vast, mediated not only by the 
                                            
45 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (noting that “only a generally available 
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly 
benefits him than it does the public at large” does not have standing under Article III of the 
Constitution.) 
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legislative process, but perhaps more importantly, but the process of regulatory 
implementation.  Your voice would be much more effective and meaningful if you 
could engage in some manner with the frontline institutions charged with the 
actual formulation and implementation of final policies—such as the actual 
regulatory agencies or local bodies that form the edges where the state meets the 
citizenry.  But even here, the question of where to target your claims is murky at 
best.  Among federal agencies, which of the many overlapping economic regulatory 
bodies would be the appropriate target for a complaint or proposal post-financial 
crisis? The Fed? The Securities and Exchange Commission? Or the Federal 
Housing Authority?  
Regulatory agencies can help respond to this challenge to democratic 
political agency through two mechanisms.  First, agencies can be constructed to 
provide visible focal points, readily identifiable targets for citizen mobilization and 
voice. But for agencies to provide a forum in this manner, we must rethink the way 
we approach the question of agency jurisdiction and specialization.  In particular, 
we must balance between multiple specialized agencies on the one hand, and a 
more consolidated regulatory power on the other. Consolidation enables a forum 
to be more visible as a target and focal point for mobilization, while 
decentralization can facilitate access to the forum by multiplying potential sites of 
democratic engagement. Further, an overly fragmented administrative state 
conduces to turf wars and clashes that can cause different agencies to be more 
likely captured by different interests, while key issues fall between the cracks of 
regulatory authority or are deadlocked by clashes between agencies with 
overlapping jurisdictions.  Thus, different agencies could be reorganized to have 
clearer authority over particular issues with clear links to particular social 
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interests.46  Topical consolidation of agency authority can also facilitate 
accountability by improving the clarity of responsibility that voters and citizens 
can ascribe to particular agencies, while also enhancing the ability of particular 
agencies to act.47 
Second, in addition to providing a visible target, agencies can act as 
dedicated representatives charged with acting on behalf of particular 
underrepresented or marginalized constituencies.  Countervailing citizen interests 
can be represented through such “proxy advocacy,” where a regulatory office is 
created with the explicit mission of representing the needs of a particular 
demographic of citizens—such as consumers, veterans, farmers—through 
advocacy, providing information to other regulators, and navigating the 
rulemakings process with an eye towards protecting these interests.48 These 
regulatory offices would act not as neutral experts, but as representatives of a 
particular social interest, identifying and channeling its concerns within the 
broader ecology of regulatory agencies and the policymaking process. Such an 
agency could help underrepresented social groups participate in and put pressure 
on regulatory policy debates on par with more sophisticated insider interest 
groups.   
                                            
46 See e.g. Keith Bradley, “The Design of Agency Interactions,” Columbia Law Review 111:4 (May 
2011), 745-94, at 778-83. 
47 See Jacob Gersen, “Unbundled Powers,” Virginia Law Review 96 (2010), 301-360, at 309-15, 
329-40. 
48 See e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, “Preventing Capture Through Consumer Empowerment Programs: 
Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation,” in David Moss and Dan Carpenter, eds., Preventing 
Capture (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 2013) (examining case studies of how proxy 
advocacy and tripartism has helped mitigate the risk of capture in state-level insurance regulation).  
 264
These two mechanisms for agencies to facilitate democratic action—by 
offering a visible, consolidated authority for citizens to target, or by actively 
representing particular social interests—come to the fore in the financial reform 
context through the debate over the recently created Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB).  As an institution charged with channeling and 
responding to consumer interests, the CFPB arguably attempts to overcome the 
existing fragmentation of the financial regulatory system by providing a 
consolidated forum and target for consumer finance policies.  Indeed, one criticism 
of the pre-crash regulatory structure was that the proliferation of specialized 
financial regulatory agencies carved up the substantive issue of “financial sector 
regulation” in a way that tracked the specialization of regulatory agencies, but 
which made it increasingly difficult for non-bank interests to engage in the 
policymaking process and act as a countervailing force to the banking lobby.  It 
also led to many key policy issues ‘falling through the cracks’.  The proposal to 
create a consolidated Consumer Financial Protection Bureau offers one way of re-
slicing this same policy space—the CFPB centralizes authority in one agency, thus 
clarifying lines of accountability and responsibility, and providing a clear target 
against whom stakeholder groups can make claims.  
At the same time, the tension between the agency as representative and the 
agency as neutral arbiter is particularly acute as the CFPB begins its work.  The 
agency and its public discourse continues to conceive its role as an expert regulator 
in the mold of other regulatory agencies.  Yet, many individuals working in the 
CFPB are themselves veterans of consumer rights advocacy bodies, and have close 
ties to the consumer rights movement.  The CFPB in many ways embodies the same 
tension that lay at the heart of the persona of its progenitor, Elizabeth Warren: just 
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as Warren spoke the language of expertise but drew much of her popular support 
from her image as a zealous advocate for consumers, families, and those left 
behind in the financial crisis, so too does the CFPB speak the language of 
traditional expert regulation, while also serving as a foothold for consumer 
interests and a potential counterweight to the influence of otherwise sophisticated 
and well-connected banks and other lobbying groups. It is notable that the CFPB’s 
grant of authority in Dodd-Frank includes the creation of subunits charged with 
protecting underserved communities and older Americans49 and gives directives to 
ensure fair lending and equal access to credit.50 The CFPB operates an office of 
community affairs office charged with organizing outreach to consumer advocacy 
groups and seeking input from constituencies like minorities, students with debt, 
and homeowners.  Indeed, the realization that the CFPB may develop into a 
powerful advocate on behalf of consumers within the federal government likely 
animated much of the vociferous opposition to it on the part of banks and some 
conservatives.51 It is notable that Dodd-Frank tempers the power of the CFPB in 
ways that very few other agencies are constrained. The statute requires the CFPB 
to consult and coordinate with the SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC.52 Further, other 
                                            
49 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1013. 
50 See Dodd-Frank Act § 1021. 
51 It is worth noting that several Republican legislative efforts sought to strip the CFPB of its 
independence in an effort to undermine its potential power. See, e.g., Shelby Amendment, S. Amdt. 
3826, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing CFPB be housed within the FDIC with diminished powers). 
The final placement of the CFPB within the Fed rather than as its own independent agency was a 
compromise measure in response to these efforts, but which largely seems to have preserved the 
independence of the CFPB. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1012, 1024, 1025 (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5492, 5514, 5515). 
52 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1015, 1025 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5495, 5515).  
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agencies can petition the FSOC to stay or overturn a CFPB regulation if a conflict 
with another agency’s policies is perceived.53 
In a similar vein, some scholars have suggested the creation of a dedicated 
public interest council, an independent governmental entity comprised of experts 
and public advocates charged with conducting investigations, proposing policies, 
auditing the regulations proposed and implemented by other financial regulatory 
bodies, all in an effort to magnify and channel the countervailing interests of 
citizens to prevent the capture of financial regulatory bodies by sophisticated 
industry players.54 Providing such expansive powers for this kind of regulatory 
agency that acts on behalf of and as a channel for citizen voice is crucial, making 
these proposals more robust than the ad hoc and more easily ignored current 
practices of advisory public interest organizations or agency ombudsmen.55 
Creating a dedicated agency in this regard is also superior to a neutral overseeing 
body like the FSOC, because it is empowered to magnify the political agency of 
citizens to help balance the terrain of political influence.56 
 
Bringing politics back into policymaking 
As suggested in Chapter 7 above, regulatory policy decisions are 
fundamentally political judgments that involve both technical and normative 
                                            
53 Dodd-Frank Act § 1023 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5513).  
54 Saule Omarova, “Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services 
Regulation,” Journal of Corporate Law 37 (2011), 621-674. 
55 Omarova, “Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians,” 635-58. 
56 Omarova, “Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians,” 673.  
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considerations.57  Avoiding these concerns does not remove them, but rather 
creates the threat of morally-weighty policy judgments being made under cloak of 
expertise.  Furthermore, as the moral stakes get higher, expertise alone cannot bear 
the weight of justification, and avoiding these moral dimensions creates even 
greater pressure on the politicization of what expertise can offer.58 Rather than 
seeking to sterilize regulatory policymaking of these normative dimensions, 
agencies should acknowledge more openly that politics, subjective judgments, 
ambiguity, and uncertainly all create gaps in what expert knowledge can resolve.59 
By embracing these political dimensions and creating a political process to make 
these judgments, agency policymaking can be transformed into a more democratic 
political process.   
Yet as currently constituted, regulatory agencies are incentivized and 
structured to resort to technocratic justifications for their policy positions, even 
when those positions are politically or morally-influenced.  Major regulations are 
subject to two forms of review: first, a review within the executive branch by 
OIRA, which under Executive Order 12866 is charged with ensuring that 
regulations pass the test of cost-benefit analysis;60 and second, a review by the 
                                            
57 See also the discussion in Chapter 10 below.  
58 See e.g., Brown, Science in Democracy; Kathryn Watts, “Proposing a Place for Politics in 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review,” Yale Law Journal 119 (2009), 2-85, at 33; and discussion 
below.  
59 See Martin Shapiro, Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1988), 142-151; Christopher Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: 
Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 190-9; Cass 
Sunstein, “Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946,” Virginia Law Review 72 
(1986), 271-296, at 281. 
60 See Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration,” Harvard Law Review 114 (2001), 2245-2385. 
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judiciary under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.61  In both forms of review, 
the incentive for agencies is to claim expertise-based foundations for their policies, 
resorting to technocratic justifications.   
Take for example, the 2007 Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v. EPA.  
In this case, the Supreme Court challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(EPA’s) decision under the Bush administration to decline a petition by states 
requesting new regulations on greenhouse gas emissions under the authority 
granted by the Clean Air Act.  The majority opinion criticizes the EPA for giving 
insufficient scientifically-based reasons for its denial of the rulemaking petition, 
arguing that the EPA could not legitimately appeal to the policy priorities of 
political leaders like the President or his appointed head of the EPA.62  The decision 
is thus what Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule have called “expertise-forcing”: 
an attempt by the Court to ensure that agencies base their policies on scientific 
expertise, free from outside political pressures whether from the White House or 
political appointees.63  This holding rested on a sense that the EPA had not acted in 
good faith, and that its policy judgments rested on political imperatives instead: 
Although we [the Court] have neither the expertise nor the authority 
to evaluate these policy judgments, it is evident they have nothing to 
do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate 
change.  Still less do they amount to a reasoned justification for 
declining to form a scientific judgment.64  
 
                                            
61 See e.g., Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
62 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
63 Jody Freeman, Adrian Vermeule, “Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise,” Supreme 
Court Review 2007(2), 51-110, at 52. 
64 Massachusetts, 549 U.S., at 533-34. 
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While it was the liberal bloc on the Court in Massachusetts who turned to 
expertise to combat what it saw as undue political influence tainting climate 
science in the Bush administration, this same expertise-forcing approach has 
hobbled efforts to expand financial regulations even after the passage of Dodd-
Frank. The DC Circuit court in particular has a recent track record of being hostile 
to expanded financial regulations,65 and has found ways to cast doubt on new 
regulations pursuant to Dodd-Frank as resting on insufficiently expert 
justifications. 
For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a rule 
on shareholder proxy access to corporate board elections pursuant to Dodd-Frank, 
only to have the rule struck down on the grounds that agency had offered 
insufficient empirical evidence that this rule would improve corporate governance. 
Industry groups challenged the rule arguing that the SEC had inadequately 
considered the economic impact of the rule, which the SEC is under special 
obligation to do under statutory language compelling particular attention to 
considerations of efficiency, competition, and capital formation effects,66 and under 
prior DC Circuit precedent.67  Despite the SEC’s stated evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of its rule, the Court found that the agency had “inconsistently and 
opportunistically” skewed its cost-benefit analysis, listing several faults such as the 
failure to quantify certain costs or to adequately justify its predictive judgments.68  
                                            
65 See Ben Protess, “Regulator Prepares to Appeal Dodd-Frank Court Ruling,” New York Times, 
Dealbook, October 9, 2012.  
66 See 15 USC 78c(f), 78w(a)(2), 80a-2(c).  
67 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
68 Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce of the USA v. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. 
July 2011), 7.  
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The agency had provide “insufficient empirical data” on whether the rule would 
actually create benefits of board performance and increased shareholder value, 
relying on two “unpersuasive” studies of the subject.69   
In a similar case, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
issued a new rule on position limits for derivatives trading.70  The CFTC saw this 
rule as required by Dodd-Frank’s directive that the CFTC prevent “undue 
burdens” associated with “excessive speculation” regardless of any finding of cost-
benefit analysis.  The CFTC also argued the rule was a prophylactic one that did 
not require an affirmative finding that such position limits would be necessary to 
protect derivatives markets.  Industry groups however challenged the rule for being 
based on insufficient scientific evidence as to the rule’s impacts on derivatives 
markets.71  The DC Circuit found that the statutory language permitted but did not 
require the CFTC to issue the rule—and as a result the agency would have to 
provide a more reasoned justification for its decision on remand.72   
In all of these cases, courts have deployed their power of reviewing the 
justifications of regulatory actions under the “arbitrary and capricious review” 
standard as a way to force agencies to ground their decisions on sufficient scientific 
evidence. Justifying regulations as resulting from a political command from the 
executive or the legislature is treated with suspicion by courts in practice  This 
technocratic disciplining of agency justifications has been accepted “uncritically” 
                                            
69 Ibid., 11.  
70 CFTC, Position Limits Rule, 76 FR 71626 (November 2011).  
71 See Protess, “Regulator Prepares to Appeal Dodd-Frank Court Ruling,” New York Times, 
October 9, 2012.  
72 International Swaps and Derivatives Association v US, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___ (D.D.C. 2012), 2012 
WL 4466311.  
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by judges and scholars alike.73  Yet this expertise-forcing doctrine tends to operate 
as a proxy for substantive disputes; rather than actually forcing expertise, the 
result of this doctrine is to submerge the real dimensions of policy debate beneath a 
veneer of technocratic justification or judicial oversight. Indeed, judges’ ideological 
and partisan agreement with the substance of agency policies affects their 
likelihood of upholding agency decisions under arbitrariness review.74 
The arbitrary and capricious doctrine should be revised to allow greater 
room for normative as well as technocratic justifications for agency policymaking. 
This approach would mitigate the danger that courts themselves might use the 
arbitrary and capricious standard as a pretext for voicing substantive disagreement 
with agency policies. Further, by openly allowing certain kinds of political factors 
to weigh on agency policymaking, this shift in arbitrariness review can help remove 
some of the smokescreen around agency policy judgments: “Encouraging agencies 
to disclose political factors rather than hiding behind technocratic facades would 
enable more political influences to come out into the open, thereby enabling 
greater political accountability and monitoring.”75 
How might political judgments be more brought to the fore in regulatory 
decision-making?  First, the Court could simply require a more explicit statement 
of the agency’s reasons—scientific, technical, as well as political.76  So long as these 
                                            
73 Watts, “Proposing a Place for Politics,” 32. 
74 Richard Revesz, “Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit,” Virginia Law 
Review 83:8 (1997), 1717-72; Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Ellman, “Ideological Voting on 
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76 See e.g. State Farm, 463 U.S., Rehnquist dissent. 
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political judgments are disclosed, and consonant with explicit authorizations such 
as Congressional statutory language or Presidential Executive Orders, they can be 
accepted as appropriate judgments.77   
Second, Congress can facilitate greater normative transparency and 
contestability by providing more detailed descriptions of the policy goals and 
evaluative standards in its statutory delegations of agency authority. For example, 
many environmental statutes require agencies to promulgate regulations that 
require industries to use “best available technologies,” but the statutes do not 
define what constitutes a best available technology.  In light of congressional 
silence, some cases have interpreted the standard to mean “cost effective 
technology,” but even then it is unclear what level of risk reduction is cost-effective 
at what price.78 Congress could instead provide more detailed descriptions of 
evaluative standards that agencies and courts should employ in formulating and 
reviewing regulations.79 
Third, agencies themselves could engage in preliminary rulemakings that 
focus on  establishing the principles or evaluative methodologies that the agency 
plans to use for a certain set of regulations. For example, agencies could solicit 
public comments on a particular method of weighing competing values. Similarly, 
agencies could issue statements that outline the normative or political principles to 
be used to guide discretionary rulemaking decisions in a particular area of 
                                            
77 Watts, “Proposing a Place for Politics,” 45-73. 
78 See e.g. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009). 
79 Such substantive guidance within the statute would also have the added benefit of avoiding 
pockets of non-reviewable agency discretion where there simply isn’t enough statutory language to 
guide judicial review.  See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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regulation.  These statements could then provide a basis both for direct public 
engagement through notice and comment, and for possible judicial review if 
agencies are seen to depart from these regulations themselves.80  
Fourth, this process of agencies declaring the values or principles guiding 
their policymaking can be further facilitated and incentivized through presidential 
administration. As defenders of presidential administration have regularly noted, 
presidential oversight can function both as a mechanism for promoting policy 
coherence, and as a way of linking agency policies to the political and 
democratically accountable goals of the executive.81 A new Executive Order could 
amend the regulatory review process requiring agencies to submit such statements 
of principles and general approach in addition to the current practice of regulatory 
impact assessments and cost-benefit analyses.  Similarly, presidents could issue 
executive orders that state basic values that will guide the analysis or policymaking 
of administrative agencies, enforcing these orders through the regulatory review 
process.  Currently, the requirement for agencies to submit cost-benefit analyses is 
the only institutionally enforced aspect of the range of such executive orders.  But 
it is possible to use the mechanics of presidential oversight to evaluate agency 
proposals not only for whether they have employed sufficient cost-benefit analysis, 
but also for whether they have, for example, taking sufficient consideration of 
other normative policy goals as determined by the president.82   
                                            
80 United States ex rel Accardi v Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 
33 (1964). 
81 See Kagan, “Presidential Administration.” 
82 Executive Order 13132, for example, requires agencies to take adequate consideration of 
federalism concerns, calling for additional justification for policies that burden state or local 
governments.  This is a good example of a normative value imposed to shape agency policymaking 
through the regulatory review process.  However, it is also notable that this executive order is not 
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These reconfigurations of the administrative state are relatively minor, but 
would facilitate more open normative argument in agency policymaking, placing 
normative considerations alongside factual and technical ones in policy discourse.  
This in turn opens up more space for democratic engagement, contestation, and 
accountability. There may still be incentives for agencies and presidential officials 
to deliberately clothe decisions in technocratic language to stave off political 
challenge.  But by removing the institutional and legal incentives to do so, these 
reforms can mitigate this tendency to cover political and normative policy 
decisions in the aura of pretextual technocratic expertise.  Further, by facilitating 
more open statements of normative policy values, this overall approach helps 
create the preconditions for more effective democratic engagement.  Without a 
clear understanding of what values are at stake or being employed, it is difficult for 
many groups to adequately mobilize and engage with the policymaking process—a 
difficulty that will not be shared by more sophisticated, well-resourced, and well-
connected interest groups.  Such normative transparency is thus vital to counteract 
imbalances of representation, influence, and political power.   
This effort to bring politics back into regulatory policymaking does not 
reject the role of agency expertise or policy science altogether.  But it does place it 
on more even footing with other elements that go into policy decisions.  Instead of 
a turn to technocratic discourse that obscures other considerations operating in the 
background or otherwise narrows the space for citizen engagement with policy 
                                            
often enforced the way the cost-benefit analysis provisions of Executive Order 12866 are.  A more 
open and deliberate use of executive orders as mechanisms for articulating and enforcing normative 
values could also lead to more effective enforcement and coordination as the administration focuses 
its efforts, rather than attempting to implement a wide range of facially neutral mechanisms that in 
practice will nevertheless are already inflected with the values of the administration. 
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debate, expertise is paired with other forms of normative and political argument to 
enliven and facilitate greater public discourse.    
 
* * * 
The regulatory state can therefore be reconstituted not as a domain of 
technical implementation or technocratic judgment, but rather as a space for 
participatory, and contestatory, democratic politics.  Regulatory agencies already 
possess relatively broad powers, but much of the current structure of the 
regulatory state instantiates a technocratic view of regulation—for example, 
through the requirement of neutral, scientific justifications for policies.  By 
contrast, the suggestions above indicate ways in which the authority of regulatory 
agencies can be embedded in a more vibrant democratic politics: by engaging 
citizens more directly through participation and representation; involving citizens 
not only in the formulation but also in the implementation, enforcement, and 
revision of policies; and by opening the discourse of justification beyond 
technocratic expert discourses to engage with the moral and political concerns that 
are central to regulatory policy.  These efforts are particularly vital in economic 
governance, where the presence of such institutional frameworks for political 
action is crucial to enable individual citizens to mobilize and act effectively in 
governing and remaking our economic order.   
Reconstituted in this way, the regulatory state can be a crucial forum, 
catalyst, and enabler of democratic politics.  The democratic potential of the 
regulatory state stems from its position as a ‘front-line’ institution of governance: a 
set of bodies that exists at exactly the porous boundary between “the state” on the 
one hand, and the citizenry on the other.  Regulatory agencies are among those 
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bodies that are charged with crafting, implementing, and adjudicating the final, 
specified policy initiatives, and thus interact more directly with the world than 
more removed spaces of policymaking.  In a similar manner, democratic agency 
over the economy can be facilitated through another front-line institution of our 
democracy: local governments.  But where the problem of regulatory agencies was 
primarily one of organizing an existing broad set of authorities along more 
participatory lines, the challenge with the local is to harness a greater participatory 




9 DEMOCRACY THROUGH THE CITY  
 
Enabling democratic participation in economic governance is not just a 
matter of reforming our regulatory institutions at the national level.  Much of the 
day-to-day business of government takes place through local government bodies.  
These institutions provide another front line in the interface between the state and 
the citizen.  As such, they offer another set of potential spaces for meaningful 
democratic participation.  Although local government bodies are often 
romanticized as intrinsically linked to grassroots democracy, in practice these 
institutions rarely meet these aspirations.  Where federal regulatory agencies often 
possess broad powers, but have a structure and process that makes them relatively 
distant from participation, these local bodies have a different set of problems.  
Legally, local governments have severely limited powers that undermine their 
efficacy as democratic forums.  Thus, another vector through which democratic 
agency can be fostered is through the reform of local government institutions to 
provide them with greater regulatory powers in a way that encourages 
participation in governance.  
 
The unrealized democratic promise of the city 
As with the consolidation of agency authority, there are civic benefits to 
restructuring the scope of local government power.  For all the romantic imagery 
associated with local democracy, the reality of local democracy is very different.  
Localities are hobbled by tight legal limits on the kinds of powers they can 
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exercise—and as a result are limited in the capacity to serve as a viable forum for 
meaningful democratic participation.  Indeed, historically, the same anxieties that 
have driven both the technocratic and laissez-faire understandings of economic 
governance—concerns about likelihood of corruption and capture, fears of 
inefficient government, or anxieties about the use of state power to undermine 
liberties—have been particularly acute in context of local government.  It is 
because of these concerns that local government has evolved into its current, 
limited form.  Yet in the process, the participatory democratic potential of the 
locality has been undermined.   
The history of local government law has been one of evolving limits and 
constraints on the powers of municipalities, following many of the same currents 
that shaped the discourses of economic regulation and the administrative state. 
Formally, cities, like corporations, are chartered creations of the state legislature.  
Early American law struggled to categorize and regulate municipal corporations: 
municipal corporations were publicly chartered like private corporations, but 
seemed more akin to associations than they did to hierarchical firms.1  By the 
eighteenth century, municipal corporations had been distinguished from private 
corporations: where private corporations required protection from state 
interference as products of constitutionally- and legally-protected individual 
property rights, municipal corporations were instead treated as instruments of the 
state, to be created and constrained as needed to prevent abuses of state power and 
the problems of faction.2 Local governments were understood to have only the 
                                            
1 Gerald Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” Harvard Law Review 93 (1980), 1057-1154, at 1096-7. 
2 Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1099-1106. 
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authority to act where it is expressly granted by the state legislature.  Further, 
localities were understood as creatures of the state legislature, with no inherent 
rights or protections of their own.  
Just as nineteenth century concerns about the regulatory state cited risks of 
capture, corruption, inefficiency or unresponsiveness, these same concerns drove 
the attempt to narrow the powers of municipal corporations. Under what came to 
be known as Dillon’s rule, grants of regulatory power to municipalities were to be 
read narrowly.  Despite earlier practices of state and local level economic 
regulation for the public welfare, cities were seen as a particularly flawed 
institutional approach to governance.3 Dillon’s rule and its limited view of the 
powers of localities stemmed not from an outright rejection of the idea of local 
democracy, but rather out of a concern about unchecked public power as a threat 
to property and liberty—and out of a fear that local governments left to their own 
devices would act irrationally, or be captured by special interests.  For some critics 
of city power, the presumption behind Dillon’s Rule was that state oversight of 
cities would be preferable precisely because state governments would be more 
rational, effective, and responsive—exemplifying the technocratic vision of 
regulation.4  But in practice, Dillon’s Rule worked to help foster a laissez-faire 
political economy, as judges used the presumption against local authority to limit 
attempts at economic regulation or redistribution, as judges operated under the 
                                            
3 See e.g. David Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” Harvard Law Review 116 (2003), 2257-2386, 
at 2283-5. 
4 Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1110-2. 
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same understandings of laissez-faire that shaped critics of the early regulatory state 
in cases like Lochner.5 
Just as Progressive Era reformers sought to combat laissez-faire thought 
through creating regulatory agencies and other mechanisms for democratic action, 
many of these reformers also saw Dillon’s rule and its support for laissez-faire 
political economy as another element of laissez-faire governance in need of reform.  
In this case, the presumption against local power seemed instead to encourage 
greater efforts by factions and special interests to capture state legislators, moving 
the problems of corrupt, or ineffective governance up a level.6  In response, 
Progressive Era reformers across the country sought to reinvent the city as a 
democratic forum.  
For many reformers, city-level politics offered a path to realizing democratic 
aspirations of self-rule and self-government.7  The social and economic problems of 
an industrializing economy were most visible in the city, with its concentrations of 
poverty, social fragmentation, and extreme inequalities of wealth.8  At the same 
time, cities were the primary providers of social services, housing, sanitation, and 
other central services.9 Cities offered the promise of an alternative democratic 
space where the citizenry could be empowered to make public policy free of the 
                                            
5 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2285. 
6 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2286-8. 
7 Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 158. 
8 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 112-3.  
9 See Richard Schragger, “The Progressive City,” in Kathleen Claussen, Adam Grogg, and Sarah 
Russell, eds., Why the Local Matters: Federalism, Localism, and Public Interest Advocacy (New 
Haven: Yale Law School, 2008), 39-50, at 40-4. 
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constraints of the judiciary, and of party bosses and special interests dominating 
state legislatures. But in order to fully realize these reformist aspirations, local 
government itself had to be reformed to overcome patterns of corruption and party 
boss rule.10  
Thus, a number of reformist movements emerged with the goal of 
facilitating deliberation, community, and political engagement within the city. The 
“city beautiful” movement led by organizations like the American League for Civic 
Improvement and the American Park and Outdoor Art Association sought to 
engineer public spaces aimed at provoking local pride, social interactions, and 
deliberation.11 Frederick Howe led reformers and reformist politicians in Cleveland 
and New York to develop systems of local forums aimed at bringing citizens 
together with elected officials and policymaking experts, in order to displace the 
political power of corrupt parties.12 This turn to the city as a forum—from the 
establishment of city utilities to the brief anti-chain store movement—there was a 
link between an empowered locality as a political space, the ability of citizens to 
experience real democratic agency and self-government, and the capacity to 
experiment with new policies, particularly in responding to the upheavals of the 
new industrial economy.13 While some activists and thinkers emphasized harmony 
and community as the key goals, others focused more centrally on the task of 
                                            
10 Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings, 156-9. 
11 Keith Mattson, Creating a Democratic Public: The Struggle for Urban Participatory Democracy 
During the Progressive Era (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 16-30. 
12 Mattson, Creating a Democratic Public, 32-47. 
13 See e.g. Richard Schragger, “The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the 
Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940,” Iowa Law Review 90 (2005), 1011-1094, 
especially 1082-5. 
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encouraging political judgment and democratic deliberation through increased 
social interaction, argument, learning, and engagement with the day-to-day 
practice of urban governance.14 
The biggest policy success of these efforts came in the Home Rule 
movement.  Through state constitutional amendments that guaranteed city 
authority to make policy on “local” policy issues, Home Rule would promote of 
public good by creating an alternative space for policymaking apart from corrupt 
state legislatures, while also imposing a set of legal authorities and constraints that 
would encourage good government at the local level.15 In practice, however, the 
legacy of Home Rule as a democratizing innovation has been mixed. Home Rule 
paradoxically has operated as much as a constraint on localities as an 
empowerment of them.16   
In current practice, municipalities do enjoy the autonomy to make public 
policy under Home Rule provisions, but face two major constraints on this 
authority.  First, there continues to be an ongoing legal and judicial debate over 
what counts as a matter of “local” concern where Home Rule powers apply. While 
many states have Home Rule amendments granting local governments some form 
of autonomy, local efforts to experiment with new social and economic policies 
such as gun control, local campaign finance, minimum wage laws, rent control, 
and mortgage regulations are often found preempted by state or federal authority, 
                                            
14 Mattson, Creating a Democratic Public, 69-77. 
15 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2289-91. 
16 See e.g. Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 116; Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2290; Frug and 
Barron, City-Bound: How States Stifle Urban Innovation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 
36-8. 
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on the grounds that these city policies implicate policy decisions that are not purely 
local, and where federal or state authorities trump the locality.17  The viability of 
localities as forums for democratic action is undermined when localities are viewed 
as having narrowly limited domains of authority.  These disputes underscore that 
the attempt to demarcate city authority on the basis of a distinction between 
“local” and “national” subject matter is a shaky approach to city level democracy 
at best.18   
Second, local authority is also circumscribed by the competing authority of 
neighboring localities.  Ironically, by granting autonomy to all localities, the 
structure of Home Rule creates tendencies towards fragmentation and policy 
competition: the ability of one locality to enact regulations on business or 
economic development efforts, for example, is constrained by the degree to which 
other neighboring localities enact rival policies that run in a different direction.19  
This problem is compounded by the fact that many local areas are actually 
governed by dozens, sometimes hundreds, of distinct municipal corporations; the 
greater Boston metropolitan region for example, is actually comprised of several 
hundred rival, and autonomous, municipal bodies. 
These limitations to Home Rule as a legal guarantor for local level 
democracy were embedded from the beginnings of the Home Rule movement.  
Despite its apparent commitment to local autonomy and local-level democracy, the 
                                            
17 See e.g. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So.2d 1098 
(2002); Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000); American Financial 
Services v. City of Oakland, 34 Cal.4th 1239 (2005). 
18 Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 61. 
19 Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 39-41; 206-9. 
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Home Rule movement was largely driven by the same concerns for good 
governance that has shaped the historical debates over economic regulation and 
the administrative state.  As a result, reformers often saw their task not as enabling 
governmental power, but rather as constraining it to prevent irrational or illiberal 
policies.  Again, the debate revolved around a clash between technocratic, laissez-
faire, and democratic understandings of city power.  The debate during the turn of 
the twentieth century over local power thus revolved around the same triad of 
conceptions of political economy that animated similar debates over economic 
governance and regulation: laissez-faire, technocratic, and democratic. 
Thus, the Home Rule movement gained ground in the turn of the twentieth 
century precisely because the idea of Home Rule “served as a placeholder for an 
array of conflicting concrete proposals,” winning support from both conservative 
defenders of laissez-faire and Progressive proponents of technocratic expertise.20  
For the conservatives, Home Rule offered a technique to limit the growth of 
taxation, spending, and governmental power more generally.  By defining a narrow 
scope of local power in a state constitutional amendment, these reformers could 
limit the ability of state legislatures to manipulate city policies and structures in 
response to special interest lobbying.  Home Rule would also restore the ideal of 
small government focused solely on minor local issues rather than larger visions of 
social reform.  In so doing, these conservatives hoped, as similarly-minded thinkers 
in other contexts like the Lochner decision, to preclude the risk of “special 
                                            
20 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2291.  See also Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 36-8. 
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legislation” favoring particular factions, or other forms of state capture or 
corruption.21  As David Barron explains,  
finding neither local autonomy nor its opposite attractive, the old 
conservatives pursued a middle path. They sought to rejigger the city- state 
legal relationship in a way that would restore the idealized small- scale, low-
tax, low-debt, highly privatized (and thus incorruptibly public) ideal of local 
government that seemed on the verge of being lost forever.22 
 
Technocratic Progressives had a very different ideal vision of government—
not the small, noninterventionist government of the laissez-faire advocates, but 
rather an expert-based administrative government capable of developing complex 
social policies—but they shared the conservative anxiety over corruption, capture, 
and inefficiency.  Home Rule, for these technocratic reformers, offered a way to 
rationalize state policy, specifically by pairing local autonomy with extensive 
administrative rather than legislative oversight by the state.23  As with their 
contemporaries advocating for the rise of the federal regulatory state, these 
reformers saw technocratic expertise as the ideal way to defuse the anxieties of 
critics like Dillon, without abandoning the idea of economic regulation and the 
ability of localities to respond to social problems altogether. 
The historical advocates for Home Rule saw it as a way to rationalize and 
constrain—rather than truly empower—local government.  It is no surprise, then, 
that localities continue to struggle to enjoy the kind of powers and authority 
necessary for them to serve as viable forums for democratic political agency.  Yet 
there was a third vision of local power present in the Home Rule movement.  This 
                                            
21 Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 37. 
22 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2294.  
23 Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 37; Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2300-7 
 286
third batch of reformers had a very different motivation: focused not on the need 
to constrain problematic exercises of state power, but rather on the need to 
catalyze, enliven, and enable the political power of citizens as makers of their own 
collective futures.   For these reformers, the locality was seen primarily as an 
expression of the shared social experience of citizens aspiring towards self-
government—rather than being a way to protect private property or to promote 
administrative expertise:24  “The benefits of Home Rule were to be found in the 
political effect of arousing a public realm too long dominated by private power, 
rather than in the promotion of administrative or business-like efficiency.”25 
These reformers thus sought to expand the locality’s policy capacity, 
enabling it to engage in big policy issues of the day, through expanded powers to 
tax, regulate activities, and even to operate utilities.26  In contrast to the Home 
Rule focus on matters of “local” concern, these reformers saw the local not as a 
particular set of issues, but rather as a forum through which citizens could 
experience self-government on issues of central concern, including major national 
issues.27  This vision of the democratic city thus follows the strand of radical 
democratic Progressivism espoused by thinkers like Dewey and Brandeis—and like 
those thinkers, sought to respond to the problems of capture, corruption and 
inefficiency neither through privatization nor expertise but rather through 
mechanisms to empower greater democratic self-rule.  As Frug argues, “cities have 
                                            
24 Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 38.  
25 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2309. 
26 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2312-8. 
27 Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule,” 2310-11. 
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served—and might again serve—as vehicles to achieve purposes which have been 
frustrated in modern life,” especially by realizing “the ability to participate actively 
in the basic societal decisions that affect one’s life.”28  This defense of local power 
is distinctive; the local is valuable, in this view, not because it enables a diversity of 
localities that cater to individual preferences, nor because it speaks to matters of 
purely local concern, but rather because it offers a space in which citizens can 
experience meaningful political agency as they attempt to respond to the social 
problems of the day. This is the kind of participatory vision that is needed to 
reformulate the balance of local power today. 
Today, the problem of local powerlessness erodes the potential for this 
participatory vision.29  Whether in the form of Home Rule constraints, Dillon’s 
Rule, or further limitations arising from the narrow tax base, limited tax authority, 
localities are tightly constrained in their ability to enact public policy.30 Municipal 
corporations have even less power to act than private corporations, despite their 
shared ancestry.31  Even where city-level democracy seems secure within limited 
areas of city power, the prevailing democratic skepticism of the era hollows out 
further the scope for democratic participation at the local level.  Many city 
functions are now provided by alternative technocratic bodies, special districts, and 
                                            
28 Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1068. 
29 Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1072. 
30 See e.g. Frug and Barron, City-Bound; Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1062-4. 
31 As Frug notes, city discretion is the application of coercive power to liberty and must be 
restrained, while corporate discretion is the exercise of that liberty and must be protected.”  See 
Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1066. 
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public-private partnerships, over which cities themselves have little control.32  As 
we have seen elsewhere, the pattern is a consistent one of institutionalizing 
constraints on political action, either because the idea of participatory democracy 
seems “so bizarre, so dangerous, and so unworkable that most state constitutions 
prohibit its emergence,” or because the notion of city discretion of any kind 
“evokes images of corruption, patronage, and even foolishness.”33  
 
Localism and democratic economic governance 
The value of cities as democratic spaces—and their relative weakness in 
contemporary policymaking, particularly on economic matters—is well exemplified 
by the role of local governments in anticipating the financial regulation debate.  
Cities were at the forefront of identifying and attempting to respond to the 
emerging subprime lending crisis.  But the current structure of local power stymied 
efforts by citizens and localities to respond to the subprime lending and financial 
crisis.  
Predatory lending was a major cause of the financial crisis, as borrowers 
found themselves caught in subprime mortgage loans which they could not repay, 
leading to waves of foreclosures that decimated many communities and eventually 
undermined the value of a wide array of mortgage-backed securities. Predatory 
lending refers to loans and lending practices that include characteristics such as 
excessive fees, excessive interest rates, lending without regard to the borrower’s 
                                            
32 Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1065-6.  See also Richard Briffault, “Who Rules at Home: One 
Person/One Vote and Local Governments,” University of Chicago Law Review 60 (1993), 339-
424. 
33 Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1073, 1066. 
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ability to repay, loan flipping, fraud and deception, prepayment penalties, and 
balloon payments.34 As early as 2000, a range of community advocacy groups in 
multiple states appealed to federal regulators such as the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) to crack down on predatory lending, while hard-hit cities such 
as Cleveland lobbied Federal Reserve to regulate the industry more stringently.35  
These appeals ultimately were not followed.  Federal regulators systematically 
undercut state and local efforts to regulate predatory lending during the 2000s, in 
the lead up to the financial crash. 
A number of municipalities took the lead in attempting to regulate 
predatory lending through city ordinances. But such local ordinances passed in 
almost 20 cities faced near immediate preemption challenges.36 In California, the 
city of Oakland adopted a local ordinance regulating lending and home mortgages. 
A few days later the California legislature passed its own predatory lending law. 
The financial services industry promptly challenged the more stringent Oakland 
ordinance, arguing that California state legislation had occupied the field of 
mortgage lending regulation, thereby preempting the Oakland ordinance. 
California courts ultimately agreed, ruling against the city of Oakland.37 While the 
                                            
34 Jonathan Entin, Shadya Yazback, “City Governments and Predatory Lending,” 34 Fordham 
Urban Law Journal 757 (2007), at 760-1, quoting US GAO, Consumer Protection: Federal and 
State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending (2004), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf 
35 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2011), 10. 
36 Entin and Yazback, “City Governments and Predatory Lending,” 771-2. 
37 American Financial Services v. City of Oakland, 34 Cal.4th 1239 (2005).  Oakland passed a 
publicly-backed municipal code regulating the subprime industry and the secondary mortgage 
market.  However, local area banks opposed the measure, and successfully combined with other 
groups to help push through a state level regulatory statute that specified less-stringent regulations.  
These banks then initiated a lawsuit to strike down the Oakland regulation as preempted by (i.e. 
inconsistent with) the state statute.  Though Oakland argued that it had the authority to pass 
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state law did not include any express preemption language, it exhibited an 
“implicit intent to fully occupy the field of regulation”.38 Oakland’s local concerns 
with blight and foreclosures “do not give the City a license to regulate a highly 
complex financial area comprehensively addressed by state law.”39  Yet as the 
dissent in the case noted, the question of local preemption was explicitly 
considered and rejected by the state legislature, despite a push by the same industry 
groups bringing the lawsuit itself.40  Oakland could rightly have considered its 
ordinance a local community development measure.  Furthermore, the ordinance 
did not contradict the state law, instead providing additional borrower rights not 
covered in the state law, in effect furthering rather than subverting the state law’s 
intent of protecting low-income borrowers.41 
This pattern—where economically distressed cities attempted to revive their 
communities by regulating predatory lending, but were thwarted at the state level 
as the financial industry pursued state legislation and preemption through state 
courts—repeated itself across the country. In Ohio, the city of Cleveland passed its 
own anti-predatory lending ordinance which was intended to build on existing 
state predatory lending laws. In response, national financial institutions fled the 
city, while the state legislature pursued litigation to eliminate the ordinance. In 
                                            
regulations that went above and beyond the minimum floor established by the state statute, the 
court ruled that the state regulation set both a minimum and maximum level of regulation, and 
struck down the Oakland code.  It should be noted that the state statute was ultimately relatively 
weak in its impact on banks.   
38 AFSA v. Oakland, 34 Cal.4th, at 1252. 
39 AFSA v. Oakland, 34 Cal.4th, at 1259. 
40 AFSA v. Oakland, 34 Cal.4th, at 1266-7.   
41 AFSA v. Oakland, 34 Cal.4th, at 1273. 
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litigation backed by the same financial services industry group that challenged the 
Oakland ordinance, the Ohio Supreme Court found the Cleveland ordinance 
unconstitutional for attempting to regulate matters of general statewide concern, 
thereby going beyond the scope of municipal powers and conflicting with the 
prerogative of the state legislature.42 The Supreme Court also invalidated a similar 
effort by the city of Toledo.43 Similarly, New York City also attempted to push 
back against predatory lending through its Local Law 36, which stipulated that the 
city would only contract with vendors who did not engage in predatory lending or 
work with predatory loans. Although the city possessed discretion over 
“proprietary laws” which involved the city’s own dealings with its vendors, New 
York state court found Local Law 36 to be a thinly veiled “regulatory law”, 
beyond the scope of the city’s power, and preempted by state banking law.44  
In addition to passing local ordinances, several cities attempted to use the 
courts as litigants to change state and federal regulations in an attempt to crack 
down on predatory lending.  But here too, municipalities faced an uphill battle in 
securing standing to make claims in court.  For example, Cleveland attempted to 
sue Wall Street for public nuisance, arguing that the securitization of subprime 
mortgages led to foreclosures that cost the city and police and fire expenditures, 
and to the detriment of the overall public good. But this litigation attempt was also 
                                            
42 American Financial Services Association v. City of Cleveland, 824 NE 2d 553 (Ohio Ct App 
2004), rev’d 858 NE2d 776 (Ohio 2006).  See also, Kyle Cutts, “City on the Brink: The City of 
Cleveland Sues Wall Street for Public Nuisance” Case Western Reserve Law Review 58 (2007), 
1399-1421, at 1409. 
43 See American Financial Services Association v. Toledo, 830 N.E. 2d. 1233 (Ohio App 6 Dist 
2005) 
44 See Mayor of City of New York v. Council of City of New York, 780 N.Y.S. 2d., 266 (2004), 
preempted by NY Banking Law, § 6(i).  
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defeated on insufficient standing and proximate causation grounds.45 Further, as 
one recent analysis suggests, it is unlikely that cities will be able to establish 
sufficient standing to as parens patriae in cases brought in the name of the public 
interest.46 
State governments enjoyed some more success in regulating predatory 
lending, but they too ultimately faced federal preemption that favored the financial 
services industry. State attorneys-general in Minnesota, California, Washington, 
Arizona, Florida, New York, and Massachusetts all pursued legal allegations 
against subprime lenders for fraud and violations of consumer protection laws.47  
Massachusetts, for example, has an extensive consumer protection statute that 
limits unfair lending practices.  This statute was successfully used by the state 
Attorney General to prosecute banks engaged in subprime lending, and win legal 
protections for subprime mortgage owners.48  Other state legislatures such as 
Minnesota and New York have passed financial regulation statutes.49  Historically, 
states have used their police powers to regulate mortgages during times of 
economic crisis.50 
                                            
45 Cutts, “City on the Brink”. 
46 See Entin and Yazback, “City Governments and Predatory Lending,” 763-4. 
47 See FCIC, 11-12; Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 196. 
48 Commonwealth v Fremont Investment and Loan, 897 N.E. 2d 548 (Mass., 2008). 
49 See Minn. Stat. §§ 58.13(1)(a)(24) – (26); NY Banking Law § 6 (g) – (m).   
50 See e.g. Home Building and Loan association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding the 
constitutionality of Minnesota mortgage moratorium act, which authorized courts to extend 
periods of redemption for mortgages); Bank of Craig v. Hughes, 398 N.W.2d 216 (upholding Iowa 
code protecting farmers from loss of farms in economic crisis). 
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But in the 2000s, such state efforts were also preempted by federal agencies.  
The OTS and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) each issued 
rulings in 2003 and 2004 intended to occupy the field of predatory lending 
regulations, interpreting their authority under the National Banking Act to 
formally preempting state and local efforts in the area.51   While a number of 
states, particularly North Carolina, pushed ahead with their own legislation 
despite this action, resistance by the American Banking Association ultimately 
culminated in a Supreme Court ruling that construed the National Banking Act 
protect banks from state regulations even for state-level subsidiaries, effectively 
siding with the OCC and the OTS against state regulatory efforts.52  
During the 2000s, city and state governments thus were on the leading edge 
of identifying the problem of predatory lending and attempting to respond through 
local regulation. However both cities and states faced barriers to their policies in 
the form of state and federal preemption doctrines, which were used to great effect 
by the financial services industry seeking to challenge these more stringent 
experiments with regulation. Of course, there is no guarantee that state and local 
governments will always innovate in constructive or socially desirable ways.  There 
will be times when the stated goals of preemption—maintaining coherent and 
uniform regulations—do apply.  However, a more permissive preemption regime 
would open up state and local governments as spaces where citizens and advocacy 
groups might be able to adopt regulatory approaches that may otherwise be 
                                            
51 Raymond Brescia, “Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The Financial Crisis and the 
Community Reinvestment Act,” South Carolina Law Review 60 (2008), 618-677, at 650; Entin 
and Yazback, “City Governments and Predatory Lending,” 780-81. 
52 See FCIC, 13; Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1; Brescia, “Part of the Disease or Part of the 
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blocked at the federal level. Further, such a more varied approach could combine 
federal minimum standards with scope afforded for state and local governments to 
develop more tailored approaches that go beyond those standards.   
Since the 2008 crisis, while there has been some attempt at loosening the 
constraints on local power, these efforts have not gone far towards 
institutionalizing the locality as a democratic forum.  For example, the Dodd-
Frank legislation provides for federal and state interaction on mortgage, insurance, 
and municipal securities regulations, enabling states to go beyond the minimum 
standards established by federal regulators.53   In addition, after extensive debate 
over the degree of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) 
preemption power,54 the final bill allows states to experiment with consumer 
protections beyond the minimum standards established by the CFPB. While the 
CFPB has independent rulemaking authority, it is required to commence a 
proposed rulemaking when a majority of states pass resolutions in favor of 
additional consumer protection.55  In addition, the Supreme Court seemed to 
support greater leeway for states, holding in 2009 that the OCC’s attempt to 
prohibit state regulations of national banks exceeded its authority under the 
                                            
53 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. V, 
subtit. A & B, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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55 Dodd-Frank Act § 1041 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551). 
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National Banking Act.56 Dodd-Frank explicitly attempts to limit preemption to 
cases of explicit conflict between local and federal regulators.57  Yet in 2011, the 
OCC issued a letter stating that it viewed its preemption rulings as unaffected by 
Dodd-Frank, despite the new provisions for consultation with state and local 
authorities incorporated into the bill.58 But in the early going, courts have struggled 
to implement this directive clearly, in some cases deferring to the OCC preemption 
of state regulations,59 while upholding the state regulations in other cases.60 
 
Public law and the revival of the city as participatory forum 
The experience of local governments in financial regulation underscores the 
importance of expanding the role of the local as a space for democratic politics, 
particularly on matters of economic governance.  Achieving this democratic vision 
requires reformulating the law of local government.  Four areas in particular stand 
out.  First, promoting this kind of local democratic experimentalism would require 
a looser legal doctrine of preemption under both state and federal law. Second, this 
vision of the local requires a different view of how the federal government relates 
to the local, including a rethinking of our traditional views of federalism.  Third, 
localities should be granted greater legal standing to make their own claims in 
                                            
56 Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, 557 U.S. 519 (2009). 
57 Dodd-Frank, § 1044(a), codified at 12 USC 25b(b)(5)(A).  
58 Comptroller of the Currency, letter to Senator Thomas Carper, May 12, 2011 [on file with 
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59 Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 640 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2011). 
60 Cline v. Bank of America, 823 F. Supp. 2d 387 (SD WV 2011).  
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court and in national policymaking institutions.  Finally, localities should be 
organized into regional bodies that can coordinate policies and enable further 
democratic participation and debate across localities experiencing similar shared 
problems.    
 
Permissive preemption 
As noted above, much of local authority is constrained by state and federal 
preemption, where the local policy is overridden either by an explicitly contrasting 
policy from a higher state or federal authority, or by an implied conflict between 
the claim to local authority and the degree to which state or federal governments 
appear to have already occupied the topical field. Preemption doctrines nominally 
seek to preserve higher order authority from eroding in the face of competing 
policies passed by local bodies, thus assuring uniformity and state or federal 
power. Doctrine nominally seeks to preserve national authority for national issues 
as distinct from “local” ones, yet “there is no natural order dividing topics into 
those that are local and those that are not.”61  As a result, preemption doctrine is 
easily manipulated to prevent local policymaking as a proxy for more substantive 
policy disputes.  Indeed, often, preemption doctrine offers a route for business 
interests to quash local level experimentation on everything from gun control to 
minimum wages.62  Indeed, the risk of a policy patchwork is often overstated: most 
local governments are cautious, and remain constrained by political forces, public 
                                            
61 Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 49. 
62 See Schragger, “The Progressive City,” 47-8. 
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opinion, and economic leverage of businesses, even absent the legal constraint of 
preemption.63  
Preemption thus works less to assure policy rationality, and more to erode 
the idea of democratic empowerment: “The federal judiciary has become a primary 
facilitator of citizen dis- empowerment by its failure to reconsider and revise 
existing preemption standards, and by its approval of a wide range of tenuous 
federal preemption claims.”64  Preemption doctrine is so broad that any local or 
state law is potentially open to displacement, thus discouraging innovation and 
participation, promoting the interests of large national corporations, and 
conducing to regulatory vacuums.65   
The aspiration for cities as democratic forums requires that localities 
possess freer reign to experiment with new policies, rather than being preempted.66  
Preemption doctrine should instead be construed more permissively, to focus on 
enabling greater citizen engagement and facilitating voice. By granting more scope 
for local governments to engage in policy development, a more permissive 
preemption doctrine can encourage greater local policymaking—and this 
expansion of local power in turn can make local level civic engagement more 
meaningful.  Concerns about irrationality, capture, or ineffectiveness remain, but 
rather than using these concerns to preclude local power, these concerns can be 
                                            
63 Schragger, “The Progressive City,” 48. 
64 S. Candice Hoke, “Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values,” Boston University 
Law Review 71 (1991), 685-768, at 698. 
65 Hoke, “Preemption Pathologies,” 711-19. 
66 See e.g. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980); New Mexicans for Free Enterprise v. 
City of Santa Fe, 138 N.M. 785 (2005). 
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met by combining expanded local authority with greater coordination across 
localities via federal and regional arrangements.  
 
Federal-local linkage 
The democratic approach to harnessing local governments in regulatory 
policy debates can be further encouraged by restructuring the relationship between 
federal and local policymaking.  Current legal doctrine largely calls into question 
the ability of the federal government to engage in cooperative and coordinated 
policy schemes with local governments.  Such schemes, according to the Supreme 
Court, may raise concerns that local governments are “commandeered” to execute 
policies against their will.67   
While this anti-commandeering doctrine correctly identifies the importance 
of values such as local autonomy and clear channels of accountability, these values 
are ironically undermined by the doctrine itself.  The doctrine envisions respect for 
local democracy in terms of protecting a sphere of local sovereignty that is 
otherwise inviolable.  It also focuses more on state sovereignty than on locality per 
se.  As a result, this approach both ignores the importance of local forums below 
the state level, while also inhibiting the scope for federal-local cooperation.   
Indeed, often federal engagement with local forums and institutions can 
facilitate rather than inhibit the broader democratic vitality of the polity.  The 
integrity of local governmental forums and accountability of public policy to 
citizens can both be better facilitated by regulatory schemes that combine federal-
                                            
67 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). 
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level resources and expertise with local-level enforcement and citizen engagement. 
Federal agencies can devise overall policy approaches, harnessing the financial and 
technical resources of the federal government that many localities lack.  But these 
policies can then be crafted to allow for a range of local-level variation, 
adaptation, and experimentation, while also harnessing local forums as channels 
for democratic participation. The Obama administration took some tentative steps 
in this direction, encouraging local governments to engage with federal agencies to 
share experiences, ideas, and identify problems.68  But a more structured approach 
can be pursued, through statute or executive order. 
 
Democratic regionalism 
In addition to harnessing existing local governments, the scope for 
democratic engagement in regulatory policy can be further expanded by use of 
additional regional scale policy forums.  For example, many regions share common 
socioeconomic challenges or are interlinked in a dense metropolitan area that cuts 
across several localities, but is smaller than the state itself.  In these settings, neither 
the state nor the local government matches the scale of the region or its policy 
challenges.  Here, regional bodies can be created—for example, by statute—to 
address common policy questions to these identifiable regions.69   
The idea of regional governance has been a recurring one.  Massachusetts 
experimented with regional coordination of localities as early as 1896.  In the mid-
twentieth century, St. Louis and Cleveland made similar attempts, while the US 
                                            
68 See the Partnership for Program Integrity, http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/partner4solutions.  
69 See generally, Frug, City-Making; Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 45-50. 
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Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations proposed a two-tier 
approach of local and regional governance.70  Indeed, many states have already 
created numerous regional and “special district” policy entities aimed at governing 
a particular policy area—such as water management or mass transit—that 
concerns a region cutting across several localities.  
Today, regional arrangements often exist in areas like environmental 
management, water utilities, and transportation infrastructure.  Yet these entities 
are often constructed out of the same kind of technocratic considerations that 
animate national administrative and regulatory bodies: they are deliberately 
insulated from democratic politics, purportedly to ensure expert-based 
policymaking.  Yet they often function with little meaningful oversight, despite 
their exercise of significant governmental authority that directly affects many 
citizens.71  These entities offer a useful starting point for regional governance—but 
should be reformulated along more democratic and participatory lines.  
More broadly, the multiplicity of localities can be consolidated into more 
meaningful regions or sub regions that encompass the whole of a particular 
geographic community.  Currently the structure of local government law conduces 
to greater fragmentation through permissive incorporation regimes and difficult 
annexation requirements, conducing to the multiplication of municipalities.  While 
multiple local spaces can be helpful for democratic politics, as noted earlier there is 
a balance to be struck between the idea of consolidation—which assures a single, 
visible, and empowered governance body that speaks to a particular issue or 
                                            
70 Frug and Barron, City-Bound, 46-7. 
71 See e.g. Salyer Land Co v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719; Ball v. James, 
451 U.S. 355 (1981). 
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constituency—and the idea of fragmentation, which multiplies spaces to facilitate 
access.  From the standpoint of facilitating democratic voice, localities should be 
reorganized to track the actually experienced borders of communities of interest—
for example, encompassing a metro area.   
 
Municipal standing 
Consolidating the borders of localities to track the actually experienced 
boundaries of affected communities will help empower citizens by giving them a 
voice within the community of interest that shapes their experience of the local.  
But by defining a geographically-rooted set of citizens in this way, localities can 
also help foster democratic voice through another channel: as channels for 
representation and assertion of the geographical community’s collective interests in 
other policymaking institutions.  When other institutions, including courts, federal 
administrative agencies, and Congress, are deciding issues, there is a value to 
representation of interests as a locality, rather than through direct citizen 
engagement with these larger institutions.  The locality can channel a different set 
of collective interests and concerns that may not be captured by individual 
standing.   
Consider for example the recent Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v. 
EPA.72  The state of Massachusetts, alongside other states, brought suit to 
challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) denial of a rulemaking 
petition proposing greenhouse gas regulations.  The Court ultimately held that 
EPA would have to provide scientifically-grounded reasons for its refusal to 
                                            
72 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 US 497 (2007). 
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regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.  While the biggest impact of the 
case—as will be discussed in the next chapter—stems from its commitment to 
expertise as a driver of regulatory policymaking,73 before reaching the merits, one 
of the issues in the case concerned the ability of Massachusetts to have standing on 
this issue.  The majority opinion held that states have broad standing rights to 
bring claims against regulatory agencies—particularly as a form of legal check on 
the broad powers that agencies exercise, as implied by Congress’ guarantee of 
judicial review of agencies for arbitrary and capricious action.74  Indeed, Stevens 
argued that States have long been recognized as having an “independent interest” 
in its own land, air, and environmental conditions sufficient to generate the 
necessary adversarial relationship for judicial standing. 
The dissent, penned by Chief Justice Roberts, challenged states’ standing on 
the traditional grounds that the parties could not show the a harm that was 
traceable to the defendant and redressable by the court, largely because of the 
dissent’s view that the state of climate change science was too murky to assign 
clear lines of causality and blame.75  But it is interesting to note that Roberts’ other 
argument against standing in the case was a principled stand against standing as 
states themselves: Roberts argued that climate change was a policy issue to be 
settled through ordinary legislative channels, and that states ought to channel their 
concerns through the political arena of Congress or the Executive rather than being 
                                            
73 Jody Freeman, Adrian Vermeule, “Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise,” Supreme 
Court Review 2007(2), 51-110, at 68-70 (noting that the majority’s ruling on the standing issue is 
relatively straightforward, borrowing from Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan in order to move 
quickly to the merits of the case and the majority’s emphasis on expertise). 
74 Massachusetts, 549 US 516-26 (Stevens majority opinion). 
75 Massachusetts, 540-2 (Roberts, dissenting). 
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represented directly in courts.76  Roberts rejected Stevens’ argument “special 
solicitude” of states as litigants, arguing that there were no quasi-sovereign 
interests at stake sufficient to justify state standing. 
The clash between Roberts and Stevens here is telling.  We are indeed 
accustomed to thinking of geographically-based interests as already represented 
through geographically-rooted districts that elect legislators.  But electoral districts 
rarely if ever coincide with the boundaries of the locality, or of the actually-
affected community of citizens.  And where it does, as in the case of US states, the 
geographical units themselves rarely have representation as collective bodies. The 
same problem arises in more severe context for localities, who lack the channel of 
the federal Senate that states enjoy.  As we shall below, cities face difficulties in 
bringing suits to assert their interests qua cities—as geographically and 
sociologically determined spaces that have collective interests not easily captured 
by an individual plaintiff, nor easily channeled politically through district-based 
legislators.  In administrative and legislative bodies, such locality standing can be 
achieved through the kinds of coordinating and consultation provisions noted 
above.  But legally, localities often face difficulty in asserting their standing as 
localities.  
 
Democratic agency as initiative, not autonomy 
There is a vast literature extolling the virtues of federalism as a way of 
fostering more local participation, accountability, and policy experimentation.77 
                                            
76 Massachusetts, 536-9 (Roberts, dissenting). 
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These same arguments are better applied to local government bodies, as more local 
spaces where citizens can participate and governments can innovate policy 
approaches. Local governments comprise “counterpublics”—forums where citizens 
can participate, new ideas can be initiated, and problematic regulatory approaches 
in other jurisdictions can be challenged with alternatives.78 Multiplying the arenas 
for policymaking and debate in this way may also help overcome blockage or 
capture of the regulatory process by providing alternative spaces for initiative or 
experimentation.79  Yet, in much of public law doctrine, the locality as a political 
forum is treated with suspicion and ambivalence.  While values of local democratic 
participation, experimentation, and local tailoring of policies are celebrated, they 
are often done so in reference to federalism of the state governments.80  
Conservative jurists in particular have sought to bolster the protections for state 
sovereignty against assertions of federal power.81 In place of the technocratic and 
laissez-faire unease with localities as creating a chaotic patchwork of regulations or 
as conducing to unreflective local passions, the locality can be better viewed as a 
vehicle for enabling democratic engagement and experimentation. 
                                            
77 See e.g. Yair Listoken, “Learning through Policy Variation,” Yale Law Journal 118 (2008-9), 
480-553; Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy, “Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in 
Decentralized Governments,” Emory Law Journal 58 (2008), 1333-1400 (suggesting that 
decentralization and policy experimentation at different levels of governance can be beneficial in 
some situations, whereas national policies may be desirable in others).   
78 See Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy,” in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1992), 109-142.  
79 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere.” 
80 See e.g. Brandeis, dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). 
81 See e.g. United States v. Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 US 598 
(2000).  
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Such local authority, however, need not take the form of local autonomy 
immune from external influence.  Rather, democratic agency can be better served 
by local governments with wide capacities to initiate policies, while remaining 
subject to overrule or revision by higher legislative authorities at the state or 
federal level.  Rather than a binary debate between pure local autonomy—which 
magnifies concerns about irrational or illiberal local policies and chaotic 
‘patchworks’ of social policies—and complete state authority over localities—
which eliminates room for local democratic engagement and experimentation—this 
approach would seek to harness the democratic potential of localities while 
embedding them in a larger ongoing policy debate.  In this view, local governments 
become a positive force facilitating the working out of complex social problems 
over time.82  Such experimentation could be constrained by national minimum 
standards and basic constitutional rights, but could also give rise over time to new 
minimum standards and policies that can be adapted in different contexts.  Cities 
can thus serve as important spaces for policy experimentation on everything from 
living wages to labor ordinances, environmental protocols, and mortgage 
regulations.83  
This emphasis on facilitating local experimentation, initiative, and 
democratic voice suggests a broader rethinking of the ideas of federalism and 
decentralization themselves.  Decentralization, in this approach, is less about 
ensuring the pure autonomy of the local, to which dissent can exit, and instead is 
more about multiplying the sites in which citizens, associations, and minorities can 
                                            
82 For a similar argument see e.g. Barron, “Reclaiming Home Rule”; and Barron, “Blue State 
Federalism at a Crossroads,” Harvard Law and Policy Review 3:1 (2009), 1-7.  
83 See Schragger, “The Progressive City,” 39-40. 
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experience democratic self-government, and enact real policies.  These policies in 
turn ought to be subject to contestation and review—but this system of initiation 
and review is a different one from traditional understandings of decentralization as 
autonomy.84  This approach allows a democratic polity to harness the full value of 
democratic debate, disagreement, and dissent.  Rather than limiting the capacity of 
alternative views to realize their visions in the name of uniformity, this approach 
suggests the polity is better served by enabling dissenting voices to actually enact 
their proposed policies, which can then be challenged or contested more broadly.  
Such “dissenting by deciding” blends self-governance with self-expression,85 
enabling dissenters to force majorities to engage with the merits of their proposed 
policies and visions, helping catalyze broader national debate.86   
Progressives have historically shied away from this kind of broad local 
authority, in part out of the fear of extreme policies being proposed at the local 
level—a fear with foundation in the politics of race and other forms of 
discrimination.  But moderation and social progress is often better served not be 
precluding self-governance, but rather by enabling dissenters to enact their 
proposals—and forcing them to actually govern on the basis of these ideas.87 The 
                                            
84 See e.g., Heather Gerken, “Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,” Harvard Law Review 
124:4 (2010), 1-71. 
85 Gerken, “Federalism All the Way Down,” 64. 
86 Heather Gerken, “A New Progressive Federalism,” Democracy Journal (Spring 2012), 37-49. 
87 Gerken, “Progressive Federalism,” 46 (“As in the context of race, we often laud minority rights 
because they can knit political outliers into the polity. But the odd thing about a rights strategy for 
protecting dissent is that it pushes dissenters outside of the project of governance. They have a right 
to speak their mind, but only when they speak for themselves. Minority rule, by contrast, pulls 
dissenters into the project of governance. When dissenters wield local power, they can no longer 
jeer from the sideline. Instead, they have to suit up and get in the game. Minority rule thus requires 
dissenters to do just what the majority is accustomed to doing: deal with criticism, engage in 
compromise, figure out how to translate broad principles into workable policies. Abstraction and 
ideological purity are the luxuries enjoyed by policy-making outsiders. When dissenters have an 
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fear of minority repression, in other words, can be defused not by eliminating the 
space for local political agency, but by multiplying the opportunities for various 
kinds of minorities to exercise meaningful voice and agency.  This in turn suggests 
that far from fearing the local, Progressive reformist politics ought to embrace the 
local more wholeheartedly, as another set of arenas in which citizens can 
experience democratic self-government, contest policies that may be in ascendance 
elsewhere, and innovate new approaches to social problems.   
This approach better instantiates the value of self-government—and enables 
more effective macro policy learning through direct experience and wider variation 
across policy proposals.88  Cities can thus serve as a crucial forum facilitating 
democratic empowerment, but for this vision to be achieved, the legal structure of 
city power must be altered. As Frug suggests, the central element is to expand the 
power of localities, for “power and participation are inextricable linked: a sense of 
powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than participation, while the 
existence of power encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do so.”89 
 
                                            
opportunity to govern, however, they must figure out how to pour their arguments into a narrow 
policy space.”). 
88 Listoken, “Learning through Policy Variation” (noting that higher variance in policies enables 
more effective identification of optimal approaches). 
89 Frug, “City as a Legal Concept,” 1070. 
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10 MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE COSTS OF AVOIDANCE 
 
The presumption of technocratic and laissez-faire approaches to economic 
governance is that market aggregation or expert policymaking will conduce to the 
public good by generating socially-optimal outcomes that are free from the 
partiality, irrationality, and raw politics that characterize democratic debate. This 
turn to markets or experts works by depoliticizing economic policies, moving them 
out of the realm of political—and especially democratic—debate, to be instead 
formulated by neutral, rational systems of either market forces or expert oversight.  
But something important is lost in this attempt to depoliticize the development of 
economic policies and outcomes. As suggested in Part II above, a vibrant 
democratic polity requires that matters of moral and social concern be engaged 
openly, rather than submerged from contestation.   
This chapter examines recent debates in financial regulation policy to 
explore these themes.  After first offering a general argument that such matters of 
economic policy implicate moral, and not merely technical or neutral expert, 
judgments, the chapter examines two of the most prominent policy debates since 
the financial crisis: how to regulate too-big-to-fail (TBTF) financial firms, and how 
to address the proliferation of risky new financial instruments such as derivatives.  
In both cases, the prevailing policy discourse and legal regime have cast these issues 
as a matter of technical optimization through expert policy or market forces.  The 
presumption is that only expert oversight can mitigate economic risks while 
harnessing the benefits of large financial firms and new financial instruments.  But 
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this understanding of the issues submerges real moral questions at stake: at heart, 
both policy issues implicate the same moral judgment over the social value of 
finance.  In both cases, the decision of whether or not to permit large firms or new 
instruments rests on a moral and political—rather than technical—judgment about 
what kinds of financial activity we value as a society, and what kinds of harms we 
are willing to tolerate. Redescribing both TBTF and financial innovation as moral 
rather than purely technical issues thus not only better describes the nature of these 
problems; it also opens up a wider variety of alternative reform approaches.  So 
long as we see these issues as narrowly technical ones, this construction of the 
problem calls for a response that relies on technocratic expertise.  More radical 
attempts to limit the size and activities of financial firms can be dismissed from a 
technocratic perspective as naïve, forgoing economic benefits out of an overly 
moralized disapproval of certain financial firms or activities.  But when the issues 
are understood in their moral and political dimension, these policy alternatives 
start to look more apt.   
Yet the institutional history of financial regulation has been driven by an 
effort to avoid such controversial moral questions, delegating them to expert 
regulators or to the market itself.  This effort at moral avoidance, however, is a 
costly mirage. The transference of financial policy to experts does not resolve 
moral controversy; it only displaces it to a proxy battle over the scope of expert 
authority.  Indeed, this effort to sterilize financial regulation of controversial moral 
judgments drove the very construction of technocratic financial regulatory 
institutions, undermining the kinds of democratizing channels of participation and 
decentralization outlined in pervious chapters.  These debates also paradoxically 
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produced some of the pathologies of financial regulation that helped fuel the 2008 
crisis itself.  
 
Expertise and moral judgment in economic discourse 
Despite the promise of expertise as a way to resolve social problems 
through apolitical rationality and knowledge, expertise is necessarily inflected with 
subjectivity, moral judgment, and politics.  For critics within the economics 
discipline, this illusion of scientific mastery contributed to the proliferation of 
overly optimistic models of self-correcting financial markets, such as the theory of 
efficient financial markets which justified much of the deregulation of finance.1  As 
Paul Krugman argued later, “the economics profession went astray because 
economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, 
for truth.”2  Regulators followed suit, coming to see markets as self-correcting, 
regulation as presumptively costly and undesirable, while become less mindful of 
problems of concentrated financial capital, and increasingly risky market 
activities.3 The financial crisis thus “forces us to reassess faith in our ability to 
reduce the complexities of the world into understandable systems, and to use 
algorithms based on those regularities to predict and control the future.”4  But the 
                                            
1 See Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on 
Wall Street (New York: Harper Business, 2011). 
2 Paul Krugman, “How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?” New York Times Magazine, September 
6, 2009. 
3 Harry McVea, “Financial Services Regulation Under the Financial Services Authority: A 
Reassertion of the Market Failure Thesis?” Cambridge Law Journal 64:2 (July 2005), 413-448 (on 
the turn to deregulation in the British Financial Services Authority).  
4 Jeffrey Lipshaw, “The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity, Causation, Law, and 
Judgment,” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 19 (2010), 299-352, at 302. 
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failure of economics was not just its turn to abstraction over empirics; it was also 
the degree to which economics as a social science and a language of policy 
justification presented itself as neutral, uncovering optimal social policies free of 
the burden or complication of moral judgment. These moral dimensions, however, 
cannot be eliminated from economic policy questions.  As a result, expertise alone 
cannot fulfill its aspiration of generating neutral policy solutions to public 
problems. 
Moral judgments inflect expertise in part because of the limits of expert 
knowledge.  Many complex systems are difficult to master through expert 
knowledge and analysis, and may defy definitive technical resolution because of 
poorly defined outcomes, probabilities, feedback loops, and sudden changes to the 
system in question.5  Further, social and political concerns often outpace scientific 
consensus, meaning there will always be the need for political as well as technical 
judgments in public policy.6   
These limitations of expert knowledge provide laissez-faire critics of the 
state with an argument to turn to markets as more epistemically superior modes of 
governance. But this solution to the epistemic limits of expertise is also unsatisfying 
because, while expert knowledge may be limited, the policy issues themselves are 
intertwined with fundamentally moral concerns that ought not to be decided by 
markets or experts, but rather through democratic politics.  Economic policy 
necessarily raises moral decisions to be made about the social value of different 
                                            
5 Douglas Kysar, Regulating from Nowhere: Environmental Law and the Search for Objectivity 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 73-5. 
6 Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007), 6-8. 
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kinds of financial activity, about what types of transactions to permit, prevent, or 
regulate.7 
Indeed, in many policy issues, particularly in areas like economic regulation, 
it is not possible to determine a neutrally ‘correct’ policy solution, since any such 
computation will necessarily rest on moral judgments about what interests and 
factors should be considered, how they should be valued, and weighted. As 
Douglas Kysar argues in context of the debate over expertise and technocracy in 
environmental regulation,  
The most worrying danger presented by cost-benefit analysis is not that we 
will choose the wrong modeling assumptions, but that the full power and 
responsibility of our collective agency will become lost amidst the rhetorical 
force of an interest-aggregation exercise that purports to take account of all 
relevant consequences of social choice.  This semblance of 
comprehensiveness is misleading: the answer that cost-benefit analysis 
provides work a narrowing of the questions that environmental law asks.8   
 
Much the same can be said in context of economic regulation.  Economics 
as a discipline claims unique understanding of the economy and of specialized tools 
of statistical, mathematical, and cost-benefit analysis.    But while there is real vital 
knowledge in the discipline that is relevant for policy disputes, it is important to 
remember that economics—like any social science—is also inextricably political, 
carrying normative implications for what we ought to do as a society.  The use of 
mathematical models, statistical tests, and other arguments more often than not 
function as a form of rhetoric, as figures of speech to persuade, convince, and 
advocate.9   This is not to belittle economic or social science; rather it is to 
                                            
7 See e.g., Lipshaw, “The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis,” 347-51. 
8 Kysar, Regulating From Nowhere, 119. 
9 See Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1998). 
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acknowledge that all claims to expertise—especially when in context of a policy 
dispute—are partly attempts at persuasive conversation aimed at shaping social 
action.10 
These limits of expertise are no reason to throw up our hands.11  Rather, 
they points to the need to subordinate and embed expert analysis on broader 
democratic debate over the moral issues at stake.  If economic expertise cannot 
fully capture the complexity and moral dimensions of a policy matter, then far 
from being a source of disempowerment, this instead opens up the terrain for a 
broader morally-inflected discussion of what the right thing to do might be. As 
some scholars of expertise have noted, lay persons do possess some forms of tacit, 
local, and experiential knowledge that are crucial to informed policy judgment.12  
But more importantly, as democratic citizens, we all deserve a voice in the 
normative and political questions that help shape our social realities and 
possibilities. Thus,  
there is no reason to think ordinary people are any less capable of 
correcting their mathematical errors after dialogue with others than are 
technocrats. …Our task is not to refine a technocratic standard of 
rationality alien to people’s concerns, but to empower people to speak and 
act for themselves.13   
 
The lesson of the financial crisis is not only that our experts lack sufficient 
knowledge.  It is that expertise alone is not enough.  Our attempts to erase the 
                                            
10 McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 162, 179. 
11 Lipshaw, for example, seems to suggest as much: “The conundrum, of course, is that if it takes an 
expert to see the problem caused by complexity, how are the rest of us (ordinary people as well as 
the intermediates) who possess merely common sense supposed to do anything but rely on their 
judgment?” Lipshaw, “The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis,” 303. 
12 See Collins and Evans, Rethinking Expertise, 28-40. 
13 Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 216. 
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dangers of moral judgments in economic policy through appeals expert knowledge 
or market forces are therefore bound to fail.14   An over-reliance on expertise risks 
the displacement of moral and political agency of citizens themselves.  In grappling 
with these limits of their knowledge, expert policymakers must necessarily engage 
in subjective judgments, but the rhetoric and stature of expertise is such that it 
seeks to efface this subjectivity, removing it from view.15  As a result, such claims 
to expertise remove from the domain of political contestability matters of moral 
and political concern, under the guise of neutral, objective expertise that can 
seemingly resolve such thorny policy issues through calculation and optimization.16 
Instead, these questions must be addressed through a more openly moral debate 
through democratic politics—a debate in which economic expertise can offer 
insight, but not resolution. 
Incorporating such moral and political debate would seem to be a recipe for 
even more controversial, ineffectual, or socially undesirable policy outcomes.  But 
rather than trying ever harder to sterilize policy debates from the political, we must 
instead acknowledge the irreducibility of politics and find ways to integrate the 
political and the expert in productive ways.  As Mark Brown argues, efforts to rid 
science of politics implies that scientific expertise can be free of politics and value 
judgments altogether, but the analysis of complex multifaceted problems 
necessarily entail value judgments of some kind—particularly in the case of 
political problems which are generally ill-formed, with tremendous uncertainty, 
                                            
14 Lipshaw, “The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis,” 304.  
15 Kysar, Regulating From Nowhere, 32; David Kennedy, “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of 
Global Governance,” Sydney Journal of International Law 27 (2005), 5-28, at 11. 
16 Kennedy,  “Challenging Expert Rule,” 5-12; Kysar, Regulating From Nowhere, 67. 
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and no single optimal solution.17 As a result, such efforts paradoxically turns 
science into more of a “proxy battleground for politics,”18 where different sides 
cherry pick their experts, making experts both more necessary and powerful, and 
also less trusted.19 Thus, 
efforts to eliminate politics from science advice inevitably lead to conflicts 
over what is ‘political.’  The result is to displace the political conflict onto 
science.  Science becomes a proxy battleground for politics.  In this respect, 
those calling for science advice free of politics are as guilty of politicizing 
science as their adversaries—even as they simultaneously scientize politics, 
by implying that political questions can be resolved by science.20 
 
What is needed is an alternative way to enable inclusive deliberation and 
contestation in the democratic process that is informed by, but not subordinated 
to, the claims of expertise.21  By acknowledging the realities of moral and political 
dimensions to seemingly technical issues, those issues can be opened up to a wider 
range of democratic contestation.  While potentially tumultuous, such 
democratization of economic policy debates better than the total delegitimization 
and rejection of expert knowledge altogether.22   
Conventional economic governance has been largely driven by an effort to 
sidestep and avoid this kind of moral democratic judgment about what constitutes 
a desirable economic order as naïve at best, dangerous at worst.  The attraction of 
both technocratic and efficient markets approaches to this question lies in their 
                                            
17 Mark Brown, Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2009), 2, 11. 
18 Brown, Science in Democracy, 3.  
19 Brown, Science in Democracy, 11-12.  
20 Brown, Science in Democracy, 3. 
21 Brown, Science in Democracy, 3.  
22  Kennedy, “Challenging Expert Rule,” 23. 
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promise of offering a morally neutral way of understanding the complexities of 
modern financial capitalism, suggesting straightforward ways to optimize the 
market’s functioning for social welfare.  Despite the allure of neutrality and market 
optimization, however, this effort to sidestep the fundamentally moral questions of 
economic governance is misleading, and ultimately narrows our range of 
possibilities in response to the problems of the market economy.   
These costs of moral avoidance in the allure of neutral expert management 
can be seen in two of the headline policy debates to emerge from the 2008 
financial crash: the question of how to regulate too-big-to-fail (TBTF) firms, and 
the question of what to do about the innovation of new financial instruments like 
derivatives.  The mainstream policy response to both issues has turned to experts 
as key to developing technical policies that mitigate the risks of TBTF firms and 
new financial instruments while harnessing their contributions to economic 
growth.  While some more radical reformers argued for more structural reform 
approaches that institutionalized limits on the size or permitted activities of 
financial firms, these approaches were dismissed as naïve, imposing an overly 
moralized attack on the financial sector where a more neutral and expert-led 
approach of market optimization was necessary.  But both of these policy issues at 
their core rest on a moral judgment about the social value of finance.  Our moral 
stance on the social value of TBTF firms and new financial innovations is implicit 
in any regulatory regime.  Bringing this moral question of the social value of 
finance to the fore provides a fuller description of the problems posed by TBTF 
firms and financial innovation, and in so doing provides a more solid normative 
foundation for more radical, structural reform possibilities.  
 
 317
The social value of finance  
As economist Benjamin Friedman notes, the awareness of the tremendous 
social costs brought on by the financial sector—in terms of unemployment and 
economic recession following the crisis, and the risk of future crises—must be 
linked to the substantive role that financial markets do and ought to play in 
modern society.  Otherwise, how can any public policy make appropriate decisions 
about how to regulate the sector?23 
As Friedman argues, the basic social functions of finance are simple: the 
industry offers individuals a mechanism for saving, while converting these savings 
into socially-beneficial investment.   First, and most importantly, financial markets 
provide a critical mechanism to channel the savings of individuals and businesses 
into productive investments.  Through such “intermediation” banks lend out cash 
they receive as deposits, providing credit and capital to businesses, thereby 
promoting broader economic activity.  Similarly, finance links longer-term flows of 
funds into shorter-term provisions of credit and resources.  In such “maturity 
transformation,” basic securities such as mutual funds and bonds can provide day-
to-day financing for businesses and individuals out of a pool of longer-term 
savings.  Third, finance provides credit for individuals and businesses enabling 
them to balance their consumption and income against fluctuations, protecting 
themselves against various economic risks through insurance or certain forms of 
hedging.  Finally, all of these practices can help promote economic activity directly 
by creating employment within the financial sector, and indirectly by supporting 
the ability of other firms and businesses to thrive.   
                                            
23 See Benjamin Friedman, “Is Our Financial System Serving Us Well?” Daedalus (2010), 9-21. 
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These basic functions must be weighed against the full range of social costs 
of the financial sector as currently constituted: not only the risk of future financial 
crises, but also the costs arising from bubbles where financial firms misallocate 
investment into sectors such as housing in the 2000s and the telecom bubble of the 
1990s; opportunity costs as financial firms came to represent a highly 
disproportionate share of all corporate profits and wages paid in the American 
economy; and social costs as financial firms came to absorb a disproportionate 
proportion of highly skilled and educated workers.24  Any additional benefits from 
the financial sector—in particular, the profits and wages derived from trading in 
more complex financial instruments such as derivatives—may benefit the 
individuals involved in those transactions, but provides little value to society as a 
whole. These are precisely the financial activities that magnified the risks of a 
financial crisis, in which financial regulation can try to limit. 
The mainstream accounting the social contribution of finance generally 
sums the output of the financial sector, which in the US in 2010 combined for $1.2 
trillion, or 8 percent of GDP.25  But as Andrew Haldane, chief of financial stability 
at the Bank of England, has argued, this kind of accounting of the social value of 
finance does not distinguish between greater risk-taking which may not necessarily 
raise social welfare, and risk-management, which is the core of the social value of 
finance.  Adjusting for this distinction reduces the estimated value-added of the 
                                            
24 Friedman, “Is Our Financial System Serving Us Well?”, 13-16. See also Paul Kedrosky and Dane 
Stangler, “Financialization and Its Entrepreneurial Consequences,” Kauffman Foundation Research 
Series, March 2011 (finding that human capital increasingly flowed into the financial sector during 
the 1990s and 2000s, creating a feedback cycle as finance came to displace productivity, 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and job growth in other parts of the economy). 
25 Andrew Haldane, “What is the Contribution of the Financial Sector?” VoxEU, Nov 22, 2011. 
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financial sector significantly.26  And this does not count the social costs from 
financial crises—and the implicit subsidies for too-big-to-fail firms that Haldane 
estimates to be as high as $1 trillion from 2007-2010—several times the annual 
profitability of the largest global banks in the five years prior to the crisis.27  
This assessment of the actual social value of finance suggests two things.  
First, a line can be drawn between socially desirable and socially harmful financial 
transactions.  Second, that regulations that limit the latter may be desirable even if 
they cut into the wealth and value of the financial sector itself. By putting the 
question of the social value of finance at the center of the regulatory question, we 
can motivate regulatory approaches that rely not on sporadic technocratic 
oversight or minimalist regulation, but instead on structural changes that can help 
prevent social harms by limiting in various ways the activities of the financial 
sector: “starting from the view of the financial sector as a servant of the broader 
economy and society, rather than as a master, would produce a radically different 
approach to its regulation.”28  
The limitations of bypassing this kind of moral judgment by appeal to 
expertise, can be seen in two distinct policy areas: the debate over regulating the 
size of TBTF firms, and the debate over regulating the innovation of new financial 
instruments like derivatives.  In both of these areas, the mainstream policy 
response turned to expert oversight as a way to avoid these controversial moral 
judgments over the value of different kinds of financial activity, relying on experts 
                                            
26 Haldane, “What is the Contribution of the Financial Sector?” 
27 Haldane, “What is the Contribution of the Financial Sector?” 
28 John Quiggen, “Financial Markets: Masters or Servants?” Politics and Society 39:3 (2011), 331-
46. 
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to mitigate economic harms without legislating away entire firms or activities. By 
contrast, engaging with this question of the social value of finance opens up a 
wider array of reform possibilities that impose more stringent limits on financial 
firms and activities.  Regardless of which of these policies are ultimately pursued, 
what they share is a willingness to impose a more stringent constraint on financial 
firms and transactions, rooted in an underlying moralized judgment about the 
social value of those firms and transactions.    
 
Too-big-to-fail as a moral category 
One of the major policy issues since the financial crisis has been over how 
to identify and regulate “systemically risky” or TBTF financial firms—firms whose 
collapse would threaten the entire financial system as Lehman Brothers did in 
2008.  Dodd-Frank’s approach to this problem of TBTF firms is essentially to defer 
to expert oversight.  The statute creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(FSOC) comprised of the heads of the major financial regulatory bodies, chaired by 
the head of the Federal Reserve Bank, tasked with first identifying and then 
regulating appropriately TBTF firms.  On the surface, TBTF regulation seems a 
quintessential domain for such technical expertise.  How else are we to determine 
when a firm becomes sufficiently large and interconnected that they pose a 
systemic risk to the financial system? How else would we calibrate regulations on 
these firms to ensure the continue to contribute to the macroeconomy while 
mitigating the potential of a catastrophic collapse? Dodd-Frank thus seeks an 
apolitical approach to the problem of TBTF firms.  
But expertise alone cannot fully address the problem.  Experts themselves 
disagree on the causes and responses to TBTF.  Existing efforts by policymakers 
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and economic academics to define the category of TBTF firms and systemic risk are 
surprisingly slippery, using a range of metrics but without any clear consensus.29  
The problem is that “systemic risk” and “too-big-to-fail” are not technical 
economic concepts, but rather political judgments. Labeling a firm as TBTF, or as 
posing systemic risk, is another way of saying that we as a society are unwilling to 
bear the social costs of their collapse.30  TBTF firms might be “large” in terms of 
assets, interconnectedness, or even in terms of their implications for the labor 
market.31  The slipperiness of the concept of TBTF stems from the moral nature of 
this identification of the social harms that warrant resolution by the state.  The 
problem is analogous to what Brandeis faced with public utilities in New State Ice, 
discussed in Chapter 7 above: when a private firm implicates a vital social 
necessity, it may warrant more severe political scrutiny and oversight, but this 
determination is ultimately a political, not a technical one.    
Indeed, so long as TBTF and systemic risk are understood as issues of 
purely technical complexity, the turn to expert oversight may seem reasonable.  As 
a technical matter, the challenge of mitigating the risks of TBTF firms while 
harnessing their economic potential seems to require fine-tuned calibrated 
regulations developed through expertise.  But if TBTF and systemic risk are moral 
categories, then these determinations cannot be made purely on the basis of 
expertise.  Recognizing this policy domain as a fundamentally moral judgment 
unlocks a wider array of reform avenues.  Instead of relying on expert oversight, 
                                            
29 See Adam Levitin, “In Defense of Bailouts,” Georgetown Law Journal 99 (2011), 435-514, at 
445. 
30 Levitin, “In Defense of Bailouts.” 
31 Levitin, “In Defense of Bailouts,” 451-55. 
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TBTF as a moral problem can also be addressed through more structural reforms 
that limit the size and powers of TBTF firms thus eliminating the problem of 
systemic risk. This more structural approach, while dismissed as naïve or 
economically harmful, relies on a moral judgment about what kinds of financial 
activities and firms we value as a society.  
Historically, the idea of fundamentally restructuring corporations as a way 
to limit their harmful effects has been a staple of reform politics, especially in the 
antitrust movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  These 
views gradually went out of favor over the course of the New Deal, as noted 
earlier. But they continue to provide a compelling avenue for realizing a more 
democratic political economy in which the dangers of concentrated private power 
and harmful economic repercussions of various industries can be curtailed.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, Dodd-Frank approached the TBTF problem through an appeal 
to expert oversight.  But a rival camp of reformers called for a return to traditional 
Progressive principles of antitrust.  For these advocates, the problem of TBTF was 
simple: like the railroad and oil trusts of the early twentieth century, these firms 
had acquired control over too great a share of the nation’s financial system, and 
thus should be broken up into smaller entities.  These smaller entities would then 
pose no real threat to the broader financial system if they engaged in abusive 
practices or failed entirely. 32   
Whether using the Brown-Kaufmann standard of capping the total deposits 
of financial firms at some percentage of GDP, or by using the Federal Deposit 
                                            
32 Simon Johnson, “White House Should Also Announce An Antitrust Investigation into Major 
Banks,” Baseline Scenario, January 21, 2010; Krishna Guha, “Opening salvo on banks has yet to 
come,” Financial Times, January 18, 2010.  
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Insurance Corporation’s already-existing metrics of firm size,33 an antitrust 
approach is feasible.  Further, it resolves the problems that continue to plague the 
technocratic approach of Dodd-Frank: by creating a bright-line rule, an antitrust 
approach forces firms to choose between maintaining a certain size or being 
broken up by the government, preventing the moral hazard of bailouts, and the 
difficulties regulators face in credibly and effectively implementing complex 
regulation without succumbing to risks of capture.34  
Economist Nouriel Roubini furthered this position, arguing in Newsweek 
that large TBTF banks were not only too big to fail, but were also “too big to 
exist, and too complex to be managed properly.”35  For Roubini, the anxieties 
about reducing financial sector profits and innovation were misleading; these 
claims to efficiencies and social benefits from complex financial securities were 
over blown.  “The TBTF firms consider themselves essential to the world 
economy,” Roubini argued.  “Thanks to their scale, we’re told, they offer 
“synergies” and “efficiencies” and other benefits. The global economy can’t 
function without them, they say.  This is preposterous.”  In reality, these activities 
were little more than risky profit-making bets, which created bubbles rather than 
adding real social value to the broader economy.  The entire purpose of tougher 
regulations, then, is and ought to be the reduction of corporate profits which 
would induce the reorganization of these firms along less risky lines.  Roubini 
ultimately called for even more aggressive bright-line limits on what financial firms 
                                            
33 Jonathan Macey, James Holdcroft, Jr., “Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to 
Financial Regulation,” Yale Law Journal 120 (2011), 1368-1418, at 1371-3. 
34 See Macey and Holdcroft, Jr., “Failure Is an Option,” at 1372-3; 1382-3. 
35 Nouriel Roubini, “Bust Up the Banks,” Newsweek Magazine, May 6, 2010. 
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could do: not only restoring the Glass-Steagall separation of investment and 
commercial banking and implementing the Volcker rule ban on proprietary 
trading, but also banning investment banks from doing any short-term borrowing 
in the first place, thus reducing the chain reactions caused by the collapse of firms 
like Lehman Brothers.  
These proposals were largely marginalized in the reform debate around 
Dodd-Frank itself.  But if instead we were willing to address this question of the 
social value of finance and impose structural limitations on financial firms in the 
name of the public good, the old antitrust vision suddenly becomes more viable 
and current.  The problem preventing an antitrust approach is one of ideas and 
vision, not one of technical capacity or administrability.  
 
“Speculation” and financial innovation  
A second key policy debate since the financial crisis concerns how to 
regulate new financial instruments like derivatives and futures contracts that 
helped create the kind of complex mortgage-backed securities that gave rise to the 
crisis.  Indeed, throughout the debate over the 2008 financial crisis, one of the key 
disputes was over what large financial firms that engaged in complex derivatives 
and mortgage- backed securities trading actually did.  Many of these firms 
defended their innovation and se of complex financial instruments as a form of 
“market-making,” creating new mechanisms to channel funds into economic 
investments thus promoting economic productivity.  Critics meanwhile argued that 
these instruments were simply a way for these firms to speculate, creating huge 
profits for themselves and large risks for the taxpayer.  As one bank executive 
complained to the New York Times, modern finance “has become a virtual 
 325
casino.”36 As with the case of TBTF regulation, this debate has largely been 
pursued by relying on expert judgment of regulators in the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), and elsewhere to oversee the use of these financial 
instruments, mitigating their risks, while harnessing their economic benefits.  But 
derivatives and futures regulation is fundamentally a moral question about what 
kinds of financial activities we as a society sanction—as “productive” work—and 
what kinds we disapprove of as “speculation.”   
As Simon Johnson and James Kwak, two of the most vocal critics of the 
financial sector during the crisis, noted, “today’s challenge is to rethink financial 
innovation and learn how to separate the good from the bad.”37  If the main 
purpose of finance is to channel savings into investment, and to link long-term 
savings to the shorter-term funding needs of companies seeking credit and loans, 
then financial innovation is good only when it improves this task of financial 
intermediation in socially productive ways.  The development of new securitization 
techniques like credit default swamps and collateralized debt obligations did 
improve financial intermediation, creating a new species of mortgage-backed 
securities that were so seemingly safe that even pension funds and money market 
mutual funds would buy them. But such financial innovation is ultimately 
detrimental, for it essentially manufactured safe-looking assets out of 
fundamentally unsound subprime mortgages.38   
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Instead of giving the financial sector a free hand to “innovate” subject only 
to some loose risk constraints, regulation should emphasize consumer protections 
to prevent individuals from falling subject to predatory lending and usury; 
standardized terms for securities to prevent the spread of ‘toxic’ assets into areas 
such as pension and mutual funds seeking to maintain stability; and spreading 
financial services to the unbanked and businesses in need of credit.39  As Johnson 
and Kwak argue,  
The role of financial regulation should be to discourage innovation that 
produces excessive intermediation and promote innovation that delivers 
financial services that people need. The key to any successful regulatory 
regime is therefore discerning the difference between good and bad financial 
innovation. Right now, ours doesn’t. … [Current reforms] follows the old 
conventional wisdom—that innovation is inherently good, and regulators 
need only watch out for abnormal excesses or “bad apples.” Instead, the 
presumption should be that innovation in financial products is costly—it 
increases transaction costs, the cost of effective oversight, and the risk of 
unanticipated consequences—and should have to justify itself against those 
costs.40  
 
Put another way, innovations that protect or expand the social benefits of 
finance—such as through more effective linking of savings and investment, 
expansion of basic credit to the unbanked, and job creation through investment in 
new businesses—are of a different normative and social value from the kinds of 
financial innovations that marked the boom in the financial sector in the years 
leading up to the financial crisis.  While the explosion of exotic new securitization 
practices generated windfall profits for relatively few workers in the financial 
sector, they did so in ways that not only created risks of systemic financial 
collapse, but also in ways which concentrated greater social resources in the 
                                            
39 Johnson and Kwak, “Finance: Before the Next Meltdown,” 23-24.  
40 Johnson and Kwak, “Finance: Before the Next Meltdown,” 22-23. 
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relatively small number of persons involved in the financial sector, widening 
inequality and supplanting activity in the real economy.41  Further, such negative 
innovation creates unjustifiable risks for the broader polity to enrich the few in the 
financial industry. 
A willingness to cut into financial profits to distinguish socially valuable 
transactions would open up a variety of more stringent regulatory approaches to 
financial instruments like derivatives and futures contracts.  First, and most simply, 
all complex financial transactions like derivatives, futures, and swaps could be 
subjected to a financial transactions tax which would impose an additional cost on 
financial firms and traders.  This would decrease the frequency and volume of 
transactions perhaps enough to reorient financial activity towards safer channels.   
Second, futures contracts, like the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives that 
played such a large role in magnifying the risks and costs of the mortgage-backed 
securities collapse, could be limited by a government regulator akin to the Food 
and Drug Administration, with the power to approve transaction types as safe, or 
acceptable after weighing the social costs and benefits.  While many products can 
be used to either hedge or speculate, some products such as the credit default 
swaps and collateralized debt obligations at the heart of the mortgage-backed 
securities collapse arguably have no non-speculative value.  An agency could 
identify socially beneficial financial products as those whose welfare gains from 
insurance outweigh the likely costs from speculation, permitting only those 
                                            
41 See e.g. Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).   
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transactions that pass this test.42 This proposal is interesting because while it 
retains a faith in technocratic expertise, it nevertheless pushes farther than Dodd-
Frank because it engages directly with the effort to distinguish socially desirable 
from undesirable financial activities, and is willing to accept a hit to the 
profitability and wealth of the financial sector in exchange for a more stable 
economic order.   
A third, and even more compelling, approach to regulating derivatives 
would go one step further, addressing the moral distinction between speculation 
and risk-mitigation in a way that does not necessarily rely on the capacities of 
expert government regulators.  To the extent that Dodd-Frank reverses the 
deregulation of derivatives from, it remains reliant on the CFTC to draft or loosen 
the requirements for derivatives trading.43  This conventional appeal to expertise 
seems alluring because it delegates controversial judgments over productive versus 
speculative transactions to expert regulators.  By contrast, a more explicitly 
moralized approach could simply make futures contracts legal but unenforceable, 
thus limiting speculation by making traders internalize the full costs of their 
gambles without relying on the government as an overseer or gatekeeper to 
financial markets.  In effect, this approach flips the laissez-faire critique on its 
head: it is now proponents of market exchanges like futures contracts, rather than 
the state, who must bear the burden of enforcing—and therefore justifying the 
broader social value of—these transactions. The goal of distinguishing productive 
                                            
42 Eric Posner, E. Glen Weyl, “A Proposal for Limiting Speculation on Derivatives: An FDA for 
Financial Innovation,” Working paper, on file, January 26, 2012. 
43 Lynn Stout, “Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Crisis,” Harvard Business Law 
Review 1 (2011), 1-38, at 31-4. 
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from speculative finance is thus achieved without the dangers of capture, 
ineffectiveness, and lack of knowledge that plague technocratic solutions to the 
problem of modern finance.44 
Traditionally, common law required speculators who wager on prices 
through futures and options to make and accept the deliver of the goods and 
services being traded.  This stance persists in modern law through legal rules on 
insurance—where a party can only collect insurance on something where they have 
a demonstrable interest—and through the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) 
which had required that futures contracts that were not being collected or 
delivered were only permitted on regulated exchanges, where traders and 
reputation costs could limit excessive speculation. The CEA thus codified the 
common law rule, forcing traders to cabin speculative activities on regulated 
exchanges that imposed technical limits on issues such as margins, positions, and 
short-selling—restrictions weakened by the deregulatory push in the 1980s.45   This 
tradition of legal limits on speculation continued to animate the 1934 Securities 
and Exchange Act.  In securities markets, where there are no physical goods to be 
delivered, the problem of speculation is even more rampant, and the debate around 
the 1934 Act explicitly revolved around this need to prevent speculation as a moral 
and economic harm.46 
The broader ascent of economic understandings of efficient financial 
markets viewed speculation as ultimately productive, abandoning anti-speculative 
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45 Stout, “Speculators,” 713. 
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language as anachronistic.47  But the historical unease with speculation was not 
anachronistic nor irrational; rather it reflected a very real moral and economic 
sensibility that sought to discourage unnecessary increases in risk and wastage of 
human and financial capital on socially unproductive activities.48  Dodd-Frank did 
not really recapture this earlier tradition of financial regulation, but a more 
aggressive constraint on derivatives and speculation could do so. 
 
Regulating financial firms as public utilities  
If the social value of finance is limited to providing safe vehicles for saving 
and linking savings to investment, then this suggests another, even more aggressive 
form of regulatory oversight of financial firms as a public utilities.  In this 
approach, financial firms would be tightly regulated in the same way that electrical 
or water utilities are to ensure they provide the basic social services safely.  Other 
forms of financial activity would either be disallowed, or separated entirely from 
the most critical functions served by these firms.  
This approach of regulating social necessities as public utilities has a long 
tradition; as noted in Chapter 3, Progressive Era reformers established utilities in a 
range of socially-important industries including water, electricity, gas, 
telecommunications, banking, insurance, and transportation.49  To treat these 
industries as public utilities was not necessarily to require public ownership and 
                                            
47 See Stout “Speculators,” 735-40; See also Fox, Myth of the Rational Market. 
48 Stout, “Derivatives,” at 11-13. 
49 William Novak, “Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism,” Emory Law Journal 60 
(2010), 377- 405, at 400. 
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administration of the industries; but it did articulate a deep public concern with the 
functioning of these agencies, opening up a much wider range of regulations as 
part of the effort to ensure social control of the industries to ensure the common 
good. Brandeis, a vocal proponent of the Progressive use of public utilities, 
explained that when “the public's concern about a particular business may be so 
pervasive and varied as to require constant detailed supervision and a very high 
degree of regulation,” private industries may be treated as “public” because they 
affected the public interest so significantly.50 Regulation would thus be used to 
provide a vital social function in a collective, cooperative manner, directing 
activities in socially desirable channels, expanding the benefits of finance, and 
protecting a core industry that serves as a backbone or basic utility for much of the 
rest of the economy.51    
For example, the New Deal era Public Utility Holding Company Act 
(PUHCA) subjected public utilities such as electrical utilities to extensive state 
regulatory oversight for much of the twentieth century.52 Under PUHCA, utilities 
were required to register with the SEC, which would then scrutinize the utilities, 
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assessing their corporate structures and business practices to prevent internal 
conflicts of interest, unfair prices and terms for consumer, and other similarly 
abusive activities. The experience of PUHCA could be applied to banks, preventing 
the problems of TBTF without resorting to costly antitrust litigation, which 
historically has favored Wall Street over the federal government.53 
The public utility framework ports easily to the financial sector. The 
modern financial system is effectively a public-private partnership that provides a 
critical resource upon which all depend: the basic money supply itself.  The 
government insures and regulates the money supply through deposit insurance and 
other regulations aimed at preventing runs or crashes, while banks engage in the 
business of making investment allocation decisions.54  The utility framework 
suggests that so long as firms provide basic money supply functions, they should be 
tightly constrained to focus on this basic function, insulated from risky bets or 
toxic assets that would compromise this core economic foundation.  Arguably, at 
its height, the package of New Deal banking regulations achieved a utility-like 
regulatory regime where “postwar commercial banking became similar to a 
regulated utility, enjoying moderate profits with little risk and low competition.”55  
This system of “boring banking”—a system that lacked the complex array of 
wildly profitable and risky securities that marked the pre-2008 crisis economy—
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Meltdown (New York: Vintage, 2011), 35.   
 333
proved more than adequate to facilitate postwar economic growth and relatively 
high incomes for workers in the financial sector.56 
This utility approach would imply a segmenting the financial sector into 
two distinct domains. The first domain would be that of narrow banking, where 
firms would focus exclusively on essential financial services—taking deposits, 
providing savings vehicles, and extending basic credit loans.  The second domain 
would consist of more complex, profitable, and risky firms that focus on more 
exotic financial activities such as securitization and other forms of investment 
banking.  The narrower domain of banking would then be tightly regulated to 
ensure the basic provision of those financial services carries on without 
interruption or contamination by excessive risk-taking and complex potentially 
toxic securities.  The other domain of financial activity could then be safely left 
alone to engage in profit-maximizing activities, since the core social function of 
depositories, savings, and basic credit had been cordoned off and insulated from 
the potential risks of these more risky activities.57  The basic functions of narrow 
banking can in fact be successfully pursued without the kinds of complex 
securitization and brokering activities of more complex financial firms such as 
investment banks.  Consumer needs such as checking accounts and vehicles for 
savings can be easily provided by simple banks or even by publicly-run 
mechanisms.58 
                                            
56 Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers, 61-4. 
57 See John Kay, “Should We Have Narrow Banking?” The Future of Finance, London School of 
Economics Report, 2010, 217-234.  
58 See Friedman, “Is Our Financial System Serving Us Well?”, 10. 
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Thus, this utility framework would also suggest that such constraints extend 
to all firms that provide money-creation services even if they are not currently 
regulated as depositories.  Thus, part of the problem of the 2008 crisis arose from 
the proliferation of “shadow banks,” firms that were not cash depositories and 
thus existed outside the tight regulations on those firms, but nevertheless held cash-
like deposits such as repo agreements and money market mutual fund shares.  Part 
of the 2008 collapse came from a run on these money-like instruments stored in 
this shadow banks—a danger made possible precisely because these firms were 
permitted to engage in money supply functions outside of the regulatory regime 
that ordinarily applies to traditional banking.59  
Nor is the idea of banking as a public utility unprecedented.  States or the 
federal government could easily provide basic banking services for deposits with 
clear fee structures, following the leads of states like North Dakota and Montana, 
creating a “public option” for banking that would not only offer secure 
depositories but also provide a lever for investing in new industries and 
competition for private firms to offer similarly stable banking systems.60  Indeed, in 
North Dakota, the official state bank provides student, residential, and private 
loans, operating mostly like a normal depository subject to external audits and 
whose profits are turned over to the state treasury.  Other states including Hawaii, 
Washington, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Virginia have considered similar state-
                                            
59 See e.g. Ricks, “Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis”; Perry Mehrling, The New 
Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010).  
60 Ellen Brown, “The Public Option in Banking: How We Can Beat Wall Street At Its Own Game,” 
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backed depository institutions.61  City governments could even get in the act, 
creating public banking entities that function like utilities, providing basic 
depository and investment channeling functions under the purview of the city 
government.62 
These various approaches to financial regulation—capping the size of TBTF 
firms, greater restrictions on derivatives, and regulating finance as a public 
utility—share a common feature. In each of these areas, these more stringent 
regulations have been avoided out of a preference for expert oversight, which 
appears less controversial, and offers the illusion of rational, neutral, and efficient 
market management.  Yet all of these policy questions rest on an implicit moral 
judgment about the social value of different kinds of firms and transactions.  A 
willingness to regulate on the basis of such moral approbation or disapproval 
opens up these more stringent reform ideas that, while expressed since the 2008 
collapse, did not gain traction precisely because they were seen as too moralized, 
and thus unrealistic, naïve, or irrational.  The purpose of the above discussion is 
not necessarily to argue for any one of these particular regulatory approaches, but 
rather to highlight how an engagement with—rather than avoidance of—these 
kinds of moral judgments opens up a much wider set of reform possibilities.   
 
                                            
61 Jake Grovum, “The Bank of North Dakota: Banking’s ‘Public Option’” Stateline, The Pew 
Center on States, April 14, 2010 (http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/the-bank-of-
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62 See Gerald Frug, “City as a Legal Concept” Harvard Law Review 93 (1980), 1057-1154, at 
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The costs of avoidance and the construction of technocracy 
Financial regulation policy disputes, as other economic policy areas, thus 
implicate moral judgments about what kind of economic order we desire.  Yet 
much of the recent history of financial regulation is animated by an effort to avoid 
such controversial moral judgments by transferring financial regulation policy to 
neutral experts or self-optimizing markets.  This moral avoidance not only narrows 
the menu of policy options as discussed above.  It also drives us to build flawed 
institutions of economic governance.  Thus, delegating these morally-charged 
policy issues to regulatory experts has displaced, rather than resolved, the moral 
controversies over what kind of economy we desire.  The result has been a 
transmutation of this substantive moral concern into a set of proxy debates over 
the scope and jurisdiction of expert regulatory authority.  These proxy battles have 
in turn created many of the pathologies of financial regulation that helped fuel the 
2008 crisis—as well as constraining the opportunities for a more democratic 
alternative approach to economic policy through regulatory agencies or city 
governments. 
 
From moral to technocratic judgment 
In 1868 the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) suddenly found itself in an 
unanticipated dilemma:  investors betting on the agricultural futures market had 
cornered the market on grain. In an institution that had emerged as a mode for 
commodities dealers to protect themselves against risks such as low crop yields, 
such profiteering speculation hijacking a legitimate and socially-productive form of 
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risk hedging was troubling.63 In traditional common law, speculative contracts are 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.  Similarly in popular discourse there is 
a long tradition of rhetoric against speculation and gambling in the financial 
sector.  But the difficulties of distinguishing appropriate risk-mitigation from 
speculation or gambling gradually induced common law regulation through courts 
to pull back, and accept modern financial markets.64   
In 1905, the Supreme Court ratified the emergence of futures markets like 
CBOT as legitimate financial transactions, withdrawing from the earlier efforts of 
common law to distinguish acceptable from prohibited speculative financial 
transactions.  In his majority opinion, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that in 
the modern economy, many contracts are made where the buyer is not intending to 
take actual delivery of the goods in question.  This practice, for Holmes, had to be 
accepted as a legitimate economic activity of hedging against perceived future risks: 
Speculation of this kind by competent men is the self-adjustment of society 
to the probable. Its value in well known as a means of avoiding or 
mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices, and providing for periods of 
want.65 
 
To the extent that such risk-mitigation financial transactions were 
problematic, for Holmes, it was only because “the success of the strong induces 
imitation by the weak, and that incompetent persons bring themselves to ruin by 
undertaking to speculate in their turn.”66 The fact that such trades were taking 
                                            
63 See William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: WW Norton 
& Company, 1991). 
64 Roy Kreitner, Calculating Promises: The Emergence of Modern American Contract Doctrine 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press 2007), 97-99. 
65 Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain and Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905) (J. Holmes, 
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66 Christie, 198 US, at 248. 
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place on a public exchange with publicly-advertised prices and the close interest on 
the part of businesses and individuals was evidence enough for Holmes that 
commodity futures trading spoke to some general public interest, and was not 
mere gambling.67  Therefore, the danger of financial losses by ‘incompetent’ traders 
was simply a cost that modern society had to bear in exchange for enabling risk-
mitigation strategies.  Such “natural evolutions of a complex society,” argued 
Holmes, “are to be touched only with a very cautious hand.”  Legislators and 
judges had to recognize that blanket prohibitions on such transactions were 
“coarse attempts at a remedy for the waste incident to every social function,” and 
ultimately “harmful and vain.68 
For judges like Holmes, the difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate 
risk-mitigation and socially-desirable channeling of resources, and illegitimate 
speculation seemed an empty formalism: speculative transactions had the same 
features and looked the same as “legitimate” productive transactions.  The 
distinction between the two seemed to be more a matter of intention and context, 
too murky for courts to adjudicate.  To the extent that finance still required 
oversight, these difficulties seemed to suggest the need for neutral, technocratic 
expertise capable of identifying the public good in ways that retained the social 
benefits of finance.  Combined with the attractiveness of the broadly acceptable, 
neutral pursuit of economic growth via greater financialization of the economy, 
this turn to expert management helped erode the rich moral discourse that 
animated earlier generations of financial reformers.  
                                            
67 Christie, 198 US, at 249. 
68 Christie, 198 US, at 248-9. 
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By the New Deal era, the historical aversion of common law to speculative 
finance had been supplanted by the emergence of the modern regulatory state.  
Financial transactions were now a problem for the regulatory state, not common 
law.  This shift to expertise helped move the policy discourse further away from a 
strong moral engagement with the debate over productive versus speculative uses 
of finance.  So long as expert regulators were on the case, it seemed less vital to 
manage difficult distinctions between productive and speculative finance. In one 
emblematic case, an Illinois court rejected a suit alleging futures contracts were 
invalid gambling transactions, arguing that with the advent of modern securities 
legislation passed by Congress and the creation of the SEC, the “various acts of 
Congress make it clear that our public policy now recognizes the desirability and 
necessity of maintaining open markets, even if they sometimes be used for 
gambling, in order to stabilize values in commodities and securities.”69  The old 
anxieties of common law about distinguishing productive from speculative 
financial transactions had given way to an acceptance on the desirability of 
modern finance, and a reliance on the technocratic oversight of the new regulatory 
apparatus.  The problem of the social desirability of finance had thus been settled, 
and the thorny line-drawing problem sidestepped: “The public policy has been 
declared to be that these contracts for future delivery are necessary to the 
commerce of the people of the United States in their domestic interstate economy, 
and since no one can tell with what intent they are entered into, it is impossible to 
pick and choose among them.”70 As a result, futures contracts like those which 
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70 Ibid. 
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troubled CBOT and Holmes, were largely accepted by the 1940s as vital to the 
modern economy. 
 
Displacing the moral into the jurisdictional  
But as Roy Kreitner argues, to the extent that the anxieties about potentially 
undesirable financial transactions persisted, they manifested in a transmuted form, 
as a proxy debate over the scope of expert regulatory authority.71  While these 
concerns about limiting agency authority appropriately are certainly valid, many of 
these disputes were animated not by such jurisdictional questions, but rather by 
substantive disagreements over the social value of finance.  By displacing the 
substantive question into the domain of expertise, modern financial regulation law 
did not resolve the moral question of the social value of finance; rather it 
transmuted it into an even more problematic register, resulting in policy decisions 
that ironically created even more pathologies in the financial regulation 
architecture.  This pattern can be seen in two areas: disputes between courts and 
agencies over agency regulatory authority in finance; and disputes between federal 
agencies on the one hand and state or local regulators on the other.  
 
Courts versus agencies  
Thus, as federal banking regulation after the New Deal became primarily an 
exercise of federal regulatory agencies, this jurisdictional question of the reach of 
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agency authority became a proxy battleground for competing substantive concerns 
over developments in finance. For example, in the famous Chenery case,72 the 
Supreme Court initially rejected the SEC’s reorganization plan for a public utility, 
but upheld the exact same plan once the agency resubmitted it with additional 
documentation justifying the plan on the basis of the agency’s expertise, deferring 
to this “accumulated experience” and expertise of SEC.73  Yet the dissent saw this 
deference as reducing judicial review to a “hopeless formality,” putting agency 
actions beyond the reach of the law.74  For the dissent, what was at stake was not 
just the ability of courts to limit agency authority; it was also a substantive concern 
over what the dissenters saw as a literal taking of property, in the form of the 
SEC’s reorganization plan that invalidated the value of the plaintiff’s stock in the 
company.75  
In another 1963 example,76 the Court overruled the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC’s) approval of a bank merger, claiming the 
merger violated antitrust statutes.  The dispute between Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion and Justice Harlan’s dissent concerns rival interpretations of whether 
recent Congressional legislation implied an exemption for banks from antitrust 
provisions; Brennan thought they did not,77 while Harlan thought they did.78  This 
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74 Chenery II, 332 US, at 210. 
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dispute over the scope of the OCC’s authority as a regulatory agency and implicit 
Congressional intent, however, operated as a proxy battle for a deeper 
disagreement between Brennan and Harlan over the growing concentration in the 
banking sector and the role of banking and finance in modern society. Brennan’s 
opinion emphasizes the “definite trend towards concentration” in the banking 
sector,79 noting that the proposed merger would result in an entity that accounted 
for over one-third of the region’s total deposits, assets, and net loans.80 For 
Brennan, this level of concentration poses a clear threat to the public good, which 
cannot be overcome by the banks’ or the OCC’s claim of the economic 
development from the proposed merger.81 Brennan operates on a presumption 
against financial bigness, noting that the critical nature of banking for the economy 
makes anticompetitive concerns more, rather than less, important.82  By contrast, 
Harlan emphasizes the expertise of the OCC and regulatory agencies, suggesting 
that agencies rather than courts are the better arbiters of the public good here, and 
noting that the centrality of banking and finance to broader economic activity 
warrants looser and more flexible regulatory constraints.  
As the financial sector was gradually deregulated after the 1980s, these 
proxy debates over agency authority paradoxically helped create some of the 
regulatory gaps and pathologies that gave rise to the eventual boom and 2008 
crash, out of an effort to sidestep those same substantive controversies.  In 1983, 
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for example, OCC loosened its prohibitions to now enable retail banks to provide 
brokerage services.83  As a result, banks rushed into this profitable new industry, 
but operated free of the regulations that the SEC had traditionally imposed on 
non-bank brokerages.  To remedy this regulatory gap, the SEC moved to extend 
those regulations to these retail banks entering the brokerage industry.  The DC 
Circuit court, however, struck down the SEC’s move on the grounds that the SEC 
rule reached beyond its Congressional authorization: the Securities Exchange Act 
provided strict and clear definitions of broker, dealer, and bank, and the SEC did 
not have authority over statutorily-defined banks.84  Yet this argument is perverse; 
as the SEC pointed out it its defense, the Congressional allocation of regulatory 
authority between the SEC and other agencies was premised on a background 
assumption that banks were already precluded from brokering securities in the first 
place.85  That this division between banks and brokerages had already broken 
down by agency-led deregulation, to block a concurrent expansion of SEC 
authority to plug this new gap in the regulatory system effectively created a 
judicially-sanctioned loophole.   
This pattern replayed itself several times in the late 1980s.  As agencies 
deregulated New Deal era constraints on the financial sector, courts deferred citing 
agency expertise.  For example, courts upheld the Fed’s gradual erosion of Glass-
                                            
83 Securities Industry Association v. OCC, 577 F. Supp. 353 (DDC, 1983) (upholding Comptrollers’ 
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Steagall’s separation of investment and commercial banking in the 1980s, out of 
the “greatest deference” to their regulatory expertise.86  But as these same agencies 
on occasion sought to expand their regulatory reach to cover new developments in 
the financial industry, courts often prevented these expansions of regulatory 
authority as transgressions of the formalist definitions of banking activities subject 
to agency oversight.  Thus, Paul Volcker’s Fed attempted in 1986 to expand its 
oversight of banks to cover new nonbank institutions that were based on new 
equivalents of demand deposits such as NOW accounts.  These firms were not 
formally banks, and were not regulated as such, but the Fed instituted Regulation 
Y in 1984 to treat these entities as banks, since in practice they accepted financial 
instruments that operated like deposits.87  This regulation was prescient in that 
much of the 2008 financial crisis involved a run on money-like demand deposits 
offered by nonbank entities, like money market mutual funds and repo contracts.88  
Yet the Supreme Court, consolidating several challenges to this regulation struck it 
down as it did the SEC’s attempt to regulate bank-affiliated brokers. While the Fed 
explicitly attempted to regulate firms that were “functionally equivalent” to 
banks,89 “no amount of agency expertise” could overcome the plain language of 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which defined banks to exclude the new 
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entities.90  The Court even conceded the practical necessity of this kind of 
functionalist regulatory expansion, but felt bound by the terms of statute:  
Without doubt there is much to be said for regulating financial institutions 
that are the functional equivalent of banks. NOW accounts have much in 
common with traditional payment-on-demand checking accounts; indeed 
we recognize that they generally serve the same purpose. Rather than 
defining “bank” as an institution that offers the functional equivalent of 
banking services, however, Congress defined with specificity certain 
transactions that constitute banking subject to regulation. The statute may 
be imperfect, but the Board has no power to correct flaws that it perceives 
in the statute it is empowered to administer. Its rulemaking power is limited 
to adopting regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed 
in the statute. 
 
Of course binding agencies to the scope of their delegated authority is an 
important principle in modern administrative law and a check on the power of the 
state.  But what is interesting about these cases is the way in which the 
transposition of the problem of finance into a question of regulatory jurisdiction, 
expertise, and authority complicates the original challenge of financial regulation, 
often with problematic consequences.  Thus, expert deference can sanctify 
deregulatory moves that proved problematic in retrospect.  Meanwhile, the 
jurisdictional questions about the scope of agency authority oriented courts down 
a misleading path, resulting in the limiting of agency authority precisely where it 
was most needed in plugging growing cracks in the financial regulatory system 
resulting from innovations in new forms of nonbank money-like instruments, or 
the growth of securities affiliates outside the SEC’s regulatory umbrella.    
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Federal versus local 
A similar proxy debate over the scope of regulatory authority arises 
between federal and local regulators.  Here too, the formal disputes are over the 
scope of authority on the part of national expert regulators like the OCC relative 
to state and local regulations on finance, but the animating concern is a substantive 
one.  In recent years, for example, concerns about subprime lending played out in 
terms of this jurisdictional debate between national and local levels of regulation.  
The tendency in these clashes was to centralize authority away from local bodies 
into seemingly more expert-led and uniform regulatory agencies—which in effect 
undermined early efforts to respond to and head off the subprime crisis itself. 
Thus, as noted in Chapter 9 above, well before the subprime bubble collapsed, a 
number of cities like Oakland and Cleveland especially hard-hit by foreclosures 
and blight began to impose new regulations on the subprime lending industry.  Yet 
each of these efforts were struck down as industry groups successfully litigated the 
local ordinances as being preempted by state and federal regulations.91  
A similar dynamic appeared in context of federal-state preemption disputes.  
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the Court upheld in Watters v. Wachovia the 
OCC’s preemption of state regulations on nationally-chartered bank mortgage 
business subsidiaries, striking down Michigan’s attempted to impose regulations 
on a new mortgage subsidiary of Wachovia bank.  In dissent, Justices Stevens, 
Roberts, and Scalia argued that the OCC ruling represented an overreach of 
agency authority over sovereign states.92  Yet two years later, after the crash had 
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already occurred, the Court held that a similar OCC regulation purporting to 
preempt New York state’s efforts to regulate banks was not a reasonable 
interpretation of the National Bank Act.93  The difference between the two cases 
says less about the differences between Michigan and New York, and more 
perhaps about the heightened skepticism of the Court after the 2008 collapse of 
the OCC’s pattern of favoring industry by overriding stricter state regulations on 
predatory lending.  
 
Moral judgment and democratic institutions 
In both the recent history of financial regulation and the post-crisis debates 
since 2008, there is a common tendency to turn to technocratic institutions as a 
preferred way to address controversial questions about what kinds of financial 
firms and activities we as a society ought to permit.  But these are not purely 
technical issues to be resolved by neutral expertise.  They fundamentally implicate 
moral judgments about what kind of economy we desire, and what kind of 
activities we value as a society.  Furthermore, by transmuting these moral 
questions into technocratic ones to be judged by expert regulators, we do not 
resolve them.  Instead, substantive concerns reappear through proxy debates over 
the scope of regulatory authority and expertise, creating an additional layer of 
formalism and contributing to some of the regulatory pathologies that helped fuel 
the 2008 crisis itself.   
In the effort to avoid these moral controversies, policymakers and judges 
have routinely turned to centralized, national, expert-led organizations.  By 
                                            
93 Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, 557 US 519 (2009). 
 348
contrast, a more moralized engagement with the substantive issues of economic 
regulation calls for a different institutional structure.  Once engaged, such moral 
debate must be channeled through institutions where all affected interests can 
engage to voice their concerns, where there is a legitimate procedure through 
which these moral debates can be argued, judged, and revisited.  A moralized 
understanding of economic regulation goes hand-in-hand with a more democratic 
structure for deciding these moral questions.  This democratic structure reverses 
the features of technocratic governance described above.  Instead of centralized, 
expert-led bodies, this democratic approach points us towards the kinds of 
democratized and decentralized governance institutions explored in Chapters 8 and 




11 DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Four years after the 2008 financial crisis, surprisingly little had changed in 
the financial industry.  Wall Street profits had returned to pre-crisis levels while the 
sector as a whole remained concentrated in a few systemically-risky, too-big-to-fail 
firms.  What has changed is the overarching system of financial regulation.  After 
the reforms of the Dodd-Frank statute, all this financial activity now takes place 
under the watchful gaze of newly-empowered and expanded expert oversight 
through technocratic institutions like the Federal Reserve Board, the new Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, the SEC, and the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau.   
In appealing to the promise of technocratic regulation to mitigate market 
failures and promote economic welfare free of the corrupting influences of special 
interest or ordinary democratic politics, Dodd-Frank built on a well-worn tradition 
of progressive political thought, carrying forward the vision of Progressive and 
New Deal thinkers like James Landis.  But in so doing, this turn to technocratic 
expertise also renewed the anxieties of laissez-faire critics who, at both ends of the 
twentieth century, warned against the dangers that state economic regulation 
would be co-opted and captured by special interest groups, and would therefore 
pose a threat to liberty. This criticism has also been a major thread of twentieth 
and now twenty-first century American politics, and has helped fuel a pervasive 
anxiety about the technocratic ideal. 
 350
We might have responded to the financial crisis differently.  In contrast to 
this shaky ideal of expert management, there were a number of more radical, 
democratic possibilities that emerged in the face of the crisis itself.  From reformers 
like Simon Johnson to protestors of the Occupy movement, a wide array of voices 
saw the problem of systemic risk and too-big-to-fail not as a technical matter, but 
as a moral problem of excessive private power—which in turn called for a more 
openly democratic response in which the voice of affected citizens and groups 
played a larger role than the occasional opportunity to provide input to expert 
regulators.  These voices could have been fostered, bolstered, and engaged through 
a more democratic process of economic regulation, whether through greater leeway 
for city-level reform efforts, or through more structured modes of interest 
representation and participation in regulatory policymaking, implementation, and 
revision.   
This kind of democratic approach to financial regulation may or may not 
prevent future financial crisis.  It certainly would come with real costs as 
democratic decision-making is—and should be—tumultuous, conflictual, and 
iterative.  But the appeal to self-correcting markets or apolitical experts is not 
costless either.  Despite their veneer of frictionless optimization, both markets and 
experts are nevertheless inextricably implicated in networks and exercises of power 
and political influence.  Nor do they possess the superior claim to mastery over 
economic conditions with which they are often attributed.  The experts at the Fed 
and the forces of supply and demand are no more likely to devise the optimal 
crisis-preventing and welfare-enhancing economic orderings.   
The most dangerous cost of this turn to markets or experts is a civic and 
political one.  In delegating the governance of the economy to market systems or 
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insulated experts, we suffer a tremendous blow to our capacities as self-governing 
citizens.  By transferring economic governance to the market or to experts, we 
place the locus of economic decision-making at a far remove from ordinary citizens 
out of a hope that this delegation will produce more effective and less corruptible 
governance at the price of our own disempowerment.  It is a gamble we have been 
willing to make all too often, in financial reform and throughout the domain of 
modern economic policymaking. But it is a trade that we should think twice before 
making again.  For all the justified concern over how our democratic politics 
functions today, rather than further narrowing the scope for citizens to govern 
themselves, we should instead seek to revive and rebuild democratic institutions to 
make them better able to grapple with the kinds of challenges posed by the 
financial crisis and economic upheaval more generally.   
Indeed, the key cleavage throughout the previous chapters has been not 
between pro- and anti-regulatory views, but rather between two different visions of 
economic governance: the technocratic and the democratic.  Both of these 
traditions have their origins in a critique of laissez-faire, but they take sharply 
different responses to these concerns about the market economy.  Technocratic 
economic governance views the problem of the economy in technical, managerial 
terms, and thus turns to institutions that protect, encourage, and empower expert-
led policymaking.  The democratic approach, by contrast, sees economic 
governance as a fundamentally moral and political problem, a challenge not just of 
mitigating market failures and promoting economic welfare but of contesting 
exercises of private and market power, and of enhancing the agency of citizens to 
make their own lives.  This in turn points to a different set of enabling institutions: 
not expert-led, but rather institutions that foster, catalyze, and make more 
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productive the agency of citizens themselves.  This democratic approach shares 
with laissez-faire critics of the state an unease with technocratic authority, but 
rather than abandoning the regulatory project entirely, it seeks to reimagine 
economic governance as a fundamentally democratic task—a vehicle through 
which we as citizens collectively and continually work to address our shared 
economic and political challenges.   
This turn to democracy, however, need not take the form of a blind 
optimism in democratic practice.  We may be right to view with skepticism our 
current democratic institutions; the unease that technocratic and laissez-faire 
thought share over democratic politics does rest on an apt critique of democratic 
politics.  But as with the critique of regulation, here too the answer lies not in 
abandoning the idea of democracy but rather in developing new institutions that 
provide more meaningful and effective channels for citizen agency.  If we are 
serious about the moral challenges posed by the modern economy, and if we are 
committed to the value of individual and collective agency over our futures, then 
we must be willing to engage head-on controversial moral judgments about 
economic activities and economic structure as a democratic public, without wholly 
divesting ourselves of the capacities and responsibilities of making those 
judgments.  We must in turn foster the spaces in which we can house and catalyze 
this kind of democratic judgment, whether through more participatory regulatory 
bodies or more empowered local ones. And while these democratic institutions and 
debates will assuredly require reformulation and revision, we must commit 
ourselves to the task of improving our democratic practice over time—rather than 
abandoning the democratic ideal in pursuit of the illusory stability, neutrality, and 
efficiency of market- or expert-based alternatives.   
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In the chapters above, I have suggested three possible avenues for 
democratic renewal: the repoliticization of our economic discourse, the 
transformation of regulatory agencies into sites of democratic practice, and the 
expansion of city governmental powers as meaningful spaces for democratic 
agency. These arguments do not offer precise institutional blueprints or policy 
prescriptions.  Rather, they suggest some possible directions towards a revived 
democratic polity. What kind of institutional structures can empower and help 
mobilize citizens?  How should be restructure our regulatory institutions to be 
more democratic?  What are the prospects for meaningful local democracy?  How 
can we approach decision-making in ways that engage the full range of moral, 
political, and technical concerns? These are the kinds of questions that democratic 
theory and democratic reform efforts must try to address.   
From the growing innovation around Internet and social media based forms 
of participation, organizing, and crowdsourcing, to innovations in participatory 
governance such as the spread of participatory budgeting, to renewed efforts at 
preventing regulatory capture, there is no shortage of efforts at democratizing 
reform.  Too often, these efforts alight on new tools of democracy—such as online 
participation—without an adequate political or social theory of what democracy 
entails and what we should be aiming for.  At the same time, political theory by 
itself cannot outline a blueprint of democratic practice; the tensions, tradeoffs, and 
opportunities cannot be fully grasped in a vacuum.  What we need is a greater 
interactive ferment between practically-rooted democratic theory on the one hand, 
and the actual practice and challenge of democratic reform on the other. Only 
through real-time experimentation, feedback, and reiteration that engages 
practitioners, reformers, social science, and normative theory can we develop our 
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ideas of how democratic agency can be realized.  Political theory serves not as a 
blueprint or an articulation of an ideal, but rather as a way of engaging in 
diagnosis and critique, and as a way of making sense of, in real-time, the practices 
and institutions we innovate in practice.   
This role of theory as embedded in, rather than distanced from, the world 
of democratic practice raises another latent theme of this project.  In arguing for a 
more democratic view of economic governance in contrast with the technocratic 
reliance on experts, the above chapters also raise implications for our own claims 
to expertise as academics and political theorists.  Just as economic policy questions 
cannot be fully addressed by experts from on high, who must instead be embedded 
in a thicker practice of democratic debate and experimentation, so too must 
contemporary social science and political theory embed itself in this broader 
democratic dialogue.   
Many of the ideas discussed above have been inspired by the thought of 
Progressive Era radicals, notably John Dewey and Louis Brandeis.  Neither figure 
offered a systematic normative theory of democracy, nor did they offer determinate 
policy prescriptions.  By the standards of contemporary social science and political 
theory, neither thinkers’ work would pass much muster.  But both thinkers were 
deeply rooted in the politics and practice of Progressive Era reform politics, from 
the antitrust movement to urban social reform to education.  The same can be said 
about other scholars of the period, from lawyers like Robert Hale and Morris 
Cohen to Progressive economists like Richard Ely and E. R. A. Seligman.  It was 
from this rootedness that these scholars drew moral force, conviction, and insight.   
The position of academic social science during the Progressive Era was 
unique and historically contingent.  Professional social science came into being 
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during this period through a deep symbiosis with the aspirations of the reform 
movements.  Even the formation of the first academic professional organizations 
like the American Economic Association or the American Political Science 
Association were premised on the public purpose of research in shaping social 
reform.  This reformist ethic faded in large part due to political pressure that led 
many reformers to abandon more aggressive substantive reform proposals in favor 
of more conservative policies, advocated through the more neutral veneer of 
expert-driven social science. 1  These scholars stopped short of articulating a full 
moral vision of freedom, instead resorting to an appeal to empirical research and 
more rational public policy reasoning.2 
Today’s academia looks very different, having accepted this role of the 
dispassionate, neutral expert who stands apart from and above the rough and 
tumble of reform politics.  But while the pursuit of knowledge is important, it is 
also important to recognize that this ethic of expertise is partly a product of a 
concerted effort to sterilize the research community of their political roots. This 
retreat to expertise highlights another contribution of Progressive Era thought.  
Not only did the thinkers of this period point to a kind of rich democratic renewal 
that we might benefit from today; they also exemplified, for a brief moment, an 
ethical ideal where the theory and practice of democracy were tightly bound 
together.  If we are to overcome the challenges of the modern market economy, 
                                            
1  Mary Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social 
Science, 1865-1905 (Transaction Publishers, 2010); Kenneth Finegold, Experts and Politicians: 
Reform Challenges to Machine Politics in New York, Cleveland, and Chicago (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 26-29; Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive 
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 100-5. 
2 Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 208-12.  
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and develop institutions that provide meaningful democratic political agency, we 
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